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4 
ABSTRACT 
The rise of globalization over the past several decades has witnessed a surge of cross-border 
activities by emerging market firms. To a large extent, such acceleration in their overseas venturing has 
been precipitated by the liberalization of domestic and foreign trade regimes governing foreign direct 
investment. In order to compete with advanced country multinationals, emerging economy firms have 
increasingly leveraged a broad array of resources and organizational strategies to springboard abroad. 
Simultaneously, such firms are subject to dynamic shifts in their institutional terrains triggered by a 
plethora of heterogeneous reform treatments as their governments endeavor to modernize their 
economies.  
The initiation of these potent large-scale reforms associated with transition such as economic 
decentralization, market liberalization, industrial restructuring and corporate ownership reform 
undoubtedly exert cross-cutting and transformational impacts on the resource endowments, adaptive 
capabilities and strategic behaviors of emerging market firms. Given this critical phenomenon, this 
dissertation is motivated by the primary research question – how does institutional transition and its 
related change processes operate to reconfigure and alter firm resources and capabilities for 
internationalization? Since a significant proportion of emerging market firms are owned by 
governments, this thesis investigates how reforms have transformed state-owned firms’ strategic 
characteristics for internationalization.  
The dissertation comprises of three research papers utilizing extensive primary fieldwork and 
a manually compiled panel dataset of Chinese firms to examine emerging market state-owned firms’ 
overseas activities. The first paper is a conceptual piece which develops an overarching framework to 
delineate the reconfigured orchestration of multiple institutional reforms in the emerging economy 
context can spawn organizational diversity among state-owned firms leading to their differing outward 
FDI strategies. The second paper builds on this notion of organizational diversity and investigates how 
corporate ownership reform confers varying levels of institutional competitive advantages to 
marketized and non-marketized state owned firms to support their overseas venturing. It further 
examines how the relationship between firm ownership and outward FDI propensity is moderated by 
state-owned business group affiliation. The final paper studies how hybrid organizational forms arising 
from institutional transition such as university-run firms can evolve novel organizational features 
including ‘incubating platforms’ to launch overseas entrepreneurial spin-offs. 
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ABSTRAKT PÅ DANSK 
 
Den stigende globalisering har i de sidste mange årtier resulteret i en bølge af virksomheder fra nye 
vækstlande, som har aktiviteter der rækker ud over deres egne landegrænser. Denne udvikling skyldes 
i vid udstrækning liberaliseringen af indenlandske og udenlandske handelsaftaler der regulerer direkte 
udenlandske investeringer. For at kunne konkurrere med avancerede multinationale virksomheder, har 
virksomhederne fra de nye vækstlande udviklet en bred vifte af ressourcer og strategier til deres 
internationalisering. Samtidig er sådanne virksomheder underlagt dynamiske forandringer i deres 
lokale institutioner, hvilket er udløst af deres regeringers bestræbelser på at modernisere deres 
økonomier. 
De store reformtiltag som økonomisk decentralisering, markedsliberalisering og 
ejerskabsreformer har store konsekvenser for den strategiske udvikling af virksomhederne fra de nye 
vækstlande. På baggrund af dette vil denne afhandling besvare følgende problemformulering -  
Hvordan påvirker institutionelle forandringer ressourcer og kompetencer blandt virksomheder der 
internationaliserer? Da en betydelig del af virksomhederne fra de nye vækstlande er statsejede, 
undersøger denne afhandling, hvordan reformerne har forvandlet statsejede virksomheders strategiske 
karakteristika i forbindelse med deres internationalisering. 
Afhandlingen består af tre forskningsartikler som er udformet på baggrund af primær 
dataindsamling samt et panel af kinesiske firmaer anvendt til at undersøge statsejede virksomheders 
oversøiske aktiviteter. Den første artikel er en begrebsmæssig afklaring, som udvikler den overordnede 
ramme, der afgrænser hvordan institutionelle reformer i en udviklingsøkonomi kan resultere i 
forskellige organisationsformer blandt statsejede virksomheder- hvilket igen fører til forskellige 
strategier for udgående direkte investeringer. Den anden artikel bygger på begrebet organisatorisk 
diversitet og undersøger hvordan ejerskabsreformer giver forskellige niveauer af institutionelle 
konkurrencefordele til henholdsvis markedsrelaterede og ikke-markedsrelaterede statsejede 
virksomheder for at støtte deres oversøiske aktiviteter. Den undersøger desuden, hvordan forholdet 
mellem ejerskab og udgående direkte investeringer er underlagt de statsejede koncerners 
gruppetilhørsforhold. Den tredje og sidste artikel undersøger, hvordan hybride organisationsformer 
opstår under den institutionelle overgang fra eksempelvis universitetsejede virksomheder, hvilket kan 
udvikle nye organisatoriske funktioner, herunder ”inkubationsplatforme” til at lancere oversøiske 
iværksætter spin-offs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
 THESIS INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 THESIS RATIONALE AND OVERVIEW 
This thesis investigates the internationalization of emerging economy firms under the context of 
institutional transition. Over the past thirty years, fundamental reforms during institutional 
transition have imparted profound implications for the evolution of economic coordination within 
national business systems of emerging economy countries. The Varieties of Capitalism perspective 
(Aoki, 1994; Crouch & Streeck, 1997; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1992) has sought to establish 
a meaningful typology for understanding how different systems of economic coordination with 
distinctive institutional configurations can give rise to varying systems of production.  
The government’s role and its interactive bargaining with other institutions with respect to 
shaping and steering industrial and market forces for building complementarities to sustain 
operable production regimes have been analyzed across diverse country contexts. Governments 
typically have recourse to a wide set of policy instruments for organizing economic activities and 
achieving stakeholder alignment, both directly and indirectly within their political and financial 
systems, as well as across labor, education, and cultural systems for reaching specific economic 
outcomes (Whitley, 1999). Such outcomes differ systematically based on the nature, interface and 
mode of economic coordination across countries. To this extent, the national scale, including both 
the state and non-state institutional forces, has emerged as a key organizing concept for 
interpretations of various forms of capitalism. 
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While such national systems of economic organization are viewed as being relatively stable 
and self-reinforcing over time, subsequent studies (Hancke, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007; Lane & 
Wood, 2009, 2010; Streek & Thelen, 2005) have revisited this assumption by focusing attention to 
the transformative potential of institutional change and whether the state’s formal institutional 
architecture is sufficiently elastic to accommodate such changes while maintaining the resiliency 
of established modes of coordination. This latter literature embraces a ‘diversity in capitalism’ 
perspective which highlights the importance of institutional change as a driver of internal diversity 
within national business systems. Subject to a multiplicity of institutional change processes, 
emerging economy countries must actively engage in and cope with the dynamic recasting of their 
political economies. The plurality and complex sequencing of such reform processes can result in 
the hybridization or fragmentation of seemingly coherent institutional frameworks, renegotiating 
boundaries and complementarities between institutional subsystems, thus altering the organizing 
templates in which firms are embedded. The dismantling, reconstitution, and resynchronizing of 
institutions through various reforms in the process of institutional transition (e.g. corporate 
ownership reform, market liberalization, economic decentralization, and industrial reorganization) 
may not only modify firm incentives but re-channel and recombine their resources in novel ways 
to engender organizational diversity. 
In essence, organizational diversity may arise from institutional transition which sparks an 
evolution in the greater institutional ecosystem in which firms inhabit. The primary theoretical and 
empirical agendas of this thesis are two-fold: 1) to explore in a deeper granularity how institutional 
transition and its associated change processes are linked to organizational diversity and strategic 
adaptation in emerging economy firms; and 2) to apply different methodologies to evaluate the 
impacts of various facets of such diversity arising from transition processes for emerging economy 
firms’ internationalization activities. In so doing, this thesis endeavors to synthesize insights from 
relevant research streams within the fields of political economy, organizational sociology, and 
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international business to identify new patterns of behavior characterizing emerging economy firms 
which transform their resources and strategic capabilities for global venturing. According to Scott 
(2004: 5), ‘much of the history of the development of organization studies during the last quarter 
of the twentieth century to the present reflects a growing recognition of the many and diverse ways 
in which the environment constitutes, influences and penetrates organizations’. This statement 
suggests that factoring the structural changes in emerging economy firms’ institutional 
environments which interact with the formation of their organizational building blocks may 
provide valuable perspectives into such firms’ internationalization behavior. 
The remainder of this opening chapter is organized as follows: 1) to place this thesis in a 
larger context by positioning the phenomena of emerging market multinationals within their 
evolving home-country contexts and diverse host-country environments; 2) identify relevant 
research streams which provide a theoretical foundation for this thesis; and 3) discuss the 
methodology and content of the three research papers. 
 
1.2 RECENT RESEARCH ON EMERGING MARKET MULTINATIONAL FIRMS 
 
The past decade has witnessed a rapid expansion of FDI flows from emerging economies which have 
reached a critical threshold of industrialization buoyed by productivity-enhancing structural reforms. 
The coalescence of favorable macro-economic conditions including robust worldwide demand, rising 
commodity prices, and abundant liquidity unfolding in parallel with increasing global trade integration 
has also fostered a supportive environment for driving economic growth and the basis for ongoing 
reforms. Since the 2000s, emerging economy countries have experienced a surge in growth 
characterized by an average 4.75% increase in GDP from 2000-2012 (IMF, 2014). The BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India, & China) economies have constituted a dynamic core growth engine, accounting for 20% 
of world GDP and 55% of output by emerging economy firms. 
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Against this backdrop, emerging economy firms have intensified the scope, diversity and 
breadth of their international activities, from overseas trading to subcontracting and strategic alliances 
to increasing foreign direct investment in neighboring and distant countries. Reflecting this trend, 
overseas FDI flows from emerging economy countries have reached more than $350 billion from 1990 
to 2008 (Gammeltoft, Barnard & Madhok, 2010). This has attracted the attention of researchers to re-
examine the antecedents, traits, and strategies underlying the nascent phenomenon of emerging 
economy multinationals (EMNCs). Over the past five years, there has been a substantial shift in the 
geographical representation of companies in the Fortune 500 and Fortune 2000 lists with the rapid entry 
of multinational corporations (MNCs) from China, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Malaysia, Turkey, India 
and Indonesia. How such companies have achieved this fully-fledged status and leapfrogged over 
established MNCs from advanced countries such as AT&T, Whirlpool, and Dupont has become a 
subject of major interest to researchers and practitioners. 
An extensive body of literature on the evolving nature of foreign investment by EMNCs has 
emerged beginning with early works by scholars such as Wells (1983) which minted the term ‘third 
world multinationals’  to explore the phenomenon of newly internationalizing EMNCs. Over the next 
ten years during the 1990s, the global infrastructure for trade and investment began to ripen, 
culminating in the advent of the WTO in 1995 which radically liberalized trade relationships between 
advanced and emerging economy countries. Such a pivotal event which established a rules-based 
trading system for the cross-border movement of goods and services has unleashed profound 
repercussions for global investment patterns. 
During the 1980s to early 1990s, emerging economy governments around the world had already 
begun to reconfigure the institutions underpinning their systems of economic coordination and steer 
them towards experimentation with market-based instruments and pricing policies while discontinuing 
ineffective practices such as import-substitution. Despite political challenges, such formative initiatives 
to readjust their institutional systems for orchestrating the transition from agricultural to manufacturing 
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and service stages of economic development represented a tangible change from prior modes of 
economic coordination. Standards of living began to slowly improve, corresponding with rises in labor 
productivity, human capital, industrial upgrading, institutional development and capital 
accumulation.  Despite higher volatility in output due to sensitivity to global shocks, such progress 
helped to narrow the gap between advanced and emerging economy countries, setting the stage for 
certain segments of emerging economy firms to advance overseas and play catch-up with established 
MNCs when trade and macro-economic conditions became propitious. 
According to Subramanian & Kessler (2013: 3), ‘since the late 1990s, nearly three-quarters of 
the developing world (75 of 103 countries) started catching up, at an accelerated annual pace of about 
3.3% per capita. Although developing country growth slowed during the global financial crisis (2008-
2012), the rate of catch-up with advanced countries was not materially affected and remained close to 
3%. At around the same time, perhaps just preceding this convergence phase, world trade started to 
surge, ushering an era of  ‘hyperglobalization.’  
Figure 1.1 – World exports in current dollars, 1970-2011 
 
                               Source: Subramanian & Kessler, 2013  
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Such intense globalization associated with trade integration has been attributed to watershed 
events such as establishment of the WTO in 1995 which unlocked the floodgates to domestic 
markets of both developed and emerging economy countries. As a consequence of such breakneck 
expansion in cross-border trade, global FDI stocks have accelerated from less than 10% of world 
GDP to 30% while the number of multinationals has burgeoned to 80,000 as of 2010 (Subramanian 
& Kessler, 2013). In a recent study, Arregle, Beamish, & Hébert (2009) found that prior to 2001, 
such hyperglobalization has remained confined to semi-globalization using a longitudinal sample 
of 1000 Japanese MNEs.  
 
What are the implications of hyperglobalization for EMNCs? Scholars have noted that the 
rise of EMNCs is not without a myriad of challenges and puzzles. Despite the impact of the WTO 
to balance the playing field by enforcing the principles of reciprocity  and nondiscrimination, 
EMNCs are remain subject to the limitations of their latecomer status (e.g., lower technological 
R&D, managerial, & branding competence, lack of overseas networks and familiarity working with 
foreign teams, limited financial resources) and domestic institutional disadvantages (e.g., political 
instability, lower education levels, inefficient economic institutions, lack of accountability, 
underdeveloped infrastructure due to substandard public sector management) (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2012; Guillen & Canal, 2009; Luo & Wang, 2012; Ramamurti & Singh, 2009).  
Nonetheless, scholars have also argued that the same disadvantages hampering EMNCs’ 
efforts to venture abroad can also be converted into advantages under certain contexts such as 
navigating the hazards of similarly unstable host institutional environments (Cazurra-Cuervo, 2008; 
Li, 2007; Peng, 2012) or motivate them to springboard into new markets with agility for acquiring 
strategic resources to compensate for domestic market constraints (Luo & Tung, 2007). Dunning, 
Kim & Park (2009), Guillen & Garcia-Canal (2009) and Madhok & Keyhani (2012) also observe 
that the very same forces of market liberalization and deregulation that accompany trade integration 
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can amplify pressure by incoming rival MNCs on EMNCs in their home markets, propelling them 
to diversify into new foreign markets. Moreover, rise of domestic hypercompetition may serve yet 
as another compelling reason why EM firms increasingly locate abroad (Hermelo & Vassolo, 2010). 
The rapid velocity in the reduction of trade barriers and capital restrictions associated with 
hyperglobalization has also enabled new possibilities for EMNCs to engage in accelerated 
international growth, removing constraints and shaving off years in the sequence of their overseas 
venturing, potentially enabling certain EMNCs to strategically bypass some of the logical 
assumptions associated with the OLI model (Li, 2007, Matthews, 2006).  Trade and investment 
liberalization has eased the constraints for EMNCs to cultivate strategic partnerships and alliance 
networks which involve engineering novel transactions with an assorted array of overseas players 
to source untapped opportunities and degrees of freedom from which to adapt, bridge, recombine 
and forge their own organizational platforms and networks for overseas expansion.  Furthermore, 
the accumulation of inward FDI and returnee entrepreneurs in many emerging economies 
increasingly avails EMNCs to more abundant resources and knowledge spillovers conducive to 
overcoming learning constraints (Chang & Xu, 2008; Li, 2007; Liu, Lu, Filatotchev, Buck & 
Wright, 2010). This is consistent with a correlative view offered by Mathews (2006) which 
emphasizes the possibilities associated with building fresh competitive advantages through external 
linkage, leverage, and learning (LLL model) and highlights the exploratory and creative 
entrepreneurial elements which underscore EMNCs’ potential ability to upgrade their capabilities 
and deliver unique value propositions. According to Madhok & Keyhani (2012: 28), EMNCs can 
leverage asymmetries rooted in the historical and institutional differences (e.g., different 
institutional contexts, historical starting points, initial positions, and pathways) between their home 
and host country contexts to ‘discover opportunities available through [foreign] acquisitions and 
capitalize on these by better facilitating the assimilation of knowledge through such acquisitions.’ 
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Building upon the idea of opportunity in the entrepreneurship literature, Madhok & Keyhani 
(2012: 29) draw attention to the emergent ability of the EMNC to conceive of and grasp those 
untapped spaces between such asymmetries and experiment with them to build ‘advantage through 
a skillful combination of its own and others’ resources’. Similiarly, Guillen & Garcia-Canal (2009: 
31) point to EMNCs’ ‘ability to absorb technology, combine resources, and innovate from an 
organizational point of view in ways that reduce costs and enhance learning’.  Madhok & Keyhani 
(2012) identify cross-border acquisitions as a potential vehicle for the creative re-bundling of 
resources and strategic learning because they incorporate the notions of evolution and discovery 
whereby interactions between the acquiring EMNC and target companies permit for a more organic 
process to join together different resources for achieving combined synergies which may be fully 
anticipated in advance. This perspective highlights the open-ended nature of EMNCs’ global 
venturing as a potentially dynamic process of bricolage (mixing, matching, regrouping and 
interacting), discovery (uncovering, innovating and appraising various combinations) and creation 
(calibration, strategic planning, integration and operationalization of idiosyncratic business models 
and practices) that may eventually invigorate them to acquire both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ advantages to 
transform their capabilities. 
Acquisitions may not be the only vehicle for co-creating resources, skills, and new 
knowledge platforms since strategic alliance also enables such possibilities. A recent study by the 
consulting firm Accenture (2008: 32) provides support for EMNCs’ alliance formation 
capabilities:  ‘EMMs (emerging market multinationals) have shaped a new configuration of 
alliances and relationships in the hunt to secure resources. [Their] national oil companies (NOCs) 
are no longer reliant on international oil companies for technology and capital. Instead, they build 
new relationships with independent service companies and offer lucrative deals. As a result many 
independent service companies with specialized technology are more willing to deal with NOCs 
directly. Resource companies also form alliances and consortia to gain stable access to resources.’ 
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While strategic asymmetries do not constitute actual advantages, they do offer EMNCs intriguing 
possibilities to address their issues of resource deficit and strategic fit through entrepreneurial 
action.  
Moreover, scholars have also noted the strategic versatility of EMNCs to adopt an 
ambidextrous posture to respond to simultaneous changes in both their domestic and overseas 
environments. Luo & Rui (2009) propose that EMNCs display a dual-pronged approach in their 
international strategies characterized by building strategic ‘co-competence’ (both market-based 
transactional and relational competencies), developing ‘co-opetitive’ brokering ties (simultaneous 
competition and cooperation) with their external stakeholders, maintaining ‘co-orientations’ (align 
and integrate short-term and long-term goals in their strategic planning), and pursuing ‘co-
evolutionary approaches’ (initiating internal organizational adaptation while proactively 
influencing external environmental stakeholders and institutions) to upgrade their capabilities 
abroad. 
The above discussion recognizes the macro-level significance of globalization to hasten the 
pace of EMNCs’ investment development path (Dunning, Kim, & Park, 2008; Narula, 2010; 
Ramamurti, 2012) while also acknowledging that globalization has created an plethora of unique 
opportunities and unprecedented conditions for EMNCs to deploy micro-level organizational 
strategies, engage in entrepreneurial bricolage, and optimize their strategic flexibility to creatively 
carve out new niches and alliance structures for their global expansion (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 
2009; Luo & Rui, 2009; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012; Matthews, 2006). Over the past decade, a  large 
volume of studies has been advanced to study micro-level dimensions of EMNC 
internationalization strategies from a variety of standpoints including resource and capability-based 
views (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Lu, Zhou, Bruton, & Li, 2010), network perspectives 
(Elango & Pattnaik, 2007; Manolova, Manev, & Gyoshev, 2010; Yiu, Lau, Bruton, 2007), 
corporate governance and ownership structure (Bhaumik, Driffield & Pal, 2010; Lien & Filatotchev, 
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2015); entry mode strategy (Cui & Jiang, 2009; Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010), 
location choice and geographical diversification (Miller, Thomas, Eden, & Hitt, 2008; Ramasamy, 
Yeung & Laforet, 2012), home country institutions and cultural distance (Chittoor, Sakar, Ray & 
Aulakh, 2009; Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008; Quer, Claver, & Rienda, 2011; Stal & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2011), performance-internationalization relationship (Banalieva & Santoro, 2009; Contractor, 
Kumar & Kundu, 2007), inward-outward FDI linkages (Li, Li, & Shapiro, 2012), and home and 
host country contexts (Child & Marinova, 2014; Meyer, Ding, Li & Zhang, 2014) among others. 
A review of the rich literature on EMNCs suggests that a substantial diversity among 
EMNCs exist not only across different countries (Tolentino, 2010) but in their subnational contexts 
(Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2012; Li, Chen & Shapiro, 2013; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005; 
Shi, Sun, & Peng, 2012). Such firm-level differences at the subnational level has been attributed to 
a number of factors including economic geography, institutional quality and transparency, and 
economic disparity, some of which are malleable under conditions of fundamental institutional 
transition. So far, the international business field has primarily fostered two separate streams of 
research which are highly relevant to this thesis: the first stream focuses on the relationship between 
intra-country institutional diversity and EMNCs’ patterns of international expansion while the 
second stream examines the linkages between institutional change and EMNCs’ overseas 
expansion.  
Recent studies characterizing the first stream have assessed the implications of subnational 
variations in home country institutional quality on EMNCs’ ability to launch overseas (Sun, Peng, 
Lee & Tan, 2014; see Chan, Makino & Isobe, 2010 and Meyer, Mudambi & Narula, 2010 for 
research into some of the determinants of emerging economy subnational institutional 
differences).  The second body of literature is concerned with measuring the impact of particular 
change processes such as pro-market reforms (e.g., deregulation, trade and investment 
liberalization, capital market reform, intellectual property reforms, property rights reforms, tax 
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reforms, reduction in state intervention) on EMNCs’ internationalization behaviors (Chittoor, 
Sakar, Ray & Aulakh, 2009;  Dau, 2013; Kim, Kim & Hoskisson, 2010). 
While both of these literature streams provide deep insights into the importance of 
understanding the variegated ways in which home country institutions shape the overseas 
investment strategies of EMNCs, they have proceeded largely along distinct and parallel 
trajectories. Meanwhile less attention has been dedicated to unraveling the nature of ‘systemic’ 
linkages between institutional transition and intra-country corporate diversity and the impact of 
such interrelationship for firm resources, value-creation capabilities, and strategic choices to 
venture into foreign markets. The next section discusses in more detail how more finely calibrated 
and targeted research which incorporates contributions from comparative political economy (the 
comparative capitalisms view) and organizational sociology fields can be utilized to realign and 
bridge the space between these two separate streams. 
 
1.3 RECALIBRATING THEORETICAL LENS TO THE EMERGING ECONOMY  
                      CONTEXT AND EMPIRICAL SETTING OF CHINA 
 
The infusion of insights from other research fields can contribute additional depth, 
perspective and clarity to the notion of institutional transition by discerning finer-grained aspects 
and dynamics characterizing its related change processes and how they can catalyze diversity 
among emerging economy firms which influence their internationalization patterns. The 
comparative capitalisms (CC) literature which encompasses three related sub-strands (Crouch & 
Streeck, 1997; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1992) offers an important contribution to 
understanding institutional and organizational diversity from the perspective of ‘non-market forms 
of coordination’ (Jackson & Deeg, 2008).  This is particularly salient since emerging economy 
firms are situated in domestic institutional contexts which are gradually moving away from reliance 
on non-market forms of coordination towards decentralized and reflexive self-regulating market-
based coordination. The past thirty years have witnessed some of the critical inflection points 
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delineated above which contributed to alter the make-up and functional interactions between their 
internal domestic institutions. This leads to another key supporting concept in CC literature known 
as ‘institutional-as-configurations’ which depicts a more holistic understanding of how institutions 
may strategically interact, fit, and support each other in complementary configurations to facilitate 
market exchange and leverage.  
The interlocking and overlapping utility of this theoretical approach has been acknowledged 
in various research streams, especially in organization sociology (Demers, 2008; Meyer, Tsui, 
Hinings, 1993; Snow, Miles, & Miles, 2006). Moreover, this conceptualization highlights the 
interdependent nature of institutions as opposed to an isolated variables-based approach (Aoki, 
1994). According to configurational theorists, the emergence of such patterns can be attributed to 
a complex layering of particular events or interactions between organizations and their 
environments which do not necessarily unfold in a non-linear direction. Identifying such 
instrumental processes and the  revolving axes in which they unfold can enable researchers to piece 
together the ‘multidimensional constellation of conceptually distinct characteristics that commonly 
occur together’ giving rise to ‘organizational configurations’ or typologies (Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 
1993). Institutions cluster and orbit around each other in such identifiable patterns because they 
serve as complex feedback systems shaped by a confluence of factors including discrete power 
structures, industrial capabilities, socio-economic features, and relational capital. 
CC scholars argue that such complementary features of institutions can reflect comparative 
advantages for economizing policy-making efficiency and value, especially when institutional 
resources and general enforcement capacity for economic coordination in different domains 
(political, financial, labor, industrial, education, and cultural) are limited. Such configurations may 
yield equifinal outcomes where no singular optimal outcome is generated. In essence, the 
configurational approach to institutions also embodies a functionalist co-evolutionary perspective 
which is applicable to the study of institutional transition and its related reform processes. One 
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critical insight of the CC ‘institutions-as-configurations’ perspective that remains under-explored 
in conventional IB studies is how interactions among institutions can give rise to  institutional 
diversity both in degree and also in kind. The features manifested by one institution are contingent 
on the presence or absence of other institutions. Moreover, according to Jackson & Deeg (2008: 
545) IB theory has devoted limited mindshare to ‘how institutions socialize the diverse set of actors 
related to the firm (managers, employees, owners, partner firms), or shape the interests and 
interactions among those stakeholders, and hence the activities of firms to pursue different 
strategies.’ In essence, CC scholars accentuate the intrinsic ‘embeddedness of economic life in 
social structure’ (Powell, 1990) and the interconnectedness between  micro-level attributes of 
institutions and firms as well as their capacity for action which has been identified in the early 
literature on sociological institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1997). 
More recent offshoots of this theory (Haveman & Rao, 2006; Thorton, Jones, & Kury, 2005) have 
developed to incorporate the influence of institutional change on firm behavior.  
In response to Jackson & Deeg (2008)’s observation that IB research has a tendency to 
adopt a relatively ‘thin’ and ‘unidimensional’ view of institutions for theorizing about firm strategy, 
more efforts can be made to integrate the new perspectives drawn from the CC literature and 
organizational sociology streams for enriching studies on EMNCs. Prior research on institutional 
change in the emerging economy context provide us some ideas on how the reorganization of 
national business system frameworks via reform processes such as economic and political 
decentralization can foster subnational business system diversity (Krug & Hendrische, 
2008).  Moreover, in a recent study comparing a broad group of thirteen Asian business systems, 
Witt & Redding (2013) observe the existence of ‘multiplexity’ – that is the presence of multiple 
business systems within the same economy. According to Witt & Redding (2013: 294): ‘if 
institutions are flexible (weak) enough, however, to permit high levels of variance, one possible 
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end result is the emergence of multiple punctuated equilibria, and thus multiple business systems, 
in the economy’. 
In the specific context of China, the juxtaposition of an assortment of cross-cutting reforms 
reorganizing market-hierarchy relations has created new modes of coordination and space for 
organizational diversity and improvisation. From Boyer’s (2012: 34) point of view, although 
market relations might not be the exclusive mechanism of resource allocations, their logic is 
beginning to filter pervasively through the entire economic system such that ‘competition among 
independent units becomes the main engine of economic activity’. Moreover, this competitive 
dynamic is balanced by an intense networking between business and political spheres at the local 
and central levels to realign interests. At the end, ‘the efficiency criterion is neither the welfare of 
consumers according to the consumerist variant of capitalism, nor the value for shareholders. 
Rather, it is the mix of political and economic objectives’ (Boyer, 2012: 40). 
During the early stages of Chinese economic reform, the rise of local state corporatism from 
decentralization encouraged local governments’ market incentives and flexibility to enlarge their 
tax base by creatively fostering a more entrepreneurial business environment. Moreover, given that 
provincial officials constitute the largest bloc within the Central Committee which selects the 
Politburo and Standing Committee members at the apex of the central government leadership, the 
relationship between the center and local provinces is ‘more reciprocally accountable than any 
other types of relations in China’s political system’ (Zheng, 2010: 10). In other words, provinces 
hold significant influence in the intergovernmental bargaining process which fostered 
decentralization from the early era of reform in the late 1970s until 1994 when the central 
government began to recentralize the taxation and banking system to downsize the power of 
provincial fiefdoms. However, such selective recentralization and ongoing attempts by the central 
government to readjust China’s development model has yielded limited effectiveness neither to 
dissolve the entrenchment of local interests nor to revitalize central state capacity. 
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With respect to the reform of SOEs, the early impact of decentralization etched an indelible 
blueprint for their ownership restructuring since local governments were granted direct authority 
to exercise oversight over this process which included shareholding diversification and corporate 
governance reforms. Local SOEs were being transformed into commercial vehicles for rent-
seeking by local governments because they were allowed to keep their share of SOE revenues in 
exchange for covering local fiscal expenditures. Decentralization among other market reforms 
served to readjust the axis of economic coordination between central and local governments, while 
redefining their priorities, authority to allocate resources, and adaptation mechanisms which 
permeated to the restructuring of their SOEs. Simultaneously, horizontal types of reform such as 
market liberalization and industrial restructuring were also unleashed to support SOE productivity 
and competitiveness but they unfolded in different patterns at the central and local levels due to the 
cross-cutting vertical reconfiguration of economic coordination between them.  
By the mid-1990s, the central government realized that local governments were exercising 
too much autonomy and began to rebalance its role in the economy through selective 
recentralization. Although efforts were made to implement a fiscal style taxation system, which 
clarified separate taxation responsibilities of local and central authorities by restricting the ability 
of provincial government to collect all taxes before remitting a certain portion to the center, such 
efforts did not help mitigate the fiscal responsibilities of the local government but further 
exacerbated them and encouraged corruption (Zheng, 2010). They also placed stronger pressures 
for revenue extraction by local governments on their SOEs as the costs of social welfare, education, 
infrastructure development, and healthcare persisted to mount at the local level. Meanwhile central 
SOEs were subject to differing reform treatments during the same time period. Many of them 
constituted the core of government ministries and they were viewed as strategically vital policy 
instruments. The government refrained from liberalizing sectors occupied by central SOE which 
were allowed to retain monopoly positions while local SOEs were increasingly subject to greater 
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foreign and domestic competition by private firms. However, the central government still subjected 
many central SOEs to increasing but limited ownership reform in an effort to pare away their 
inefficient assets and restructure the most valuable ones into globally competitive firms. The 
pursuit for such restructuring began in earnest when China entered the WTO in 2001, as 
globalization became an inevitable force redrawing its national economic-political landscape while 
catapulting its economy into the world arena. 
The encompassing nature of institutional transition and reform dynamics could be felt in all 
sectors of the Chinese economy. By 2006, the manifold structural realignments in economic 
coordination set in motion during the 1990s and 1990s had coalesced into the metamorphosis of 
new economic actors to the extent that Delios, Wu, and Zhou (2006) recognized the need for 
redeveloping a new ownership classification system for Chinese listed firms’ shareholders. They 
examined the identities of these shareholders using a dataset spanning from 1991-2002 and 
observed that the official categorization system (which demarcated ownership status according to 
the class of securities owned by the shareholder) did not necessarily correspond to their actual 
identities. This led them to reconsider the content validity of such scheme and to propose a new 
system which concretely accounted for shareholders’ functional identities.  
In the process of delineating a new organizing schema, they identified 16 fine-grained 
shareholding categories which more accurately captured the strategic identities of shareholders. 
They further regrouped such shareholders into three broad categories which included government 
shareholding, private shareholding, and a new class of hybrid ownership known as marketized 
corporate shareholding. The emergence of marketized corporate shareholders reflects an expansion 
of organizational diversity which had been touched upon by other scholars as early as Nee (1992). 
In particular they proposed that ‘marketized corporate shareholdings are owned by the government, 
but they are not constrained by the same social objectives that government ownership bears. 
Marketized corporate shareholders are comparatively free of government intervention and are 
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comparatively independent in deciding a firm’s strategy.’ (Delios et al, 2006: 334). The value of 
this framework resides not only in clarifying the identities of shareholders, but also in how it 
uncovers and acknowledges the irrevocable organizational morphing of new types of shareholders. 
This created a stronger basis of comparison and a departure point for the positioning of this thesis.  
 The above overview of the multidimensional interweaving processes characterizing 
China’s institutional transition reveal an array of upstream and downstream complexities associated 
with architectural reconfiguration of China’s economic system, and makes the argument for 
dedicating more attention to unearthing and tracing the dynamic macro-micro linkages between 
various institutional change processes and evolution of firm organizational features. The following 
section introduces the remaining chapters of this thesis and explicates how different methodologies 
are applied to investigate the channels in which key dimensions of organizational diversity in 
Chinese state-owned firms contribute to their variegated internationalization patterns.  
 
1.4 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The peculiarities of China’s institutional transition and resynchronized institutions of economic 
coordination have yielded significant effects for the differentiation of firm organizational 
characteristics and behavioral repertoire. This thesis takes a step forward to examine how such 
distinct heterogeneous features may be expressed in their overseas venturing, contributing to the 
literature elaborating home country effects on EMNCs’ internationalization strategies. Few studies 
on EMNCs have systematically evaluated how institutionally-derived sources of heterogeneity 
arising from institutional transition can drive firms to evolve different strategic attributes, 
capabilities, and tactics for foreign market exploration. This raises a set of new research questions 
regarding the emergence of such heterogeneity and how it is mirrored in the resources, 
organizational structures and strategic behavior of firms. To address some of these questions, this 
thesis consists of three research papers utilizing different sources of data and methodological 
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approaches to investigate the connections between institutional transition, organizational diversity, 
and internationalization strategies of emerging market state-owned firms. 
A mixed-method design is adopted to accommodate how idiosyncratic dimensions of 
organizational diversity can imprint their impacts on emerging economy firms’ cross-border 
decision-making. Some of these distinct patterns are not only manifested in large-sample empirical 
data but also embedded in organizational designs and strategies encapsulated in the institutionally 
reconfigured and evolving internal structure of different ‘species’ of emerging economy state-
owned firms. Thus, different methodologies are utilized to draw attention to and focalize on such 
potentially contrasting dimensions which may not be equally distinguishable using a singular 
methodological approach. In addition to bridging such lacuna, this thesis takes into consideration 
recent developments in the literature on EMNCs and the call for more conceptual and dynamic 
process-related approaches to revitalize the ‘static nature of mainstream theories, which thus 
contribute little to explaining the evolution of MNEs over time, or the difference between mature 
and inexperienced MNEs, such as emerging economy MNEs’ (Meyer, 2014: 169). In particular, 
one dimension which remains under-investigated and may benefit from further data-gathering, 
analysis, verification and comparison is the operational view of EMNCs’ foreign investment 
strategies which can be extracted through a fine-scoping qualitative approach.  
In this way, the thesis is structured to incorporate individual theoretical, empirical and 
qualitative components which are self-contained within each of the three papers sequenced in the 
same order. The aspiration is to bring together these different approaches highlighting varying 
elements of state-owned EMNCs’ cross-border investment patterns which stem from their 
organizational diversity. The section below provides an illustration of the data and methods used 
to underpin the empirical and qualitative chapters. 
Two primary sets of data have been constructed for the purposes of this thesis. The first set 
of data consists of a longitudinal dataset spanning 2002-2009 for 973 Chinese firms listed on the 
25 
 
Shanghai and Shenzen stock exchanges which incorporates information on their evolving 
shareholding identities, various measures of financial and operational performance, industrial 
characteristics, corporate governance and top management team data, as well as overseas export 
and investment activities which include extensive details on foreign subsidiaries. The data was 
manually compiled, coded, matched, and integrated from several sources which include annual 
reports, the WIND database, and the Chinese customs authority. Variables with missing 
observations and invalid values were removed during the data cleaning process to generate a unique 
balanced dataset. Additional information such as state business group affiliation was sourced from 
a public registry compiled by China’s National Bureau of Statistics. The consolidation of such data 
from these multiple sources serves as the empirical backbone for the third chapter of this thesis 
which examines the effects of corporate ownership reform on the foreign market entry of Chinese 
firms.  
The second set of data was derived from archival information and extensive semi-structured 
interviews with the top management teams of two prominent university-run firms – Founder Group 
and Tong Fang Group which each rank among the top 100 multinational companies from China. 
The respective management which comprised of select parent company board members including 
subsidiary CEO or COO of both companies was interviewed on site in Beijing, Kuala Lumpur, and 
Singapore for approximately 30 hours during the period totaling two weeks from May-June 2014. 
Interviews were preceded and followed-up by additional email exchanges in which senior 
executives offered to share supplementary materials which enriched the discussions. The 
interviews enabled me to tap into senior managers’ global mindsets and compile insightful 
observations on past and ongoing events, goals, and challenges experienced by such firms during 
China’s institutional transition which I triangulated with archival data to form the exploratory basis 
of the fourth chapter of the thesis. This qualitative approach unveiled some finer design 
mechanisms that served instrumental and supporting functions to activate and shore up the 
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international venturing process of both firms which cannot simply be captured through large-
sample cross-sectional or panel data. 
Taken together, both quantitative and qualitative components of the data collection 
processes provide made-to-measure optimized lens from which to observe the internationalization 
activities of emerging market state-owned enterprises undergoing cross-cutting multitudinal 
processes of institutional transition. Although the empirical data is specific to the context of China, 
the theoretical anchor for the thesis rests upon a conceptual study focusing on the impact of 
reconfiguring institutional change processes and resultant organizational diversity on the foreign 
direct investment strategies of state-owned firms from the larger emerging economy context. As 
mentioned above, each of the three research papers also examine different angles of organizational 
diversity stemming from institutional transition and how this diversity contributes to shape their 
foreign investment approach. In this way, the three individual chapters are intertwined to provide 
a coherent and integrated framework for this thesis. 
 
1.5 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH CHAPTERS 
Chapter 2 – Varieties in State Capitalism: Outward FDI strategies of central and local state-
owned enterprises from emerging economy countries 
 
The motivation behind this second chapter is to elaborate an overarching theoretical framework 
advancing a configurational perspective to capture how different macro-institutional change 
processes in emerging economy countries reconfigure and engender diversity in the strategic 
resources, incentives, and dynamic capabilities of state-owned enterprises which shape their 
overseas FDI patterns. As discussed above, existing research on EMNCs have largely proceeded 
along separate but parallel paths which either focus on the impact of intra-country institutional 
variations on EMNCs’ cross-border activities (Sun, Peng, Lee & Tan, 2014) or the impact of 
isolated institutional change processes on EMNCs’ overseas investment behavior by applying 
bivariate analysis (Chittoor, Sakar, Ray & Aulakh, 2009; Dau, 2013; Kim, Kim & Hoskisson, 2010). 
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The above overview of current progress in this research domain argues that both streams can be 
harmonized by integrating insights from the comparative capitalisms and organizational sociology 
fields which offer insights into alignment of the relationship between reconfiguration of 
institutional constellations of economic coordination and corresponding evolution of internal firm 
attributes, mandates and organizing structures. To enhance this nexus, the second chapter seeks to 
broadly synthesize insights from such relevant perspectives into a coherent framework for 
understanding how recombinant modes of governance stemming from an array of institutional 
change processes can give rise to differently organized state owners with varying resources, 
strategic mandates, and legitimacy drivers which are refracted in the structuration of their overseas 
investment strategies.  
In particular, the chapter derives a matrix framework for analyzing how horizontal and 
vertical institutional change processes (e.g., administrative and fiscal decentralization, industrial 
restructuring, and market liberalization) which simultaneously reconfigure both the distribution of 
political authority and state coordination over economic activities create organizational diversity 
among SOEs affiliated at central and local levels of government. Central SOEs which exhibit 
higher resource accumulation and embrace more vital national strategic mandates are being 
reorganized into ‘national champions’ but this profile renders them susceptible to stronger domestic 
and overseas institutional pressures. Concurrently, local SOEs with lower resource accumulation 
and stronger commercial mandates are less likely to be subject to such dual institutional pressures.  
This contrasting diversity arising from the complex interplay of multiple institutional 
change processes and SOE restructuring reflects the realignment in the resource and capability 
structures of both types of SOEs. Drawing from sociological perspectives on institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Scott, 2004), this chapter illustrates how such 
institutionally-derived diversity in emerging economy SOEs’ management autonomy, institutional 
support, monopoly power, and market orientation can give rise to ‘varieties in state capitalism’. 
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This stratification in their identities and idiosyncratic growth trajectories imbue variation in their 
overseas FDI strategies along the dimensions of pace and scope of overseas expansion, business 
diversification, subsidiary ownership and establishment methods.  
Chapter 3 – Corporate Ownership Reform and Foreign Market Entry of Emerging Market 
Firms: An institutional competitive advantage perspective 
 
The third chapter builds on the premise of institutional and organizational diversity of emerging 
economy SOEs developed in the second chapter and extends it to evaluate the impact of corporate 
ownership reform on the foreign market entry of listed Chinese firms with marketized and non-
marketized central and local state ownership. In addition to the institutional reform processes 
identified above, this chapter identifies corporate ownership reform as being a vital process which 
transforms the resources and institutionally endorsed behaviors of state-owned firms, thus 
reshaping their institutional competitive advantages for overseas venturing (Martin, 2014).  
More specifically, corporate ownership reform has given rise to new categories of 
shareholders, including an array of marketized state shareholders restructured through ownership 
diversification which have not been investigated in prior studies on emerging economy firm 
internationalization strategies. As an increasing proportion of state shareholders transform into 
marketized players, they become more operationally autonomous, exhibit higher strategic 
responsiveness and productivity, and cultivate stronger market incentives (Delios et al, 2006; Nee, 
1992). It is argued that such evolved characteristics are gradually upgrading marketized 
shareholders’ understanding of complex global markets and proactiveness to devise foreign 
business opportunities which endow their invested firms with stronger institutional competitive 
advantages for cross-border investment. However, such view should jointly consider the diverging 
patterns of corporate ownership restructuring at the central and local levels of government which 
reflect vertical realignment. Factoring in the essential parameters which underpin the 
reconfiguration of economic coordination and task interdependency between central and local 
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governments, this chapter also identifies differences in the resource accumulation of marketized 
central and local state shareholders arising from fiscal reorganization which influence their invested 
firms’ varying levels of institutional competitive advantage for overseas venturing.  
While ownership structure is likely a critical determinant of institutional advantage, other 
important channels such as state business group affiliation also shape the allocation and delivery 
of institutional resources. The extant literature on business groups in emerging economy countries 
suggest they serve as ‘micro-institutional’ platforms for international venturing since they provide 
certain competitive advantages such as intra-group strategic coordination and resource pooling 
which include internal cross-lending, technology-sharing, and inter-firm human capital and 
knowledge flows (Lamin, 2013; Ma, Yao, & Xi, 2006; Yiu, 2011). These strategic characteristics 
indicate that business groups may operate as meso-level institutional network structures which 
provide additional organizational scaffolding to orchestrate foreign business activity. Compared to 
India, most business groups in China originate from government efforts to guide resource 
reallocation and coordinate policy implementation (Keister, 1998; Lin & Milhaupt, 2013).  
Recent studies (He, Mao, Rui, & Zha, 2013) have found evidence that business groups in 
the Chinese institutional context provide internal financial market facilities in which stronger 
members may help subsidize weaker members. In particular, they investigated the effect of 
ownership type on the role of internal capital markets played by Chinese business groups by 
comparing the investment-cash flow sensitivity of group affiliated firms with private, local 
government and central government ownership. They found that such integrated internal financial 
markets are more likely to help those affiliated SOEs with private and local government ownership 
compared to those with central government ownership. This suggests that local SOEs and private 
firms may be more reliant on group resources for supporting their operations. Taking into 
consideration such redistributive mechanisms, it is hypothesized that interactive effects between 
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state business group affiliation and shareholding identities are also likely to moderate invested 
firms’ institutional resources for overseas venturing.   
These arguments were tested using a unique panel dataset spanning 2002-2009 which 
features 973 listed firms with 801 overseas subsidiaries established by 225 listed firms in 79 
countries. The ownership coding process reflects an adapted version of the revised shareholding 
classification system developed by Delios et al (2006) which incorporates a new broad category of 
marketized corporate shareholding to supplement non-marketized and private shareholdings. The 
dataset captures the evolution of ownership structures for the top 10 shareholders of listed Chinese 
firms in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges. A non-linear negative binomial model was 
adopted to account for over-dispersion in the dependent variable. The findings of this study 
supported the majority of proposed hypotheses relating to the effects of corporate ownership reform 
and moderating impact of state business group affiliation on Chinese listed firms’ aptitude to 
commit investments overseas. 
Chapter 4 – Incubating Platforms for International Entrepreneurial Spin-offs: The overseas 
strategies of university-run enterprises from China 
 
The fourth chapter uncovers a new element of organizational diversity rooted in institutional 
transition which has given rise to the phenomena of hybrid firms in the Chinese business context. 
It explores the implications of hybrid organizational diversity for firms’ international expansion 
strategies. Over the past few years, a number of studies in the organizational theory research stream 
(Battailana & Dorado, 2010; Jay, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2012) have investigated the formative 
circumstances, stakeholder composition and alignment, organizational structure, dynamic 
reconciliation of their multiple competing institutional logics, and their consequences for the 
evolutionary growth of such distinctive firms. However, few have studied how these firms may 
arise from challenging conditions of institutional transition in emerging economy countries and 
how they employ bricolage strategies to leapfrog into overseas markets.  
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Furthermore, as discussed before, scant attention has been paid to examine the dynamic 
process-related approaches to pinpoint the evolving operational features of EMNCs’ overseas FDI 
strategies (Meyer, 2014). To address such visible gaps in the literature, this chapter undertakes a 
qualitative approach to delve under the surface of such type of firm and examine how it leverages 
its hybrid organizational characteristics to penetrate foreign markets. 
The transitional and unpredictable era of economic reform in China offers an appropriate 
laboratory for distinguishing such organizational forms and observing how they maneuvered across 
the kaleidoscopic institutional landscape to build momentum, embed architectural knowledge and 
create opportunities for overseas entrepreneurship. Following the initial liberalization period, the 
first wave of domestic entrepreneurial dynamism was overshadowed by a vacuum in firm 
innovation talent, human capital and absorptive capabilities. The engine for industrial innovation 
was barely present and the institutional supports for orchestrating the creation of such innovation 
system have yet to be constructed. The only institutions which exhibited potential for crafting a 
bridging solution were universities which could offer basic R&D facilities and human resources. 
The development of new technologies through innovation and the subsequent commercialization 
demanded significant upfront capital, organizational restructuring, and learning costs which 
universities could not sustain alone. Such costs associated with potential benefits prompted the 
Chinese government to offer an array of complementary incentive schemes including tax 
exemptions, infrastructure, land, credit, and policy support to bolster this endeavor. This form of 
‘resource bricolage’, which merged various complementary resources from fragmented sources, 
including both state and non-state sources as well as market and non-market sources, formed the 
basis of university-run firms. 
As organizational hybrids, university-run firms were essentially business enterprises 
integrated into universities and managed by entrepreneurial professors and their business partners. 
This novel organizing blueprint enabled them to develop the large-scale architectural deployment 
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of what this chapter identifies as umbrella ‘incubating platforms’, an improvisational variant 
beyond the notion of ‘platform organization’ (Ciborra, 1996), which nurtured the propagation of 
smaller fleets of entrepreneurial start-ups sponsored by the university-run firm. The phenomenon 
of the university-run enterprises became widespread across China. They offered a combination of 
incubating platform assets which comprise of proprietary technological knowledge, seed capital, 
brand name, management leadership and R&D facilities that could be shared by offspring firms 
organized into mutually-supporting industrial clusters.  
Furthermore, similar to the ‘sponsored spin-offs’ of Japanese firms (Ito,1995) such 
offspring firms were given access to significant autonomy, prolonged incubation and sustained 
support from their corporate parents even after spin-off and listing under foreign stock exchanges 
where they could raise more abundant capital and build exposure to foreign markets for global 
take-off. Through a detailed investigation which included a compendium of archival documents 
and detailed interviews with senior managers, this chapter delineates a multi-stage spatial 
evolutionary process model  charting the key actors, operational initiatives, events, modular 
resources, and managerial decisions which enabled the construction of such ‘incubating platforms’, 
the spin-off launching process, and sustained parenting of their offspring firms towards 
developmental maturity. The chapter contributes to extend existing views on the international 
process model by incorporating an entrepreneurial and operational perspective that emphasizes 
how EMNCs can actively innovate new organizational solutions adapted for bridging foreign 
markets.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
VARIETIES IN STATE CAPITALISM: OUTWARD FDI STRATEGIES OF CENTRAL 
AND LOCAL STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES FROM EMERGING ECONOMY 
COUNTRIES1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Institutional diversity characterizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from emerging economies 
holds critical but under-examined implications for their internationalization activities. Different 
types of SOEs can exhibit distinct motivations, strategic resources, and adaptive capabilities for 
penetrating foreign markets. To understand how such idiosyncratic differences emerge, we 
conceptualize the heterogeneity of SOEs as an outcome of multiple institutional reform processes 
- administrative and fiscal decentralization, industrial restructuring, and market liberalization - 
which create diversity between SOEs affiliated with central and local levels of government. 
Building on the idea of 'institutions-as-configurations', we elucidate how such reforms reconfigure 
SOEs' constellation of resources, capabilities, and priorities which shape the parameters of their 
ability to negotiate for home and host country institutional legitimacy. Specifically, we propose 
that the restructuring of central SOEs into ‘national champions’ exposes them to stronger 
institutional pressures from home and host country governments while local SOEs which have 
fewer obligations to serve national strategic prerogatives display greater managerial autonomy and 
market orientation, but lower levels of monopolistic behavior. We discuss how such contrasting 
attributes contribute to variations in SOEs' international business diversification patterns, foreign 
subsidiary establishment and ownership modes, and overseas location preferences. Recognition of 
SOEs' organizational diversity holds important implications for theories on state-owned 
multinationals. 
Keywords: state-owned multinationals, institutional reform, firm heterogeneity, emerging 
economies, internationalization 
 
 
 
 ______________________________________  
1 This article was coauthored with Lin Cui and Jiangyong Lu. It is forthcoming in Journal of International Business 
Studies (doi:10.1057/jibs.2014.14).  
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In a competitive global economy, emerging economy countries are increasingly promoting the 
international expansion of their state-owned enterprises (SOEs). At the same time, successive 
waves of institutional reforms have spawned widespread corporate transformation in these 
countries, substantively reshaping fundamental mechanisms in which such SOEs are governed and 
organized. The creative destruction and reform of institutional systems unfolding through 
administrative and fiscal decentralization, market liberalization, and industrial restructuring has 
unleashed sweeping changes among firms including SOEs (Aulakh & Kotabe, 2008; Dacin, 
Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). While considerable research has examined how institutional reforms 
shape firm behavior and corporate governance through ownership restructuring in emerging 
economies (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Domadenik, Prasnikar, & Svejnar, 2008; Murrell, 2003; 
Newman, 2000; Peng & Heath, 1996), relatively less attention has focused on how the underlying 
patterns of control over SOEs exercised by different levels of state government are simultaneously 
being reconfigured through reforms which in turn redefine and SOEs’ strategic motivations and 
institutional resources for internationalization.  
Reflecting a shift in the underlying political economy of a country, reforms involve the 
recombining of old and new institutional elements into hybrid constellations which contribute to 
greater internal diversity in an economy (Aoki, Jackson, & Miyajima, 2007; Jackson & Deeg, 2008; 
Lane & Wood, 2009; Ostrom, 2005; Wei, 2007). Such fragmentation may result in the existence 
of micro-institutional environments characterized by diverse modes of economic coordination 
(Crouch, 2005; Lane & Wood, 2012). As a result, institutional change is not simply a homogenous 
time-related process (Kim, Kim, & Hoskisson, 2010; Tan, 2007), but a complex organic 
phenomenon that may involve multiple, discontinuous and possibly divergent experimental 
processes arising from interactions between firms and their surrounding institutional environment. 
Such diversity within countries has been recognized as an outcome of institutional transition 
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especially when more coordinated economic systems liberalize (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Lane 2005) 
and is increasingly referred to as ‘diversity in capitalism’  which extends traditional assumptions 
of comparative capitalism to account for a more dynamic understanding of institutions (Crouch 
2005; Lane & Wood, 2009; Streek & Thelen, 2005). 
In the context of emerging economies undergoing rapid and profound institutional change, 
diversity in capitalism has significant implications for the evolution of state capitalism since SOEs 
which undergo heterogeneous reform treatments may evolve along different developmental 
pathways. Organizational diversity among SOEs can emerge through various means.1  An 
assortment of distinct reforms can be implemented at each level of government, exerting 
differential impacts on SOEs’ internal restructuring, strategic flexibility and access to resources. 
Efforts to restructure management control over some SOEs by shifting their oversight between 
various agencies and bureaus can also influence their objectives and incentives. In essence, not all 
SOEs follow similar patterns of organizational change which provides the basis for our primary 
research questions. How do key institutional change processes in emerging economies facilitate 
institutional diversity within national business systems and how is this diversity instantiated among 
SOEs affiliated at different government levels? What implications does the emergence of varieties 
in state capitalism hold for SOEs’ FDI strategies? 
Turning our attention to emerging economies which are gradually shifting from their reliance 
on centrally directed forms of economic coordination towards more decentralized, market-based 
approaches we examine how various types of reform can catalyze diversity among SOEs. We 
elaborate a trickle-down theoretical framework that connects the impacts of macro-level 
institutional reforms to the dynamic transition and differentiation of SOEs at the organizational 
field level, which exert substantial implications on their firm-level FDI strategic choices. We do so 
by applying and linking macro and micro level institutional arguments developed in the 
comparative capitalisms and sociological institutional theory literatures.  
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 To develop theory that links macro-level institutional reform to field-level SOE diversity, 
we draw from comparative capitalisms (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 2008) and 
diversity in capitalism (Crouch 2005; Lane & Wood, 2009) theories to explain how as the 
institutional architecture of these countries is resynchronized to support a competitive market 
environment, large scale reforms (i.e., administrative decentralization, fiscal decentralization, 
industrial reorganization, market liberalization) operate to redefine the strategic coordination 
between various levels of government, reassigning different resources, priorities and institutional 
logics among them. Since SOEs affiliated at different government levels constitute an intrinsic part 
of the state capitalist system, they are necessarily subject to diverse restructuring regimes refracted 
through these macro-institutional changes which endow them with similar features, resources, and 
institutional logics characterizing their associated government owners. Our approach is motivated 
by research in sociological institutionalism (Haveman & Rao, 2006; Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 
2005) which explores the nature and manner in which institutional logics and internal 
organizational dynamics shift within firms as a response to institutional change. Specifically we 
examine how reforms can induce greater heterogeneity within the institutional fields of SOEs 
associated with central and local levels of government and exert differential isomorphic 
pressures on their behavior.2 
In order to illustrate how field-level SOE diversity leads to differing firm-level FDI strategies, 
we draw from sociological perspectives on institutional theory (DiMaggio, 1997; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991; Scott, 2004) to elucidate how institutionally derived organizational differences with 
respect to resources, logics, and behavior between SOEs affiliated with central and local 
governments (referred to as central and local SOEs hereinafter) can motivate them to pursue 
varying FDI approaches. We propose that reforms such as fiscal decentralization and market 
liberalization encourage local SOEs to acquire greater managerial autonomy and market orientation 
which imbue them with a stronger commercial logic to pursue development goals set by local 
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governments. On the other hand, central SOEs have experienced increasing consolidation to 
convert them into national policy instruments for sustaining macro-level growth and national 
industrial policies. Such differentiation in the institutional logics of local and central SOEs brings 
about disparity in home country expectations for their FDI activities and triggers different reactions 
and legitimacy challenges raised by host governments. For instance, local and central SOEs may 
be propelled to adopt different strategic prerogatives in their FDI strategy, with local SOEs going 
abroad primarily for rent-seeking purposes to satisfy local fiscal needs while central SOEs invest 
overseas to fulfill national policy objectives. Their diverging motives for going abroad will elicit 
different responses from host governments which may perceive them as credible business partners 
or as potential rivals that may pose a threat to host national interests. Through linking our 
theoretical efforts to identify the institutional sources of SOE diversity and how such diversity is 
reflected in central and local SOEs’ FDI legitimization challenges in home and host countries, we 
develop an overarching theoretical framework highlighting the trickle-down effects of macro-
institutional reforms on SOEs’ FDI strategies, substantiated by a number of propositions for future 
empirical validation.  
Our approach raises important implications for research on SOEs’ internationalization. By 
dissecting the impact of institutional change at different levels of government ownership, we adopt 
a more nuanced approach to analyze how variation in key reform processes unfolding at these 
levels can fundamentally alter the constellation of institutional logics and pattern of resource 
allocation that determine SOEs’ organizational behavior. Our study delves beneath the surface of 
SOEs to show how reforms are reshaping their internal structure in alignment with modifications 
in the overall system of economic coordination in emerging economies. Through extending the 
theoretical lens of diversity in capitalism to varieties in state capitalism, we contextualize the 
differential impacts of institutional change on SOEs’ internationalization strategies. We delineate 
how SOEs’ roles may have evolved along different trajectories of reform and as government 
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vehicles of international business activity they may not share the same objectives or capabilities 
for going abroad. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. We first synthesize key insights from the comparative 
capitalism literatures, especially the works on diversity in capitalism, to develop a conceptual 
framework capturing the effects of different institutional change processes on the evolution of 
central and local SOEs. Second, we derive four distinct constructs mapping characteristic 
differences between central and local SOEs as a result of such institutional changes which we 
systematically link to their varying abilities to satisfy home country and host country legitimacy 
requirements when investing overseas. Third, by elaborating on how these different capabilities 
may be reflected in different FDI strategies, we derive testable propositions for our model and 
conclude with a discussion summarizing our contributions, future research directions, and practical 
implications for policy makers and managers of aspiring state owned multinationals. 
 
2.2 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND VARIETIES IN STATE CAPITALISM 
To reinvigorate and deepen the existing scope of theorizing on globalization of state owned 
multinationals, we advance an ‘institutions-as-configurations’ approach (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996; Jackson & Deeg, 2008) to capture how a combination of interrelated reforms unfolding in 
emerging economies can collectively reshape and retool the capabilities and strategic objectives of 
their SOEs for overseas venturing. Adopting a configurational perspective to study how 
institutional change generates diversity among SOEs contributes to our understanding of their 
behavior in three unique ways. First, it provides theoretical insight for broadening our appreciation 
of the variety of macro-level reform processes which exert assorted influences on SOEs that guide 
their evolution into diverse actors. Secondly, by showing the patterned ways in which reforms can 
lead to variation in SOEs’ attributes and behavior, we aspire to develop a more nuanced and 
dynamic approach to theorizing about the relationship between SOEs and their principals, namely 
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their affiliated government owners which may exhibit different priorities when venturing overseas. 
Lastly, through exposing pivotal differences in the salient traits, internal governance and strategic 
prerogatives of SOEs, we identify certain prominent characteristics among them which have far-
reaching consequences for their cross-border investment activities. Overall, the configurational 
approach allows us to explore the dynamic interplay between multiple institutional change 
processes and SOEs’ strategic organizational evolution, thereby contributing to research on 
complex interactions between institutions and SOEs, as opposed to the variable-based approach 
that mainly aims to isolate singular effects of particular reforms on SOEs’ behavior (i.e., regulatory 
shocks) which has been the prevailing approach in existing studies (Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, Wang, 
& Egri, 2006; Uhlenbruck, Meyer, & Hitt, 2003). Departing from this approach, we dedicate 
attention to the multifarious ways in which state-owned players’ resources, priorities, and 
capabilities are re-bundled and customized through heterogeneous reforms which imbue them with 
varying mandates and strategic abilities for going abroad.       
Incorporating a configurational approach to institutionalism explains not only the existence 
of institutional varieties, but also the disequilibrium and dynamic processes that create such 
varieties. While the manifestation and economic rationale of typologies of national business 
systems (i.e., institutional varieties) is the focus of the comparative capitalism literature (Aoki, 
1994; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancke, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007; Jackson & Deeg, 2008), it is the 
recognition of the fluidity of institutional arrangements due to asymmetrical and idiosyncratic 
patterns of institutional change that has stimulated the emergence of ‘diversity in capitalism’ 
(Crouch, 2005; Lane & Wood, 2012; Streek & Thelen, 2005). This latter literature highlights the 
multitude of different change processes which lead to the hybridization or fragmentation of existing 
institutional arrangements within seemingly coherent national contexts to create internal diversity 
which offers an appropriate theoretical starting point for us to understand the emergence of varieties 
in state capitalism. 
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Focusing on the consequences of institutional change processes within a configurational 
framework, we examine the phenomenon of varieties in state capitalism across levels of 
governments. Specifically, we examine how the recalibration of local and central institutional 
structures through reforms in emerging economies can lead to mixed modes of coordination where 
direct intervention from the central government is gradually phased out as local governments take 
a more proactive approach to market coordination. The outcome is a hybridized market system 
integrating both aspects of market competition with inherited elements of central planning. As the 
underlying logics of economic coordination are renegotiated, new institutional complementarities 
may emerge between different levels of government. The central government may withdraw from 
certain industries but continue to coordinate key strategic sectors to promote coherent national 
growth while enabling local governments to guide their regional economies towards a market 
oriented development scheme. Such a hybridized system is characterized by the embodiment and 
integration of multiple institutional logics reflecting the mixing of old and new modes of 
coordination which engender coevolution and increasing plurality in the institutional environment.  
Motivated by the idea that institutional change can trigger the evolution of the identity and 
strategic interests of firms (Campbell, 2004; Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Jackson & Deeg, 
2008) we argue that varying internal changes unfolding within institutional subsystems can reshape 
the organizational characteristics, institutional logics and strategic priorities of SOEs along 
different trajectories giving rise to visibly distinct varieties in state capitalism which bear direct 
consequences for SOEs’ strategic behavior abroad. As emerging economy governments remodel 
their institutional architecture to gradually loosen the central government’s monopoly over the 
coordination of the economy, decisions must be made regarding the extent of economic 
coordination the central government prefers to retain, the kinds of economic activities and sectors 
from which it intends to relinquish control, and which actors – local governments or private sector 
– should coordinate those sectors which are no longer under its direct oversight. Realigning 
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priorities and roles among government actors through reforms alters the ‘functional interactions’ 
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008: 553) between them and is instrumental to modifying existing 
institutionalized arrangements to support new modes of economic coordination across different 
domains. SOEs reorganized under such new modes of coordination will increasingly respond to 
new incentive mechanisms and policy goals and thus evolve new strategic agendas for overseas 
venturing. 
Introducing market based competition involves broadening the scope of participation in 
economic activities by local governments as well as their SOEs. In many emerging economies 
undergoing gradual reforms with the exception of certain countries such as Russia, Yugoslavia, 
Mexico and Brazil which pursued sudden and profound privatization, the government attempts to 
reduce the inefficiencies of central planning by reforming the state sector and transferring authority 
to lower levels of government to run their SOEs more autonomously. Inefficient SOEs which are 
less capable of withstanding increased competition due to liberalization are privatized to minimize 
losses. At the same time, the central state may keep its control over certain SOEs which operate in 
strategically sensitive sectors such as natural gas, infrastructure, and mining to sustain the overall 
economy. Logically it follows that not all SOEs would receive the same reform treatments, with 
some SOEs being subject to specific reforms intended to transform them into increasingly 
autonomous commercial players while other SOEs are restructured to retain monopolistic 
dominance over strategic sectors for serving other key policy objectives. 
As noted earlier, our theoretical framework is subject to certain boundary conditions 
applicable to emerging economies that have not experienced rapid and extensive privatization 
which led to wholesale withdrawal of government participation in the economy to an extent that 
would represent a limitation to this study. The scope of our paper focuses on countries that continue 
to be characterized by an active state sector which are increasingly adopting federal systems of 
governance where political and economic decentralization are becoming more prevalent. This 
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boundary condition encompasses both transition economies with command economy heritage and 
pluralistic states which increasingly adhere to a market based economic governance system. Table 
2.1 summarizes the key salient features of emerging economies that apply to our theoretical 
development including a list of terms and designations for central and local SOEs in various 
countries since they are classified under different nomenclatures based on historical precedents.  
 
[Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the two dimensions of institutional change which have important 
implications on the progressive development of SOEs in emerging economies. In Figure 1, the 
vertical dimension captures the change of the locus of economic policy power in a country, 
typically through the process of political decentralization where power shifts from central to local 
level governments. The horizontal dimension captures the change in the degree of state 
coordination of national economy, which is achieved by economic decentralization reflected in 
market liberalization and industrial restructuring efforts of the government towards a more market-
coordinated economy. Overall, the framework depicts how as the state shifts from a centrally 
directed system of economic coordination towards a more liberal market based coordination 
approach, SOEs under local and central governments begin to diverge with respect to their strategic 
priorities and organizational characteristics.   
 
[Insert Figure 2.1 about here] 
 
Vertical Institutional Change Processes 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the vertical dimension reflects the change in the distribution of political 
authority (i.e., who coordinates) in a country and primarily involves two interrelated processes of 
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political decentralization – administrative decentralization and fiscal decentralization – whereby 
the central government devolves greater responsibility to local governments to make their own 
policy decisions and raise their own revenues. The transfer of management and decision-making 
authority to local governments through administrative decentralization enables them to exercise 
greater discretion in the design and execution of local development policies. Studies have shown 
that the successful ability of local governments in Vietnam to initiate experimental projects such 
as special export processing and industrial development zones to attract businesses and inward FDI 
have increased their independence from central authorities, creating additional justification for 
reforms which further enhance local autonomy (Malesky, 2003). Administrative decentralization 
therefore enables local governments to run their SOEs more freely. In other countries such as China, 
despite the prevalence of a top-down authoritarian governmental structure where power emanated 
from the center, local governments exercised a highly entrepreneurial approach to solving 
economic development issues which gained recognition from the central government during the 
1980s (Caulfield, 2006). Their successful initiatives eventually led the central government to 
devolve a wider range of economic responsibilities covering a broad spectrum of activities 
including investment, land use, banking, and management of SOEs to local governments which 
further strengthened their independent growth incentives (Chien, 2007).  
The financial incentive for local governments to promote growth and encourage their local 
SOEs to perform is further reinforced by fiscal decentralization which enables local governments 
to keep a share of SOE revenues and profits. In addition to China, India’s administrative and fiscal 
system, characterized by one of the highest decentralization ratios in the world has become even 
more decentralized in recent years (Purfield, 2004). In 1999, Indonesia also began embarking on 
an ambitious decentralization scheme to strengthen both local fiscal and administrative autonomy 
(Ahmad & Mansoor, 2005). The importance of this reform initiative is underscored by the 
government’s plans to emphasize its enhanced implementation in Indonesia’s national mid-term 
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development plan for 2010-2014 (Ministry of National Development Planning, 2010). Over the 
past two decades, provincial governments in many emerging economies have gained significant 
autonomy to run their local SOEs, which are more numerous compared to central SOEs. In India 
for example, the number of central SOEs is limited to about 200 enterprises while local SOEs 
comprise 800 to 1,000 firms (Mishra, 2009). Indonesia has also seen the establishment of several 
hundred local SOEs while central SOEs are restricted to 140 firms in total (OECD, 2000).   
As the trend of political decentralization continues, local SOEs will increasingly play a 
substantial role in generating revenues which also contributes to local governments’ ability to 
consolidate their decision-making autonomy. Furthermore, local governments have been tasked to 
privatize smaller underperforming local SOEs or convert them into corporatized entities with 
majority state ownership (Ishizuka, 2009; Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2008). As a result, local SOEs, 
whether majority or wholly owned by the government exhibit relatively greater strategic versatility 
and responsiveness compared to central SOEs which remain tightly regulated and responsible for 
serving national strategic interests. Central SOEs’ obligation to fulfill public service obligations 
may restrain their flexibility and their investments are subject to extra supervisory oversight, 
reducing their ability to respond freely to shifting market conditions. Therefore we propose: 
 
Proposition 1: The greater the degree of administrative decentralization in a country, the higher 
the level of managerial autonomy of local SOEs relative to central SOEs.  
 
In addition to granting local governments greater autonomy to set production targets and 
deploy contract-based incentive schemes for SOEs so that they can act more entrepreneurially, 
central governments have also made them more responsible for their own fiscal performance. 
During the 1990’s fiscal decentralization was among the most widespread reforms among 
developing economies (Smoke, 2001). While fiscal decentralization can vary substantially in its 
implementation across countries, one important objective has been to empower local governments 
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to collect revenues and make expenditures to promote local economic development and policy 
objectives (Lin & Liu, 2000; Smoke, 2001). In exchange for the right to keep locally raised 
revenues including a share of SOE profits for their own purposes, local governments are obligated 
to cover a large portion of their expenditures for public services, infrastructure development, and 
investment in local SOEs. Consequently, fiscal decentralization serves a dual purpose to both 
motivate local governments to improve performance of their SOEs to maximize revenues while 
also introducing hard budget constraints which limit local SOEs’ access to central government 
financial backing (Park, Li, & Tse, 2006). From this perspective, local governments are more 
restricted in the resources they can provide to local SOEs since extra expenditures beyond their 
budgetary capability require further approvals by the central government. Therefore we propose: 
 
Proposition 2: The greater the degree of fiscal decentralization in a country, the lower the extent 
of institutional support received by local SOEs compared to central SOEs. 
 
Horizontal Institutional Change Processes 
The horizontal dimension of the framework in Figure 2.1 captures change in the degree of state 
coordination over economic activities (i.e., how coordinated) in a country as various sectors are 
gradually deregulated and liberalized to promote competition among firms including SOEs, private 
companies, and foreign multinationals. By opening domestic markets to foreign and private 
investors and abandoning import substitution policies, states must balance between their economic, 
political and social priorities to decide which industries to liberalize and the extent it wishes to 
divest control (Doh, 2000; Doh, Teegen, & Mudambi, 2004). While emerging economy 
governments have actively welcomed inward FDI to bolster domestic economic growth, they 
remain keen to maintain their bargaining power by reserving control over selective ‘strategic 
industries’ which remain restricted to competition (Doh et al., 2004; Park et al., 2006). Therefore, 
the loosening of state dominance over its economy by decentralizing its economic coordination 
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functions comprises of two parallel sub-processes – industrial restructuring and market 
liberalization – whereby the central government reasserts strategic control over key industrial 
sectors by consolidating central SOEs in those industries into large ‘champion’ firms while 
devolving economic control over non-strategic industries such as manufacturing and services to 
local SOEs, foreign entrants and private firms which are allowed to play more active roles. The 
resulting outcome is a gradual shift from strategic coordination towards liberal market coordination 
in most sectors of the economy. 
Despite efforts to dismantle entry barriers to a wide array of industries, central SOEs in many 
emerging economies remain shielded from competition. Aiming to preserve control over strategic 
sectors to advance its national interest, the central state often carves out monopolies reserved for 
central SOEs or restricts private participation in these sectors to a minimal level. In both Vietnam 
and China for example, central SOEs have been structured into large enterprise conglomerates 
bounded together by interlocking directorates, cross subsidization, intra-group trade and cross 
shareholding (Child & Tse, 2001; Kim, Nam, & Cuong, 2010). This business group structure 
enables the creation of internal markets facilitating intra-group transactions such as risk-pooling, 
technology sharing, internal trading of intermediate goods, and rotation of management personnel 
(Ma, Yao, & Xi, 2006; Yiu, 2011) which further reinforces monopolistic tendencies. Similarly, 
Indonesia established a Ministry of State Owned Enterprises in 1998 with the goal to merge the 
assets of existing central SOEs and upsize them into concentrated sectoral holding companies with 
multiple layers of sub-holding companies and smaller affiliated firms (Abubakar, 2010; 
Fitriningrum, 2008). In addition to this growing conglomeration pattern, central SOEs also enjoy 
the implicit guarantee and support of the central government through various preferential policies 
including cheap access to credit. For example, central SOEs in Vietnam account for over 46 per 
cent of all liabilities held by enterprises surveyed in a 2009 census organized by the General 
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Statistics Office (Malesky, 2009). Such disproportionate privileges are not readily accessible by 
other firms including local SOEs and private companies.  
From an industrial standpoint, the concentration of national resources into large corporate 
groups provides the ‘big push’ needed to resurrect moribund industries and to coordinate growth 
across diverse industries (Morck & Nakamura, 2007) which transforms them into ‘state instruments 
for national welfare based on corporate practices’ (Abubakar, 2010:10). In other words, central 
SOEs are being reorganized by central governments to serve as policy instruments supporting 
macro-level growth and overall productivity of domestic firms through the steady provision of 
natural resources, raw materials, technologies and energy whereas local SOEs typically do not hold 
such policy responsibilities and are therefore less likely to claim monopolistic positions. This is 
consistent with studies (Mowery & Nelson, 1999; Murtha & Lenaway, 1994) which argue that 
governments have a strategic prerogative to deploy national industrial strategies and establish a 
basis from which domestic firms can build their competitive advantages. Therefore we propose: 
 
Proposition 3: The greater the degree of industrial restructuring and consolidation in a country, 
the lower the level of monopoly power of local SOEs relative to central SOEs.  
 
Compared to central SOEs which largely operate as policy instruments and hold privileged 
monopoly positions, local SOEs mostly occupy the non-strategic sectors which were deregulated 
and liberalized to enable private and foreign participation such as manufacturing and services 
sectors (Malesky, 2009). Navigating an increasingly dynamic market characterized by surges in 
the entry of highly profit-driven firms has important consequences on the organizational logic and 
structure of local SOEs. Recent empirical research which evaluated the sources of public sector 
inefficiency in Indonesia has found that market liberalizing reforms which elevate competitiveness 
in the overall business environment by encouraging foreign ownership, reductions in trade barriers, 
and greater constraints on government subsidized investments were responsible for substantial 
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improvements in SOEs’ productivity growth (Bartel & Harrison, 2005). Subjected to the discipline 
of the market, a significant portion of underperforming local SOEs has also been completely or 
partially privatized in many emerging economies. Many were simply dissolved or transferred to 
workers’ collectives. In Vietnam, the number of local SOEs has been continuously reduced, 
although the total capital in the local SOE sector has increased to provide surviving firms with 
more resources to strengthen their competitiveness (Ishizuka, 2009).  
As a result, most remaining local SOEs comprise of firms which evolved new dynamic 
capabilities to handle the challenges of a competitive market environment. By adapting more 
swiftly to market uncertainties characterized by unstable shifts in market demand, disruptive 
product innovations, and entry of new foreign competitors, local SOEs are incentivized to invest 
more efforts to acquire market information, develop product differentiation strategies, improve 
customer service, and engage in strategic planning. This shift towards market orientation in 
response to environmental turbulence has been discussed variously in the business literature (Baker 
& Sinkula, 1999; Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Santos-Vijande, Sanzo-Perez, Alvarez-Gonzalez, & 
Vasquez-Cassielles, 2005; Slater & Narver, 1995) as being vital to enhance organizational learning, 
managerial flexibility, and acquisition of sustainable competitive advantage. Given that local SOEs 
are exposed to higher levels of market competition and serve as commercial vehicles for generating 
profits for local governments, we propose: 
 
Proposition 4: The greater the degree of market liberalization in a country, the higher the level of 
market orientation of local SOEs relative to central SOEs. 
 
Taking a holistic view of institutional changes along both vertical and horizontal dimensions 
enriches our understanding of how institutional reforms can reshape central and local SOEs into 
actors with diverse agendas by re-bundling their matrix of resources, strategic priorities, and 
capabilities at different levels of government. Theoretically this is an important issue since rather 
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than viewing institutions as ‘variables’ or separate elements, our approach proposes that subsequent 
recalibration of institutions as configurations through reforms ‘give rise not just to differences in 
degree, but to fundamental differences in kind’ (Jackson & Deeg, 2008: 545). Reforms operate to 
modify the pattern of interdependence among institutions by realigning and reconciling their 
priorities, addressing coordination gaps, and reducing their imperfections. The strategic 
renegotiation of coordination between central and local governments ushers in the recalibration of 
institutional logics, organizational structures and resources at the field level of the state sector as it 
adjusts to ongoing structural transition in the political economies of emerging economy countries. 
The accompanying rise of diversity in state capitalism builds upon central and local governments’ 
evolving institutional complementarities and translates into creation of new comparative 
institutional advantages for local and central SOEs to engage in different kinds of economic activity. 
For example, central SOEs dominating strategic industries are able to produce at more socially 
optimal price levels for critical public goods and raw materials needed to spur the acceleration of 
market development spearheaded by private firms and local SOEs in downstream industries. Their 
obligation to advance national industrial and welfare priorities may lead them to operate from a 
stronger politically laden and noncommercial logic compared to local SOEs which are increasingly 
profit-driven to serve local economic development objectives. This interdependency perspective is 
supported by theories developed in the literature on organizational configurations (Meyer, Tsui, & 
Hinings, 1993) and increasingly applied in other fields such as corporate governance (Aguilera, 
Desender, & Kabbach de Castro, 2012) to advocate for a more holistic approach for examining 
how changing interactions among organizational actors can create new patterns of coordination and 
behavior within groups.  
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2.3 IMPLICATIONS OF VARIETIES IN STATE CAPITALISM FOR OUTWARD FDI  
                                STRATEGIES OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 
 
As agents of the state, SOEs are embedded in a political and social environment that extends 
beyond purely strategic and economic considerations. They must respond to home and host 
countries’ institutional demands which exert pressure on them to mobilize organizational 
legitimacy for their international activities (Cui & Jiang, 2012). On the one hand, SOEs are obliged 
to fulfill certain home country government priorities such as acquiring key technologies and natural 
resources necessary for national development to legitimize their reasons for conducting FDI (Luo, 
Xue, & Han, 2010). However, they must also seek host country acceptance when they enter foreign 
markets. Previous studies have highlighted the importance of firms adopting conforming behaviors 
to cultivate host country legitimacy as a means to overcome political opposition in host markets 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Lu & Xu, 2006). Other studies have also found that firm responses to 
host country institutional environments may be reflected in their FDI ownership strategy (Lu, 2002; 
Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Presently, there is limited theoretical understanding on how different types 
of SOEs interact with competing domestic and foreign institutional pressures when they invest 
overseas.  
By deriving a theoretical framework which elaborates the mechanisms through which large-
scale institutional reforms induce stratification in the organizational field of SOEs leading to 
cleavages among them, we seek to articulate a new theoretical linkage between macro-level 
institutional changes contributing to diversity in state capitalism and micro-level SOE strategic 
choices reflected in their overseas venturing patterns. Variations in the level of SOEs’ managerial 
autonomy, institutional support, monopoly power, and market orientation arising from macro-
institutional changes signify a divergence in the institutionalized logics and expectations of roles 
held by local and central SOEs. Drawing from sociological institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Scott, 2004, Meyer & Rowan, 1977) which embraces a prescriptive 
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approach to analyze how organizational actors conform to behavioral norms and rules established 
in their institutional environment to earn legitimacy for their continued survival, we develop a 
series of propositions elucidating how differences in the expected behavior of central and local 
SOEs along these four dimensions can transform the way they seek legitimacy from home and host 
governments. Our approach takes into consideration the distinctive attributes of central and local 
SOEs which we postulate motivate them to adopt differentiated legitimization strategies for 
outward FDI. 
 
Institutional Legitimacy in Home Countries 
Research into firms’ internationalization strategies are increasingly focused on both home and 
external host legitimacy challenges faced by firms when they enter foreign markets (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999; Lu & Xu, 2006). Such issues are relevant for internationalizing SOEs as they expand 
their business to operate in multiple overseas institutional environments. In particular, obtaining 
home institutional legitimacy is a crucial priority for SOEs since their survival is conditioned on 
sustained government access to valuable information and support. Such resource dependence exerts 
coercive pressure on SOE managers to meet government targets and priorities by establishing 
conforming routines and practices beyond purely economic mandates. Under circumstances where 
SOEs report to various government authorities with their own agendas and goals (Wang, Hong, 
Kafouros & Wright, 2012b), different tactical approaches may be employed by SOEs to obtain 
home organizational legitimacy. Moreover, central and local SOEs are not provided with the same 
level of institutional resources to fulfill their missions, which underscore their differing priorities 
(Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010).  
The different channels by which SOEs negotiate for home institutional legitimacy have 
implications for their choice of internationalization path. In exploring overseas, firms may follow 
a gradual internationalization path where they enter home-like foreign markets before venturing to 
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psychically and institutionally distant locations (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009; Xu & Shenkar, 
2002), or they can leapfrog stages and enter distant locations without accumulating significant a 
priori experiential knowledge or networks (Luo & Tung, 2007; Matthews & Zander, 2007). As 
‘national champions’, central SOEs derive a substantial part of their home institutional legitimacy 
by serving as policy instruments of central governments. Their monopoly privileges and high 
degree of institutional support are granted on the condition that they endeavor to serve certain 
national strategic goals (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010; Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008). In recent 
years, emerging economy governments have actively encouraged their central SOEs to accelerate 
their international expansion to secure important strategic assets and resources to strengthen 
national competitiveness (Kowalski et al., 2013; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). Due to substantial 
home country push factors and preferential support, central SOEs from emerging market countries 
such as Bank of Brazil, SINOPEC of China, PETRONAS of Malaysia, and ONGC Videsh of India 
have leapfrogged to far-flung developed markets such as Australia, United States, Canada and 
Western Europe. Moreover, such firms may not be sent abroad for purely commercial reasons but 
rather for strategic purposes. They may expand abroad to project their growing political and 
economic power (Child & Rodrigues, 2005), establish a banking presence in distant financial 
centers such as New York or London to raise capital (Narula, 2012), set up R&D centers in 
advanced economies to acquire technical and tacit knowledge (Di Minin, Zhang & Gammeltoft, 
2012), or make passive investments in such countries to observe the decision-making processes of 
their invested subsidiaries (Shapiro & Globerman, 2012).  
Meanwhile local SOEs are not obligated to fulfill government mandates to pursue the same 
strategic interests compared to central SOEs. Instead, they derive their home institutional 
legitimacy from maximizing rents for local government purposes. The combination of their market-
pull orientation and less privileged access to institutional resources encourages more profit-driven 
and risk adverse behaviors so they may delay entering unfamiliar advanced markets dominated by 
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sophisticated competitors requiring significant upfront investments which may reduce their short 
term profits. By contrast, institutionally and psychically proximate countries offer more predictable 
business environments with lower entry barriers which enable local SOEs to accumulate and fine-
tune their capabilities in preparation for penetrating more distant markets. Over the past two 
decades, various local emerging economy SOEs have deployed this strategy. Among them, Saigon 
Trading Group, a local company controlled by the Ho Chi Minh City government in Vietnam 
signed a joint venture agreement in 2004 with Cambodia’s SOKIMEX group to build a food 
processing factory in Cambodia before incorporating a subsidiary in the United States in 2007 and 
a representative office in Japan in 2009. Another local SOE, Hisense from Qingdao Province in 
China entered South Africa as early as 1996 and established itself as a top consumer electronics 
brand in the country before moving to more developed markets such as the US in 2001, Europe 
and Australia in 2006, and Canada in 2012. Similarly, PT Riau Airlines, a local Indonesian SOE 
owned by the Riau provincial government in Sumatra registered its first foreign branch office in 
Malaysia after entering a cooperation agreement with a Malaysian tourism company in 2009 to 
initiate air services between Sumatra and Malaysia.  
The relatively fewer institutional resources accessible to local SOEs may also incentivize 
them to operate with greater caution in foreign countries. While local SOEs may receive extra 
policy supports such as subsidies and bank loans, they lack the abundant pool of resources 
specifically reserved for central SOEs to realize large-scale national strategic goals abroad. As 
policy instruments of the central government, central SOEs may be obligated to obtain home 
institutional legitimacy by leapfrogging to foreign strategic markets while utilizing their 
institutional supports to replace experiential learning. By contrast, as commercial vehicles of local 
governments, local SOEs must balance the risks and benefits of foreign market entry by gradually 
accumulating international management expertise beyond their immediate vicinities to eventually 
explore more distant foreign markets. Therefore, we propose:  
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Proposition 5: Relative to central SOEs, local SOEs are more likely to follow a gradual 
internationalization path when conducting outward FDI. 
 
Beyond comparing the policy driven versus commercially motivated behavior of central and 
local SOEs, we identify differences in the regulatory expectations of central and local governments 
which influence how they pursue international diversification. While central SOEs are encouraged 
to invest globally, they are subject to more restrictive investment approval procedures and closer 
scrutiny of their diversification plans due to central governments’ concerted efforts to fulfill 
national welfare goals. Central SOEs in many emerging economies including India, Vietnam and 
China are required to focus on their core businesses which render them incapable of freely diverting 
resources into new business lines. While India recently recognized the importance of removing 
bureaucratic hurdles by establishing the Maharatna scheme in 2009 to allow a selective group of 
central SOEs to invest up to 15 per cent of their net worth in foreign projects of their choice, other 
emerging economies such as China continue to follow a more stringent policy. In 2006, China 
initially established a similar 10% cap for central SOEs on foreign investments made beyond their 
core businesses. However in 2012, the government issued a new set of regulations prohibiting any 
new foreign investments by central SOEs in non-core business areas unless they receive special 
authorization. Under such regulatory pressure from home country governments not to deviate from 
authorized mandates, most central SOEs are largely constrained from independently diversifying 
their businesses in their overseas operations.  
Compared to central SOEs which abide by strict government guidelines to maintain their 
institutional legitimacy, local SOEs follow more relaxed procedures to invest according to their 
business priorities. Evidence also supports the view that business diversification by local SOEs is 
spurred by local government development goals aimed at increasing production output and 
employment (Zhang & Li, 2006). Furthermore, local SOEs exhibit stronger market orientation and 
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managerial autonomy which stimulates them to be more alert to market trends in foreign consumer 
demand and deploy diversification strategies to gain competitive advantage abroad. An illustrative 
example of an internationalizing local SOE undertaking this approach is Saigontourist, a tourism 
company owned by Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh City government which expanded into the healthcare 
and rubber industries in Cambodia and Laos. In 2006, it joined a consortium of local SOEs 
including Saigon Construction Corporation and Saigon Real Estate Group to build a new hospital 
in Cambodia. As of 2011, Saigontourist invested over 27 million dollars in the development of this 
hospital and became a shareholder of a 5,000 hectare rubber plantation in Laos. In China, Liugong 
Machinery Company, a construction machinery firm owned by the Guangxi provincial government 
also established a manufacturing plant in India and recently acquired HSW, a company in Poland. 
Since initiating its production and sales in overseas markets, its senior management has actively 
broadened existing global business lines by focusing on customer’s needs, in particular by adapting 
their product lines to meet requirements in Brazil and Thailand where environmental conditions 
necessitate adjustments. Lastly, the very process of economic liberalization in local domestic 
markets leads to rising competition which magnifies pressure on local SOEs to improve the 
diversity and quality of their products.  
Deriving their legitimacy from central government regulations, central SOEs are obligated to 
focus on their core businesses and restrict their overseas business diversification. Conversely, local 
SOEs may achieve greater home institutional legitimacy by actively responding to varying market 
conditions in their foreign operations which present commercial opportunities outside their existing 
lines of businesses. Therefore, we propose:  
 
Proposition 6: Relative to central SOEs, local SOEs are more likely to engage in business 
diversification when conducting FDI. 
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Institutional Legitimacy in Host Countries 
A volume of studies have long acknowledged that multinational corporations (MNC) entering 
foreign markets face costs to entry due to their lack of external legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999; Lu & Xu, 2006; Zaheer, 1995). Such lack of legitimacy is commonly associated with 
incompatibility between home and host country institutional values and practices in the regulatory, 
cognitive, and cultural domains. It may also be attributed to perceptions by host countries of 
possible conflicts of interests between the home and host countries (Henisz & Zelner, 2005; Lipsey, 
2002). Due to such liability of legitimacy, MNCs dedicate significant resources to cultivate a 
positive corporate image in local markets and employ diverse strategies such as encouraging local 
cultural adaptation by subsidiary units or providing financial support for local social programs. In 
relation to SOEs aspiring to venture overseas, their liability of legitimacy is compounded by virtue 
of their political affiliation to home country governments which may trigger host country concerns 
about SOEs’ motivations for host market penetration (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; He & Lyles, 
2008). However, it has also been recognized that state ownership should be treated as a 
‘multidimensional phenomenon’ (Cui & Jiang, 2012: 281) and that SOEs with different types of 
government affiliation may not be subject to the same institutional pressures.  
Extending this view, we propose that different levels of government affiliation matter 
significantly in shaping the nature and degree in which host country institutional pressures fall on 
SOEs. Following the distinction between goal-level and means-level conflicts of institutional 
demands (Pache & Santos, 2010), we argue that the potential conflicts of interest between central 
SOEs (internal institution) and host governments (external institution) arising from central SOEs’ 
lack of autonomy, monopoly characteristics, and lower market orientation are likely to manifest at 
a goal level which renders such conflicts more difficult to resolve compared to disputes between 
local SOEs and host governments. As policy instruments of home governments, central SOEs may 
exercise non-commercial strategies with political motives that advance home country goals at the 
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direct expense of host country national interests. However, local SOEs with more credible 
commercial objectives and higher managerial autonomy are less likely to harm such interests. This 
does not imply their negotiations with host governments are free of disputes or contention, but 
rather their disagreements are more likely to manifest at a means level where bargaining remains 
possible. This crucial distinction between goal versus means level conflict has been analyzed in the 
context of organizational responses to competing institutional pressures, where organizations are 
more inclined to exercise harder measures such as contestation or avoidance rather than 
compromise under circumstances of fundamental goal misalignment when bargaining options are 
slim (Pache & Santos, 2010). Furthermore, resource dependence has been found to influence firm 
strategic responses. A firm that is highly dependent on an institution for important resources is 
more likely to conform to rather than deviate from the institution’s expectations and priorities 
(Oliver, 1991). In relation to central SOEs, their higher dependence on home institutional resources 
reinforces their inherited policy mandate and makes them less willing to acquiesce to host country 
demands despite their weakened negotiating power. This view is consistent with observations made 
by Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Loundsbury (2011: 319) that “an organization’s 
position within a field shapes the form and intensity of complexity that it will experience such that 
‘central’ highly embedded organizations may be more exposed to the tension that multiple logics 
engender as compared to less embedded ‘peripheral’ organizations”.  
The willingness and ability for firms to devise solutions to address external legitimacy 
challenges has important implications for their FDI strategies. Prior studies have found that firms’ 
selection of entry modes, reflected in their subsidiary ownership structure, can be used to establish 
institutional legitimacy in host environments (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Yiu & Makino, 2002). New 
foreign market entrants may opt for a highly integrated wholly owned ownership structure to 
safeguard their control or a more loosely integrated joint ownership structure to minimize risk and 
benefit from their local partner’s ability to navigate challenges in the informal and formal 
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regulatory, normative and cultural environment. The decision to engage in a joint venture also 
offers an array of advantages to shore up their organizational legitimacy. In addition to drawing 
from their partner’s expertise to mitigate host country barriers, new market entrants may benefit 
from their partner’s clean reputation to establish trust with other local stakeholders thereby 
alleviating host constituents’ unfavorable perceptions (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Yiu & Makino, 2002). 
A wholly owned subsidiary is made when firms encounter high transaction costs and difficulty in 
negotiating with or monitoring their local partners (Brouthers, 2002). Therefore, firms seeking to 
avoid possible disputes or opportunism by a foreign partner will select this form of entry mode to 
maximize their control. 
The incongruence between the interests of central SOEs and host governments may attenuate 
their ability to cultivate successful joint venture operations. Such perceived disadvantage can 
encourage central SOEs to use more exacting measures to secure their global strategic interests 
resulting in a preference for less compromising and more competitive entry modes such as wholly 
owned operations. Central SOEs may also be keen to select wholly owned entry approach since it 
optimizes their control and ability to fulfill home country obligations arising from their high 
resource dependence.  
Strong preferences by central SOEs for comprehensive ownership control in FDI was 
recently manifested in a failed attempt by Singapore’s state owned DBS Group to win regulatory 
approval from Indonesia’s central bank to gain a 99% stake in PT Bank Danamon, which ranked 
sixth in assets among Indonesian banks. In 2013, DBS Group was compelled to withdraw from its 
year-long bid which would have been the largest acquisition in Indonesia’s history due to a 
combination of de facto protectionist measures by both countries. Several months into negotiations, 
the deal was delayed by the Indonesian central bank’s decision to establish new bank ownership 
rules which restricted foreign investors’ initial shareholding to 40% in Indonesian banks. The 
Indonesian central bank gave DBS Group the option to purchase a minority stake and increase its 
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shareholding in exchange for providing greater market access to Indonesian banks for expanding 
their foothold in Singapore. Despite this compromise offer, inaction by Singapore’s Monetary 
Authority to reciprocate prompted DBS Group to withdraw its bid, contributing to the deal’s 
collapse. Meanwhile Indonesian banks such as Bank Negara Indonesia are now exploring 
alternative foreign investment strategies such as establishing a branch in Myanmar to support the 
overseas expansion of other Indonesian SOEs into this rapidly developing country.  
Undoubtedly, local SOEs also face considerable challenges in foreign markets, but unlike 
central SOEs which often stir up significant host country resistance in their overseas investments, 
we argue that local SOEs are better positioned to negotiate for host country local legitimacy. Since 
they are less likely to encounter goal level conflicts, a wider set of options to offset host government 
concerns are available to them. The more neutral perception of local SOEs by foreign host 
constituents may permit them to find willing joint venture or trading partners open to foreign 
investment in host environments. Employing collaborative entry approaches can permit local SOEs 
to gradually expand their network of formal and informal engagements with foreign stakeholders 
to modify host perceptions in their favor. Such strategies are not new and have been previously 
deployed by latecomer Japanese firms such as Toyota when overcoming high entry barriers to the 
US market in the 1980s (Chung, Mitchell, & Yeung, 2002). 
In recent years, collaborative entry approaches have been adopted by various local SOEs 
from India, Indonesia and China. A characteristic example is Beidahuang Nongken Group, a local 
agricultural company owned by China’s Heilongjiang provincial government which signed a joint 
venture agreement with Argentina’s Cresud SA and the local government of Rio Negro to lease 
and develop vast tracts of farmland in Patagonia to produce agricultural products for export to 
China. The 20 year joint venture collaboration which facilitated the circumvention of strict 
regulations banning large foreign land acquisitions also included plans for the Chinese partner to 
contribute to local economic development by expanding Rio Negro’s port and constructing 
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irrigation facilities. Indonesian local SOEs have also been actively pursuing collaborative 
investments abroad. In addition to PT Riau Airlines, PT Pembangunan Jaya Ancol, a local tourism 
and property management company controlled by the Jakarta municipal government was recently 
invited to establish a joint venture theme park by the Malaysian government. Beyond Malaysia, the 
firm has also been keen to establish a commercial presence in Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. 
Over the past decade, two local Indian SOEs controlled by the Gujarat state government also 
established high profile joint venture projects overseas. In 2006, the Gujarat State Fertilizers and 
Chemicals Ltd. initiated a joint venture project with two Tunisian SOEs to build a chemical plant 
to produce ingredients for fertilizer production which would be exported to India. This facility 
became operational in July 2013 and currently employs over 500 people. Gujarat State Petroleum 
Corporation, the only provincial company in India engaged in oil exploration and production also 
has multiple joint ventures with firms in several countries including Egypt, Yemen and Australia. 
Given prominent differences in their willingness and ability to negotiate for host country legitimacy 
between central and local SOEs, we propose: 
 
Proposition 7: Relative to central SOEs, local SOEs are more likely to choose a joint ownership 
structure than a sole ownership structure when conducting FDI.   
 
In addition to entry mode, the method of establishing a foreign subsidiary also matters for 
firms’ ability to cultivate institutional legitimacy in the host country. Firms may select to conduct 
a greenfield or mergers and acquisitions (M&A) investment which can influence host country 
stakeholder perceptions of foreign entrant’s investment motivations. Greenfield projects typically 
involve the construction of new physical facilities contributing to tangible job creation and host 
country productive output while M&A investments require purchasing of existing assets and 
resources without necessarily creating new value. M&A investments by foreign entrants are 
generally perceived less favorably by host constituents compared to greenfield investments which 
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offer more benefits (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). Moreover, M&A approaches are viewed as 
more competitive and less collaborative since it facilitates the takeover of valuable domestic assets 
by foreign entrants (Zhang et al., 2011). Therefore, greenfield projects rather than M&A 
investments may imprint more positive impressions on host country stakeholders to facilitate 
deeper operational ties.  
Since goal-level conflicts between central SOEs and host country stakeholders compromise 
central SOEs’ willingness and ability to successfully negotiate for host legitimacy, the diminished 
likelihood of resolution for such conflict may encourage central SOEs to follow more competitive 
or evasive entry strategies. Local SOEs on the other hand, have more alternatives to address means-
level conflicts with host country stakeholders. In contrast to central SOEs which may prefer M&A 
or wholly owned investment strategies, local SOEs can employ a greenfield approach to create 
mutual benefits and secure host country legitimacy. For example, the joint venture operations by 
Beidahuang Nongken Group, PT Pembangunan Jaya Ancol, Gujarat State Fertilizers and 
Chemicals Ltd., and Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation were all established through greenfield 
investments which rewarded both host and home country stakeholders. 
For central SOEs, their interest in securing and optimizing their monopoly power also places 
them in direct competition against well-established multinationals such as BHP Billiton and 
General Electric which dominate highly competitive global industries. Challenged to outpace their 
stronger rivals, central SOEs with latecomer disadvantages may also prefer M&A to rapidly 
accelerate their international growth and upgrade their capabilities directly through acquisition of 
assets and knowledge rather than rely on slower organic growth. Central SOEs often adopt this 
aggressive M&A approach despite its tendency to create goal level conflicts with host country 
governments. A widely reported and controversial case which illustrates such contentious behavior 
by a central SOE is the failed attempt by Alumninum Corporation of China (Chinalco) to increase 
its minority stake in Rio Tinto. In 2009, both parties agreed for Chinalco to make an additional 
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investment of 20 billion dollars in Rio Tinto which would have doubled Chinalco’s ownership 
stake, but after Rio Tinto withdrew from the deal partly due to heightened opposition from the 
Australian government, the Chinese media immediately made declarations accusing Australia of 
open protectionism. An unusual but noteworthy statement was issued by a Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce analyst that Chinalco was no longer interested in making additional compromises in 
such deals. Unable to respond to foreign host pressures while prioritizing home country interests, 
Chinalco was compelled to adopt a confrontational response rather than negotiate for host country 
legitimacy. Such differing host country legitimacy and global competition challenges faced by 
central and local SOEs may lead them to exhibit varying preferences for FDI establishment 
methods. Summarizing the discussion above, we propose: 
 
Proposition 8: Relative to central SOEs, local SOEs are more likely to pursue greenfield investment 
rather than M&A when conducting FDI. 
 
We illustrate our theory and propositions development in a trickle-down model (see Figure 
2). As shown in Figure 2.2, central and local SOEs differ along four characteristic dimensions 
(Propositions 1 to 4) which are derived from reform processes underpinning evolution in the macro-
institutional systems of emerging economies (see Figure 2.1). We posit that the interaction of these 
organizational differences with particular home and host institutional pressures further give rise to 
differentiation in local and central SOEs’ FDI strategies (Propositions 5 to 8). Overall, the trickle-
down model illustrates how macro-institutional processes serve as drivers of variation in SOEs’ 
FDI activities. 
 
[Insert Figure 2.2 about here] 
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2.4 DISCUSSION  
Main Theoretical Contributions  
Prior studies on the foreign venturing of SOEs have identified how incompatibilities between home 
country strategic interests and host country resistance can generate contravening circumstances 
affecting the cross-border activities of SOEs (Gordon &Tash, 2009; Kowalski et al., 2013; Shapiro & 
Globerman, 2012). While there has been no shortage of studies highlighting such important 
considerations, the cascading effect of institutional reforms in catalyzing diversity among SOEs and its 
profound consequences for how SOEs balance competing institutional demands in their cross-border 
FDI remain largely overlooked. To deepen this vein of investigation, we unravel the formative 
institutional mechanisms by which central and local SOEs evolve distinct salient characteristics that 
motivate them to adopt different overseas expansion strategies. 
With this article, we both contribute to efforts to understand the broader implications of 
institutional diversity for IB studies and respond to calls for greater cross-fertilization of ideas from the 
comparative capitalisms literature to IB research (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Our theoretical framework 
draws from and integrates both research streams by delineating how intricate combinations of reform 
processes can reconfigure institutional arrangements of economic coordination in emerging economies 
which affect resource allocation and capabilities formation for SOEs investing abroad. Rather than 
adhering to a static perspective on SOEs, we advance a configurational approach to examine their 
evolution into organizational actors with varying agendas. Embracing this approach enriches and 
elaborates a bigger picture understanding of how governments are internally adapting their state sectors 
to sustain hybrid models of economic coordination capable of greater responsiveness to global 
integration.  
More specifically, we develop a dynamic model to illustrate how varieties in state capitalism may 
emerge due to the transformative and cross-cutting nature of reforms in emerging economies which 
results in more radical measures of change and idiosyncratic patterns of development among SOEs. In 
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particular, the mixing and coalescing of elements from central planning and market based coordination 
rearrange the constellation of economic and political state actors into a hybrid institutional 
configuration capable of supporting both forms of economic activity. By disentangling the effects of 
multiple reform processes to show how they reconfigure institutional subsystems for new kinds of 
economic coordination, we trace the unique patterns of development of SOEs operating in these 
subsystems. Interestingly, the extant comparative capitalisms literature has been largely silent on how 
systems of economic coordination can be reshuffled to create new institutional synergies which 
facilitate the structuration of market based development in emerging economies. Through the prism of 
diversity in capitalism, we theoretically map the effects of macro-level institutional changes to SOE 
firm-level attributes.  
Our theoretical development shows how as the roles, resources, logics and priorities between 
central and local governments are realigned to accommodate a hybrid market economy, the functions 
and characteristics of SOEs under their respective jurisdiction also begin to diverge. Central SOEs are 
reformed into ‘national champions’ with more concentrated monopoly features and business group 
characteristics to act as policy instruments of the state. Their formal mandates to support macro-level 
industrial growth and social welfare distances them from purely profit-maximizing practices. Whereas 
local SOEs are restructured into more autonomous and market oriented firms with greater flexibility 
and driven by commercial logic. Such integral differences in the formulation of their strategic priorities 
and resource positions not only intrinsically shape how SOEs act in domestic business environments, 
but also how they navigate foreign markets.  
We extend existing theories on SOEs’ foreign investment behavior by showing how underlying 
organizational differences can regulate their ability to obtain home and host country institutional 
legitimacy for foreign investment. Prior research has found that SOEs are highly resource dependent 
on home country institutions which increases pressure for their conformity to domestic demands and 
priorities (Cui & Jiang, 2012). SOEs intending to venture abroad are also simultaneously under 
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magnified pressure from host country institutions to demonstrate credible investment motives (Li & 
Meyer, 2009; Kowalski et al., 2013). Consequently, a crucial issue faced by SOEs is whether they can 
balance the dual competing demands of home country and host country governments. Since central 
SOEs are more likely to face goal-level conflicts with host institutions which may perceive them as 
threats, the visceral strength of such conflicting legitimacy requirements may handicap their 
legitimization efforts, leading to their adoption of more evasive or competitive foreign market entry 
strategies. On the other hand, local SOEs may exhibit greater flexibility to pursue collaborative 
investment strategies due to their more credible commercial profiles.  Rather than categorizing all SOEs 
under the same umbrella, we unveil how their restructured capabilities and exposure to varying home 
and host institutional pressures can propel them to deploy different strategic tactics abroad which are 
reflected in their foreign subsidiary establishment strategies, international diversification patterns, and 
geographic location preferences.  
 
Implications for Host and Home Country Governments 
Our study holds critical implications not only for key stakeholders such as host and home country 
government owners but also for researchers in advisory roles. First, developing greater awareness 
of SOE diversity among host country policy-makers would enable them to draw more precise 
conclusions regarding the strategic motivations of foreign investing SOEs. In recent years, with the 
rapid growth of foreign investments by emerging economy SOEs, many host governments have 
imposed a spate of bureaucratic restrictions and review procedures applying to all state owned 
entities which have sparked concerns about protectionism by home country governments. While 
host governments regularly commission reports from internal research groups and experts from 
academic institutions to scrutinize foreign investing SOEs in their territories, such studies have 
tended highlight SOEs’ potential strategic and security complications with minimal consideration 
for their diverse origins or potential value propositions to host constituents.   
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For example, Shuanghui International Holdings, a food and logistics group recently 
privatized by the Henan local government in China faced regulatory hurdles in its efforts to acquire 
Smithfield Foods, a US pork producer. An expert’s testimony commissioned by the US Senate 
asserted the deal represented a national security threat on the basis of Shuanghui International’s 
previous state ownership without clarifying the nature of such state ownership apart from offering 
a general statement asserting that the Chinese government’s role is complicated and not always 
disclosed. Although Shuanghui International’s bid was ultimately successful as it did not represent 
any material harm and received unwavering support from its American partner, a more detailed 
assessment of its background would have shed greater clarity on its commercial intentions. 
Government responses have significant signaling effects on the perceptions of domestic firms and 
stakeholders. Applying finer-grained methods to diagnose the business risks of foreign SOEs may 
offer better guidance to host country firms considering potential business ventures with them. 
Secondly, home country governments should also reflect on the institutional reform 
implications for their SOEs’ overseas activities. While a substantial segment of reforms constitute 
experiments in the making, emerging economy governments should not overlook the consequences 
of their institutional designs which directly impact the ability of SOEs to address legitimacy issues 
in host environments. Emerging economy policymakers should consider how the strategic features 
of SOEs are shaped through the reorganization of institutional elements catalyzed by reforms and 
how altering these elements may trigger a change in the way SOEs’ actions are perceived abroad. 
By consolidating central SOEs into what they envision to be world class ‘national champions’, 
emerging economy policymakers may inadvertently spur corresponding measures by potential host 
countries to issue stronger policies fortifying them against incoming FDI activities by foreign SOEs. 
Therefore, engaging in more extensive communications to gauge host governments’ reactions to 
their reform efforts through regular exchanges and forums sponsored by international organizations 
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such as APEC and OECD may help host policymakers to design appropriate measures facilitating 
the viable expansion of their SOEs operating abroad.  
 
Implications for Managerial Practice   
The evolving strategic functions of SOEs bring consequences for their managers as well as host 
country business partners and competitors. Although central SOEs from emerging economies face 
significant host country resistance combined with domestic restrictions on business diversification, 
local SOEs with sufficient resources for international venturing may now exercise greater 
flexibility in their FDI strategies than before. By recognizing these favorable conditions, managers 
of local SOEs can actively prepare their firms to exploit such advantages by undertaking more 
extensive efforts to develop business ties with foreign firms receptive to alliances and partnerships. 
Local SOEs from emerging economies which have successfully cultivated such strategic alliances 
can leverage them to make inroads into new host markets while minimizing legitimacy concerns. 
Moreover, establishing such alliances can enable local SOEs to access different managerial 
perspectives from their foreign partners which may revitalize their reform momentum and lead 
them to consider new business models and organizational practices to upgrade their existing 
capabilities.  
Central SOEs may continue to encounter intrinsically more challenging issues stemming 
from their domestic policy-driven focus especially given accelerated efforts by emerging economy 
governments to promote their entry into foreign markets. Although their managers may prefer more 
evasive or competitive strategies, displaying greater openness to compromise solutions may 
facilitate future progress despite their initial lack of appeal. Following its unsuccessful bid for PT 
Bank Danamon, DBS Group’s CEO admitted the substantial setback of this missed opportunity 
and estimated it would take more than five years for DBS to independently grow its operations in 
Indonesia. Due to such prominent priorities at stake and the potentially irreversible effect of their 
68 
 
decisions, central SOE managers and their respective governments may need to more carefully 
reevaluate whether long term benefits of concessions may outweigh shorter term sacrifices when 
compromise opportunities arise. Central SOE managers may also consider more targeted strategies 
to compensate for their institutional shortcomings by cultivating mutually beneficial collaborations 
with neutral third-party foreign partners to build sufficient legitimacy for establishing multi-party 
consortiums to jointly invest abroad. While this approach may dilute their ownership control over 
foreign invested subsidiaries, it may also serve to diffuse potential goal level disputes with host 
governments.  
Finally, developing institutional awareness of complex trends in the population change of 
emerging economy SOEs can enable foreign firms to better anticipate their overseas behavior and 
incorporate these into their own schemes for effective collaboration or competition. Five years ago 
Shuanghui International became involved in a trading partnership with Smithfield Foods. 
Recognizing the strategic importance of their relationship, senior managers from Smithfield Foods 
repeatedly proposed mutual shareholding arrangements before an acquisition deal was negotiated. 
The acknowledgement by Smithfield Foods’ CEO of his proactive role in negotiations to sell his 
company indicates that Smithfield Foods was a strategic enabler of this deal and was as mutually 
interested in reaching an agreement as its Chinese counterparts. Representing the largest acquisition 
of a US company by a Chinese firm, this breakthrough deal signifies a nascent deepening in foreign 
firms’ discernment of new institutional realities in emerging economy countries.  
 
Implications for Future Research 
Through a systematic examination of the institutional drivers and mechanisms underpinning 
emerging economy SOEs’ evolutionary organizational development, we offer a series of 
propositions that can be empirically investigated using longitudinal multilevel methods. Apart from 
empirical evaluation, our attempt to disaggregate the effects of institutional change processes and 
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how they give rise to varieties in state capitalism also creates space for important theoretical 
questions regarding other forms of SOE diversity and their associated effects on SOEs’ overseas 
venturing. Organizational diversity is multi-faceted in nature. While our analysis captures general 
reform processes that are most relevant to the renegotiation of the relationship between different 
levels of government, it does not explore the full range of country-specific reform dynamics that 
may induce organizational diversity along different dimensions. For example, the effects of partial 
privatization and ownership reform in China, India, and Vietnam have led to the proliferation of 
transitional corporate entities and public-private hybrid firms which straddle between private and 
public control (Boyer, 2012; Gupta, 2005).  
While our study does not address the ambiguities and implications arising from the 
emergence of these hybrid firms, we concur with other studies (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Mussachio, 
2013; Khanna, 2012; Mussachio & Lazzarini, 2014) that this is a promising area of research for 
future investigation. More attention can be devoted to explore the combination of resources, 
competitive advantages, governance structures and routines leveraged by these hybrid 
organizations to operate internationally and whether they adopt more private competition based 
approaches to establishing organizational legitimacy in host country environments. The blurring of 
boundaries between government and private sectors in emerging economies creates a grey zone 
that will likely become a focal area where new interest groups emerge to reshape the constellation 
of constraints, motivations, and resources behind these state-private hybrid firms’ activities. Under 
circumstances of shared ownership and mutual interdependence where the state retains a silent but 
influential strategic role, the issue of control becomes highly salient. How are such firms jointly 
managed by state and private shareholders? What special niches do they occupy in international 
markets and what mandates do they follow? Do they serve to advance institutional innovation in 
emerging economies? While institutional pluralism is increasingly recognized in various fields 
including political economy, organizational studies, and international business, its consequences 
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remain underexplored. Future research into the relationship between state ownership and 
globalization can benefit from investigating how these emergent state-private hybrid firms may 
operate as governments’ response to globalization’s pressures, demands and challenges.  
Above these research horizons, future studies can also advance this line of inquiry by 
addressing additional factors not considered in this study. First, the temporal dimension of 
institutional change should be considered for its potential downstream effects. Under circumstances 
of radical change which has unfolded in some countries, the trickle-down effects of reform may be 
diminished significantly. However, this does not mean that state ownership in these countries have 
disappeared entirely. For instance, large scale privatization in Russia has substantially reduced the 
number of SOEs but they continue to account for 11% of all firms and over 32% of total capital 
investment (OECD, 2008). Comparative studies aimed at measuring the effects of different reform 
speeds and sequencing across multiple countries can shed valuable insights into the linkages 
between institutional change and organizational diversity among SOEs as well as subsequent 
effects on their foreign investment patterns. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile for future studies 
to incorporate other critical elements such as subnational institutional heterogeneity characterized 
by the level of institutional quality and socio-economic disparity of local regions. Various studies 
have pinpointed this factor as having significant impacts on firm performance and 
internationalization behavior (Liu, Lu, & Chizema, 2013; Ma, Tong & Fitza, 2013; Meyer, 
Mudambi, & Narula, 2011; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005) which may also be a source of considerable 
heterogeneity among SOEs.  
Lastly, while our study mainly considers how institutional changes in host country 
environments may shape SOEs’ FDI strategies, we see a robust theoretical opportunity in 
investigating the effects of macro-institutional changes in host countries which may alter the 
institutional frameworks and conditions under which SOEs operate abroad. Recent research finds 
evidence that evolving political conditions in host environments can substantially curtail the ability 
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of multinational firms to maintain their organizational legitimacy in these countries (Bucheli & 
Kim, 2012). Such findings merit more extensive research to evaluate the sensitivities of foreign 
investing SOEs to host country institutional changes and their strategic responses to mitigate 
associated potential risks and disadvantages.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 Broadly speaking, the theoretical framework developed in this study makes important 
contributions to the international business and political economy literatures by showing how 
organizational diversity of emerging economy SOEs derived from macro-institutional reforms can 
extensively impact their overseas venturing strategies. Our study also underscores the importance 
of institutional change as a driving component of firm strategy in emerging economies. The 
ongoing reform of SOEs into modern corporations characterized by increasingly differentiated 
organizational modalities is imperfectly captured by current literature on state-owned 
multinationals which overlooks the evolving political economy systems of emerging economies as 
core determinants of their SOEs’ global strategies. Keeping abreast of the dynamic momentum of 
institutional change and progressing beyond static conceptions of SOEs’ identities, behaviors and 
functions enables us to identify crucial inflection points in SOEs’ organizational restructuring 
which may shape their future relationships with host governments, foreign competitors and partner 
firms. Moreover, our study reveals how asymmetric institutional pressures from home and host 
countries may apply to different types of SOEs, mirroring their contrasting strategic agendas and 
capabilities. The central implication is that SOEs will encounter unique cross-border challenges 
and windows of opportunity borne out of such asymmetric pressures which lead them to adopt 
differentiated FDI strategies. By illustrating the value of diversity in state capitalism in guiding 
SOEs’ heterogeneous overseas investment choices, we hope our paper can stimulate new research 
72 
 
into other facets of SOE diversity and their potential impacts on SOEs’ organizational responses to 
globalization. 
 
Notes  
1. We use the term ‘heterogeneity’ and ‘diversity’ interchangeably in this paper.  
2. The term ‘central government’ refers to the highest level of government and is used 
interchangeably with ‘federal government’ and ‘national government’ while the term ‘local 
government’ is applied to provincial or municipal levels of government. Most studies on 
decentralization typically examine the evolving relationship between central and local levels 
of government which is why we focus our analysis on these two levels of government.  
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Figure 2.1 Institutional change processes and SOE diversity in emerging economies 
 Figure 2.2 The trickle-down effects of institutional change on SOE diversity and FDI strategies 
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Table 2.1 State ownership patterns in selected emerging economies 
 
Country Classification and Designation of Central and Local SOEs 
 Central SOEs                                                          Local SOEs 
Boundary Conditions 
China  
 
 
 
 
India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam 
Central SOEs are under the direct control of 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the national 
State Council.  
 
Central SOEs are referred to as Central 
Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs) or 
Central Public Sector Units (CPSUs) 
designated under the direct control of the 
Ministry of Heavy Industries & Public 
Enterprises 
 
Central SOEs are referred to as Badan 
Usaha Milik Negara (BUMNs) which 
designated under the direct control of the 
Ministry of State Owned Enterprises 
 
Central SOEs are referred to as Government 
Linked Companies (GLCs) under the 
control of the Ministry of Finance and five 
Federal Government Linked Companies 
(GLICs) which invest for the central 
government.  
 
Central SOEs are referred to as National 
Public Entities (NPEs) or National 
Government Business Enterprise (NGBEs) 
under the direct supervision of the national 
Department of Public Enterprises 
 
Central SOEs are referred to as State-owned 
Economic Groups (SEGs) designated under 
the control of various line ministries under 
the supervision of the Prime Minister 
Local SOEs are under the direct control of 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of provincial 
and municipal governments.  
 
Local SOEs are referred to as State Level 
Public Sector Enterprises (SLPEs) or State 
Level Public Sector Unit (SLPSUs) under the 
direct control of provincial governments  
 
 
Local SOEs are referred to as Badan Usaha 
Milik Daerah (BUMDs) which are 
designated under the direct control of 
provincial and municipal governments 
 
Local SOEs are referred to as State 
Government Linked Companies (SGLCs) 
under the direct control the State Economic 
Development Corporations (SEDCs) which 
serve as investment arms for provincial 
governments  
 
Local SOEs are referred to as Provincial 
Public Entities (PBEs) or Provincial 
Government Business Enterprises (PGBEs) 
which are under the direct supervision of 
provincial and municipal governments 
 
Local SOEs are designated under the control 
of the People’s Committees of provincial and 
municipal governments. They are referred to 
directly as Local SOEs.  
Transition economy system characterized 
by  political and economic decentralization 
with gradual privatization 
 
 
Pluralistic governance system characterized 
by  political and economic decentralization 
with gradual privatization  
 
 
 
Pluralistic governance system characterized 
by political and economic decentralization 
with gradual privatization 
 
 
Pluralistic governance system characterized 
by political and economic decentralization 
with gradual privatization 
 
 
 
Pluralistic governance system characterized 
by political and economic decentralization 
with gradual privatization 
 
 
Transition economy system characterized 
by political and economic decentralization 
with gradual privatization 
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Appendix 2.1 Illustrative case references 
                      Case Examples    
 
References 
1.  Vietnam’s Saigon Trading Group invests in  
      Cambodia, US and Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. China’s Hisense invests in South Africa, US, Europe,  
    and Australia 
 
 
 
 
3. Indonesia’s PT Riau Airlines establishes joint   
    venture with Malaysian tourism company 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Regulations restricting foreign business  
    diversification of Chinese and Indian Central SOEs 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Vietnam’s Saigontourist Holding Company  
diversifies into hospitals and rubber in Cambodia  
and Laos 
“SATRA expands business to Cambodia”, Saigon Times Magazine. 13 November 2004.  
http:// www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-14385888_ITM  
 
Company history website for details of US subsidiary: http://satra.com.vn/index.php/en/about-
us/satra-history/  
 
Thuy, B. “SATRA ready to make inroads into Japanese market”, Vietnam Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry News. 26 February 2013. http://vccinews.com/news_detail.asp?news_id=27990  
 
http://www.hisense.co.za/about/  
http://hisense-usa.com/about/  
http://hisense.com.au/about/  
http://www.hisense-europe.com/aboutus.php  
http://hisense-canada.com/about/  
 
“Ten thousand Indonesian individuals appointed as directors in Malaysia”, Viva News. 3 June 2013. 
(Indonesian) http://us.bisnis.news.viva.co.id/news/read/417787-sepuluh-ribu-orang-indonesia-
menjabat-direktur-di-malaysia  
 
“RAL Opens Medan-Ipoh Route”, North Sumatra Post Daily Archive. 21 August 2009. (Indonesian) 
http://www.hariansumutpos.com/arsip/?p=7300  
 
Bombay Stock Exchange Public Sector Undertakings website: 
http://www.bsepsu.com/maharatnas.asp 
 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Circular – Central Enterprises Shall Not Engage 
in Non-Core Business Investments Abroad (Chinese) 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20120411/004811791104.shtml  
 
“HCM City’s planned Cambodia clinic approved”, Saigon Times Daily. 29 March 2006. 
http://www.intellasia.net/hcm-citys-planned-cambodia-clinic-approved-20525 
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6. China’s Liugong Machinery broadens its product  
    lines to satisfy Brazilian and Thai customers 
 
 
7. Singapore’s DBS Group fails to acquire sole control  
    of Indonesia’s PT Bank Danamon 
 
8. Indonesia’s Bank Negara Indonesia explore other  
investment opportunities in Myanmar following 
collapse of deal with DBS Group 
 
9. China’s Beidahuang Nongken Group signs joint 
venture agreement with Argentina’s Cresud SA to  
invest in Argentinian farmland 
 
10. Indonesia’s PT Pembangunan Jaya Ancol looks to 
      expand its regional presence in Southeast Asia  and 
      was invited to establish  joint venture theme park  
      by the Malaysian government  
 
 
 
11. India’s Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd.  
      establishes  joint venture plant with two Tunisian  
      state owned enterprises 
 
 
 
12. Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation establish  
       multiple joint venture projects in Egypt, Yemen, 
       and Australia 
 
“Saigontourist spends $2 bln on infrastructure”, Vietnam Investment Review. 23 February 2011. 
http://www.vir.com.vn/news/en/top-news/saigontourist-spends-$2-bln-on-infrastructure.html.  
 
Chao, W., & Yan, H. “Liugong Machinery adapts products to overseas customer needs”, China Daily. 
28 December 2012. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/guangxi/liuzhou/2012-
12/28/content_16096389.htm 
 
Grant, J., &Bland, B. “DBS bid for Indonesia’s Danamon collapses”, Financial Times. 31 July 2013. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/23374da2-f9cd-11e2-b8ef-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2e7djUjWH 
 
Sipahutar, T. “Regional expansion still ‘on track’”, Jakarta Post. 05 August 2013. 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/05/regional-expansion-still-track.html  
 
 
Orihuela, R. “China’s top farmer to invest in Argentina’s Patagonian winemaking, corn”, Bloomberg 
News. 6 November 2008. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-08/beidahuang-will-invest-1-5-
billion-on-patagonian-farms-that-it-won-t-own. 
 
“Jaya Ancol targets Vietnam”, Waspada Online. 11 June 2008. (Indonesian) 
http://www.waspada.co.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21683:jaya-ancol-
bidik-vietnam&catid=18:bisnis&Itemid=95 
 
“Iskandar Malaysia to get third theme park”, New Straits Times. 08 January 2013. 
http://www.nst.com.my/nation/general/iskandar-m-sia-to-get-third-theme-park-1.197979  
 
“Inauguration of TIFERT by Shri Srikant K. Jena, Minister of State for Chemicals &Fertilizers” 
http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/CountryNews/1167_Inauguration_of_TIFERT_by_Shri_Srikant_K.pdf  
 
“Tunisia – India Fertilizer (TIFERT) SA Joint Phosphate Acid Project” 
http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/CountryNews/486_Tunisia_-_India_Fertilizer__TIFERT__SA.pdf  
 
Nair, Avinash. “State firms push foreign investment, Rs 670 crore capital outflows in July”, The   
Indian Express. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/state-firms-push-foreign-investment-rs-670-
crore-capital-outflows-in-july/1157520/  
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13. China’s Chinalco fails to increase its stake in  
      Australia’s Rio Tinto resorts to protestation       
 
14. US Senate expert testimony on  Shuanghui  
      International’s provides few details on nature of 
      its previous state ownership 
 
15. Singapore’s DBS Group CEO admits setback of  
      missed opportunity to invest in Indonesia’s PT  
      Bank Danamon 
 
16. US Smithfield Foods CEO acknowledges his  
       proactive initiative to engage China’s Shuanghui  
       International to negotiate acquisition deal 
 Company website for details on Gujurat State Petroleum Company’s foreign joint venture projects:    
 http://gspcgroup.com/content.php?SecType=2&CID=1&CATID=34  
 
Xu, J. “Rio Tinto-Chinalco: China is not amused”, Wall Street Journal. 4 June 
2009.http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/06/04/rio-tinto-chinalco-china-is-not-amused/  
 
Testimony of Daniel M. Slane before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry of the US 
Senate. 10 July 2013. http://www.ag.senate.gov/download/?id=2ce80e90-c82e-4d14-8176-
a522328e1d72  
 
Raghuvanishi, G. “DBS still bullish on Indonesia after failed Danamon deal”, Wall Street Journal. 1 
August 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323681904578641140671604494.html 
 
 
Shapiro, M.W. “China deal negotiated as Smithfield faced criticism from investor” Daily Press. 6 
June 2013. http://articles.dailypress.com/2013-06-06/news/dp-nws-smithfield-pope-
20130606_1_smithfield-foods-smithfield-and-shuanghui-larry-pope  
References for examples 4, 6, 9, and 13 in the appendix were accessed on 18 May 2013, while other references were accessed on 6 September 2013. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP REFORM AND FOREIGN MARKET ENTRY OF EMERGING 
MARKET FIRMS: AN INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE PERSPECTIVE1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Emerging market firms experience a variety of home country institutional reforms which reshape 
their resource profiles and stakeholder expectations. During institutional transition, corporate 
ownership reform can give rise to new shareholding identities which exert diverse influences over 
the evolving strategic orientation, performance, and resource accretion of firms, imparting them 
with distinct institutional competitive advantages. However, the effects of such ownership 
restructuring on emerging market firms’ overseas FDI activities remains understudied. By 
systematically linking reform outcomes to resulting firm institutional advantages for international 
expansion, we examine the impact of different types of reformed state ownership on the outward 
FDI propensity of firms. Results from an empirical study of 973 Chinese listed firms spanning 
2002-2009 support our arguments that relative to non-reformed shareholding, reformed marketized 
ownership has a stronger impact on firms’ proclivity for outward FDI. This effect is more 
pronounced for firms with ownership by central marketized state-owned enterprises. We also find 
evidence of synergies and misalignments between institutional competitive advantages derived 
from equity-based shareholding structures and meso-level institutional arrangements such as state 
business group affiliation. The significant interaction effects suggests a greater need to investigate 
the interplay between micro and meso-level home country institutions and how firms may leverage 
both for cross-border venturing. 
Keywords: corporate ownership reform, institutional competitive advantage, internationalization, 
emerging market multinationals, China 
 
 
 _________________________________________  
1 This article was coauthored with Lin Cui and Jiangyong Lu. It is under 1st revision at Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management.   
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, many emerging market countries have initiated substantial and far-
reaching institutional reforms which transformed their corporate landscapes. Evidence abounds 
that while such reforms created exogenous shocks challenging domestic firms’ survival, they have 
also spawned a new era by creating a novel and complex transitional context which yield 
implications for emerging market multinational corporations’ (EMNCs) abilities for international 
venturing (Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012; Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). While a number of studies 
have explored the impact of pro-market structural reforms and industrial reorganization on the 
international activities of EMNCs (Buckley et al., 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Kim et al., 
2010), there is a scarcity of research on how EMNCs transform themselves in response to 
institutional transitions and how such organizational morphing can reshape their resources and 
capabilities for internationalization (Chittoor, Sarkar, Ray, & Aulakh, 2009). One critical but 
under-examined driver of organizational evolution is the phenomenon of corporate ownership 
reform which has precipitated widespread restructuring of firm ownership identities and the 
emergence of new categories of shareholders which yield consequences for the composition of 
firms’ resources, their access to information flows, and their strategic incentives. Focusing on how 
such ownership reform may alter or redefine the competitive advantages of firms for overseas 
venturing this study seeks to evaluate the effect of reformed ownership on EMNCs’ 
internationalization strategies. 
 The rise of new ownership categories through corporate ownership reform bears important 
implications for the institutional resources and organizational capabilities of firms for orchestrating 
their foreign business operations. Such resources and capabilities can constitute unique firm-
specific advantages (FSAs) for going abroad. While existing research has focused on distinguishing 
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key differences between the FSAs of developed country and emerging market multinationals for 
under taking FDI (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc 2008; Ramamurti, 2012), few studies have examined 
how such advantages can be shaped by home country institutional reforms. The current paradigm 
of FSAs has been used to study how firms may overcome liabilities of foreignness by acquiring a 
unique set of advantages comprising proprietary skills and resources which enable them to 
minimize market imperfections and coordination costs to operate globally (Rugman & Verbeke, 
1992). In the context of EMNCs, this theoretical lens has been applied to explain how firms may 
derive FSAs from country specific advantages (CSAs) of their developing country context to 
successfully penetrate foreign markets. Ambitious EMNCs are learning to maximize their limited 
home country FSAs to springboard abroad and acquire new FSAs to overcome domestic 
disadvantages (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Luo et al., 2011). 
Despite these valuable insights into how FSAs can be leveraged for EMNCs’ global 
expansion, current treatments of FSAs in the emerging market context provide limited theoretical 
scope to map how emerging market firms’ FSAs can evolve in response to institutional reforms. In 
particular it fails to capture how some firms may sharpen their competitive advantage over others 
as institutional conditions change. Recently, a new stream of literature has proposed that 
interactions between firms and their surrounding institutions can generate enabling or disabling 
conditions which translate to unique institutional advantages or disadvantages for orchestrating 
their international activities (Martin, 2014; Sun, Peng, Lee, & Tan, 2015). This perspective 
underscores the importance of assessing how ‘firms’ initial resources and local conditions jointly 
affect how the firm’s range of activities and resources evolve, which then determines relative 
performance’ (Martin, 2014: 62). Moreover, according to Martin (2014: 62): ‘though they tend to 
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be underestimated, home country conditions cannot be taken for stable or homogenous either in 
affecting the direction of firms’ international expansion…likewise, subtle differences, depending 
on the time of founding and the state of resources and institutions in the home country, may have 
consequences for the state and buildup of capabilities within the firm’. In the context of emerging 
market countries where institutional reforms have manifested in an experimental and uneven 
manner, divergences in reform treatments may contribute to inter-firm heterogeneity, thus 
modulating firms’ strategic resource and behavioral configurations.    
Therefore, the transitional context in emerging market countries provides an opportunity for 
examining how firms which have experienced corporate ownership transformation may develop 
distinctive institutional competitive advantages for venturing abroad. In this study, we highlight 
two types of reformed state ownership, namely central marketized state ownership and local 
marketized state ownership and examine their effects on firms’ foreign market entry, relative to 
that of non-marketized state ownership, to each other, and its boundary conditions. We argue that 
in altering the identities of institutional shareholders of emerging market firms, corporate 
ownership reform has also transformed their incentive structures and relative resource positions 
which amount to heightened competitive advantages for overseas venturing. This ownership effect 
is contingent on meso-level institutions such as state owned business group affiliation which may 
support or hinder ownership-based institutional competitive advantage. By linking the theoretical 
implications of corporate ownership reform to evolution in firms’ institutional competitive 
advantages for foreign investment, we contribute to the literature exploring country-of-origin 
effects on EMNCs’ internationalization strategies. Using China as our analytical and empirical 
setting, we address this research gap by investigating the effects of reformed ownership on firms’ 
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engagement in FDI. Our theoretical approach is supported by findings obtained through an 
empirical study of 973 publicly listed Chinese firms from 2002-2009. 
 
3.2 THE CHINESE CONTEXT OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP REFORM 
Among various reforms enacted in EM countries few are as important as reforms in corporate 
ownership. As Dunning (2004: 16) points out, it demands a ‘wholesale reconfiguration of the 
organizational and economic management’ of their economies. In China, the state sector remains 
one of the largest among transitioning countries. Due to the state sector’s disproportionate 
dominance, transforming SOEs into modern corporations requires the implementation of a 
orchestrated package of reforms to overhaul their corporate infrastructure. The multilayered nature 
of reforms which reorganized SOEs’ equity shareholding structure has nonetheless produced 
unique and somewhat contradictory sequencing outcomes including the emergence of hybrid 
corporatized state-owned firms which straddle between state and market based objectives.  
Such efforts to stimulate market competition by reforming SOEs’ shareholding systems 
have also introduced more complex ownership-control relationships. Consequently, the evolution 
in Chinese firms’ shareholding structures has led to greater ownership identity diversity which can 
also be attributed to the multiplicity of reform processes operating to reconfigure firms’ strategic 
incentives and institutional resources. Over the past thirty years, ownership reforms have unfolded 
in a series of piece-meal components which has fundamentally reshaped firms’ identities. For 
instance, the first wave of privatization in China involved the divestment of state assets via auctions, 
M&A, as well as employee and management buy-outs by individuals, foreigners and other 
corporate actors which directly increased private shareholding in China’s corporate sector (Bai, Lu 
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& Tao, 2009; Jefferson & Su, 2006). A significant portion of smaller SOEs which held minor 
strategic value for the state was wholly privatized in this fashion.  
          However, for larger, strategically vital SOEs which may be publicly listed or controlled by 
important government bureaus, gradual introduction of mixed ownership and managerial reform 
served as more appropriate means to upgrade their market competitiveness owing to the 
government’s reluctance to cede ownership control (Jefferson & Su, 2006; Zhang, 2011). Instead, 
state policymakers adopted a less radical partial ownership transformation of such SOEs which 
culminated in the emergence in a new category of marketized ownership that applies to 
shareholders of listed firms responding to market incentives and profit motives (Delios et al., 2006; 
Nee, 1992). This shareholding type which is characterized by mixed ownership is commonly found 
in an increasing segment of Chinese SOEs which evolved more competitive organizational 
structures and management practices (Zhang, 2011).  
Over the past decade, the pace of conversion to a mixed-ownership corporate system has 
rapidly accelerated, and while marketized shareholders are still subject to state supervision, they 
are granted significant operational autonomy. They are conceptually distinct from shareholders that 
are directly controlled by central or local government bureaus or other state agencies with strategic 
or military responsibilities. Such non-marketized shareholders (e.g., state-owned banks, 
government bureaus and ministries, companies owned by the military, state asset and investment 
management bureaus, unreformed industry companies and government research institutes) which 
are typically tasked with fulfilling certain social welfare or strategically paramount functions are 
likely to be less responsive to market signals and have fewer incentives to do so given their stronger 
priority to serve non-financial state mandates.  
84 
 
Nonetheless, the general category of marketized state ownership does not entirely reflect the 
cross-cutting nature of ownership reforms. Beyond the broadly visible features of shareholding 
reform, a parallel but equally critical process of political decentralization has unfolded across China. 
This process, which consists of administrative and fiscal decentralization, has enabled local 
governments to exercise significantly greater administrative oversight to govern SOEs under their 
jurisdiction. It has also empowered local governments to independently restructure their SOEs, 
which include shareholding diversification and corporate governance reforms. However, since 
decentralization has compelled local governments to become responsible for their own fiscal 
expenditures, marketized SOEs which were restructured by local governments (LMSOEs) have 
also been largely transformed into commercial vehicles for local government rent-seeking (Lin, 
Tao, & Liu, 2003). When they could no longer rely on central government fiscal transfers to cover 
their spending, local governments began to task LMSOEs to shoulder increasing policy burdens 
associated with decentralization by providing for social welfare, tax revenues for education and 
infrastructure expenses, and employment for the local population (Jin & Zou, 2005).  
At the central level, marketized SOEs emerged through a combination of shareholding 
diversification, reorganization of government ministries, and reform experimentation advocated by 
top leaders within the government. Some of these central marketized SOEs (CMSOEs) such as 
Baosteel, China Ocean Shipping Company, and ZTE have undergone extensive upgrading of their 
internal governance and professionalization in their top management teams including appointing 
external independent directors or foreign senior managers. More importantly, firms such as ZTE 
have even taken steps to introduce mixed private ownership at the holding company level to 
improve their managerial autonomy. By 2013, over 52% of central SOEs have successfully 
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transitioned into mixed ownership enterprises. The pace of marketization accelerated as the 
Chinese government recognized the importance of building more dynamic market-oriented 
companies to compete with the influx of foreign rivals pouring into China’s domestic market after 
it joined the WTO in 2001 (Liu & Woo, 2001). Compared to LMSOEs which are subject to harder 
budget constraints from fiscal decentralization (Park, Li, & Tse, 2006), CMSOEs remain relatively 
less burdened by welfare responsibilities, especially since the central government has increasingly 
devolved ownership over lesser-performing central enterprises to provincial governments while 
maintaining control over the most valuable and profitable central SOEs. 
 Falling at the other end of the spectrum, are private firms which do not receive any 
institutional support from the government. While such firms may exercise complete operational 
autonomy, they are also restricted from accessing channels of credit or policy support from the 
government. Given the diverse range of ownership identities stemming from corporate ownership 
reform, we propose that such ownership differences between marketized and non-marketized 
shareholders as well as different types of marketized shareholders may confer varying degrees of 
institutional competitive advantage to firms in their overseas strategies. 
 
3.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Recent studies on EMNCs’ overseas internationalization patterns have recognized the importance 
of home country institutions on their ability to springboard abroad (Dau, 2012; Liu, Lu, & Chizema, 
2014; Luo & Wang, 2012; Peng, Li, Pinkam, Hao, 2009; Wang, C., Hong, J., Kafouros, M., & 
Wright, 2012). Some studies emphasize that home institutions may confer certain benefits to firms, 
especially in the case of emerging market state-owned multinationals where state ownership may 
confer preferential policy support such as subsidies, cheap inputs and raw materials, and abundant 
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loans (Cui & Jiang, 2010; Luo, Xue & Han, 2010; Rui & Yip, 2008). Such benefits have been 
categorized as a form of ‘institution-related capital’ for internationalization (Luo & Yao, 2006; 
Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Boateng, 2012). However, the character, availability and composition 
of such state-dependent forms of capital may vary as institutional environments evolve, generating 
important implications for firms’ ability to leverage them in foreign markets.  
Advancing this line of logic forward further, we draw from a new stream of literature which 
embraces a more dynamic perspective by suggesting that interactions between firms and their 
surrounding institutions can create supportive or disabling conditions for firms’ international 
strategies (Martin, 2014; Sun, Peng, Lee, & Tan, 2014). In elaborating his concept of institutional 
competitive advantage, Martin (2014: 55) highlights the importance of exploring the 
‘environmental characteristics and processes that jointly explain the connection between 
institutions, distinctive strategy, and competitive advantage’ of firms. Other studies have also 
emphasized the importance of investigating the mechanisms connecting institutions with firms’ 
competitive advantages in transition economy contexts (Hermelo & Vassolo, 2010). This 
perspective is highly salient under circumstances where institutional change processes such as 
corporate ownership reform can redefine vital interactions between firms and their institutional 
ecosystem. Extending beyond static conceptions of the relationship between firms and their 
institutional environment, this approach advances a finer-grained focus to explore how shifts in 
their interactions can activate different resources and strategic incentives for firms’ overseas 
strategies, thereby leading them to cultivate distinctive institutional competitive advantages. 
          EMNCs are known to be more organizationally diverse compared to DMNCs due to the 
plurality of ownership types which co-exist in transitional corporate systems in emerging market 
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countries (Peng, Tan & Tong, 2004). This can be primarily attributed to the differential ownership 
reform treatments received by EMNCs which may lead to assorted heterogeneity and a 
corresponding asymmetrical endowment in their institutional competitive advantages. According 
to Martin (2014: 64), ‘institutions and their presence are not immutable, and that too participates 
in shifting resources and prospects for a firm’. However, such firm-level processes of evolution 
have been largely overlooked in the international business literature (Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 
2010). To push this vein of inquiry, we first evaluate some critical changes in the reformed 
ownership identities of Chinese firms to unravel how their institutional attributes have transformed. 
Similar to other EMNCs undergoing market transition, Chinese firms have undergone extensive 
restructuring to upgrade their competitiveness. In exploring the multifaceted nature of such 
restructuring, we identify the sources of variation among different types of shareholders which 
contribute to reshape firms’ institutional competitive advantage for overseas venturing. 
Main Effects of Reformed Ownership on Foreign Market Entry 
The emergence of marketized shareholders represents an innovation in organizational form which 
has not been discussed extensively in international management research although it is widely 
examined in the literature on transition economies (Boisot & Child, 1996; Delios et al., 2006; Nee, 
1992). In contrast to non-marketized firms which operate as an ‘appendage of the state’ to serve 
redistributive and strategic functions set forth by the state (Nee, 1992: 7), marketized shareholders 
possess an extra degree of managerial freedom derived from their reformed ownership which aligns 
them more closely with market incentive mechanisms. Such firms may not possess the same degree 
of autonomy as private firms, but according to (Boisot & Child, 1996: 32), ‘their effective freedom 
of economic action is usually greater because of the support they enjoy from local institutional 
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intermediaries such as banks’. Furthermore, in an empirical study on ownership transformed 
Chinese SOEs, Jefferson & Su (2006) evaluated the effect of ownership conversion on firm 
performance. They observed that although ownership restructuring had little immediate impact on 
sales profitability, the infusion of non-state shareholding had a longer term positive impact on labor 
and capital productivity, as well as higher R&D intensity. They conclude that the introduction of 
mixed ownership heightens the profit-seeking behavior of marketized SOEs by deepening their 
commitment to R&D and innovation, as well as optimizing their return on capital and return on 
labor to improve efficiency gains.  
By contrast, non-marketized firms continue to rely on vertical ties to government bureaus 
which transfer to them materials and capital resources according to bureaucratic planning and 
coordination. Such firms ‘can only produce for the market once they have satisfied the requirements 
of the plan, and in many cases the prices of both inputs and outputs under the plan are fixed 
administratively…one-third of [non-marketized] state enterprises are overtly loss-making while 
another third have so-called hidden (unpaid) debts; these firms rely on subsidies to keep them afloat’ 
(Boisot & Child, 1996: 31). Based on observations drawn by Delios et al. (2006), Nee (1992) and 
Boisot & Child (1996), the prevailing pattern of behavior characterizing non-marketized firms is 
their restricted managerial autonomy, lower levels of performance efficiency, and bureaucratic 
rigidity. From both a resource and behavioral view, non-marketized firms appear to face greater 
structural challenges and demonstrate limited value-creating potential.  
The differences highlighting these forms of ownership are likely to confer varying degrees of 
institutional advantages to marketized and non-marketized shareholders which are circumscribed 
by their access to institutional resources and behaviors endorsed by institutional stakeholders. With 
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respect to their resources, both marketized and non-marketized firms receive financial support from 
the state, but since marketized firms exhibit higher return to capital investment and stronger 
performance, they are more likely to receive extra government support to compete with foreign 
MNCs in overseas markets. For example, in 2012 ZTE received a $20 billion dollar loan from the 
China Development Bank for the exclusive purpose of overseas expansion to become a leading 
contender among top global smartphone makers. According to a statement by the company, ‘The 
principal terms of the agreement include the provision by CDB of a $20 billion facility for 
cooperation, comprising financing facilities for the company's overseas projects and credit facilities 
for the company. The agreement forms the framework of business cooperation for an effective 
period of five years.’ Moreover, marketized firms also possess greater strategic flexibility and face 
fewer bureaucratic hurdles to utilize their revenues for investing abroad. From this overall 
standpoint, marketized firms may derive stronger institutional resources for international venturing. 
In relation to their strategic behavior, operating in competitive market-driven conditions has 
encouraged marketized firms to elevate their sensitivity to market signals by developing stronger 
customer focus, acquiring market information, and formulating niche product differentiation 
strategies which set them apart from traditional state owned firms. In an empirical study on the 
market orientation of Chinese SOEs, Li, Sun & Liu (2006) found that enhanced market competitive 
pressure, formalized corporate governance, and reduced government control had a positive effect 
on SOEs’ market orientation. Furthermore, market orientation which was operationalized as a 
three-dimensional construct consisting of the generation of market intelligence, dissemination of 
intelligence across the organization, and organization-wide responsiveness was positively 
associated with organizational performance.  We propose that such increasing inclination for 
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marketized SOEs to expand their search capabilities and knowledge horizons about both clients 
and competitors alike also improves their ability to handle the challenges associated with adapting 
to rapidly evolving global market conditions. The ability to acquire and leverage complex market 
knowledge may confer stronger competitive advantages to marketized firms compared to their non-
marketized counterparts for identifying and exploiting overseas market opportunities. Combining 
the strengths of their institutional resources with their institutionally endorsed behaviors, 
marketized firms are more likely to exhibit greater institutional competitive advantages to engage 
in FDI activities. To summarize, given marketized shareholders’ stronger institutional competitive 
advantages, we predict: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Marketized state ownership, both at central and local government levels, has a 
stronger positive association with a firm’s foreign market entry compared to non-marketized state 
ownership. 
 
        While marketization has rendered SOEs more profit-driven, not all marketized SOEs can be 
bundled together since certain subsets of these firms were exposed to varying ownership reform 
treatments. Substantive differences in ownership restructuring between marketized SOEs at 
different levels of government may lead to distinctive variations in the way these marketized SOEs 
interact with their surrounding institutional environments. According to Martin (2014: 59, 64) 
‘…at various levels, institutions exhibit a complex of effects that may promote or hinder economic 
and organizational outcomes’ and the ‘scope for institutions to differentially enable resource 
accretion’ contributes to firm heterogeneity, thus leading to their varying abilities to acquire 
institutional competitive advantage.  
        Divergences in the reform pathways of CMSOEs and LMSOEs thus hold important 
implications for their potential to cultivate institutional competitive advantages for overseas 
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venturing. Relative to LMSOEs, the evolution of CMSOEs has followed the streamlining and 
reform of the central government apparatus. Some CMSOEs were formed as products of complex 
and substantial reorganizations at the central ministerial level which altered China’s industrial 
landscape while others emerged from experiments by the central government to serve as 
centerpieces of reform. The merging of certain ministries and obsolescence of others enabled the 
government to inject competitive economic dynamics into otherwise lackluster sectors. For 
example, within the defense sector alone, by 1993 the Ministry of Energy Resources was converted 
into the China National Nuclear Corporation, the Ministry of Coal Industry and the Ministry of 
Electric Power Industry were both re-established, while the Ministry of Machine Building and 
Electronics Industry was divided into three separate entities – the Ministry of Electronics Industry, 
the Ministry of Machine Industry, and the Northern Chinese Industries Corporation (NORINCO).  
          Although central SOEs such as China National Nuclear Corporation and NORINCO are 
considered as non-marketized industry companies under Delios et al.’s (2006) classification 
scheme, other firms including ZTE Corporation have become marketized through shareholding 
reform. By 1999, the Chinese government had embraced the restructuring of large and medium-
sized SOEs into shareholding companies with mixed ownership and enshrined this policy during 
the 4th plenary session of its 15th annual Communist Party Congress. Originally founded as a 
subsidiary of the China Aerospace Science Technology Corporation and the China Aerospace 
Science and Industry Corporation, ZTE was transformed into a partially privatized firm and its 
controlling holding company has been 49% privately held over the past decade. Institutional and 
foreign shareholders including Deutsche Bank, China Life Insurance Company, HKSCC Nominees, 
Agricultural Bank of China, JP Morgan Chase, PNB Paribas and Sun Life Financial consistently 
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serve among its top 10 shareholders.  Other CMSOEs include listed subsidiaries of CITIC Group 
(China International Trust and Investment Corporation) which has diversified into the utilities, real 
estate, telecoms, airlines, natural resource, and banking industries. Founded in 1979, CITIC Group 
was the brainchild of a private industrialist who was appointed by the central government to 
promote market liberalization and foreign investment into China. Although the parent company of 
CITIC Group is controlled by the Ministry of Finance, its listed subsidiaries have undergone 
extensive shareholding diversification into marketized firms.  
Moreover, over the past 10 years, the central government has actively reduced the number 
of central SOEs from over 170 to 116 SOEs through a series of mega mergers between them while 
transferring their less valuable and non-performing assets to local governments or state asset 
management companies. Nonetheless, from 2001 to 2010, the total value-added including 
compensation for labor, profits, and taxes paid by central SOEs has quadrupled. This suggests that 
instead of downgrading the profiles of reformed central SOEs, the central government has 
proactively cultivated their competitiveness by concentrating their resources through strategic 
mergers and transforming them into flagship companies. As a result, CMSOEs not only exhibit 
greater strategic agility and responsiveness, but also a deeper reservoir of financial resources, 
reputational capital, and foreign networks which can be leveraged for their foreign operations 
(Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Luo et al., 2010). This combination of access to robust institutional 
resources and strong market orientation imbues CMSOEs with considerable institutional 
competitive advantages to absorb the risks associated with overseas FDI.  
        On the other hand, the pattern of corporate restructuring for LMSOEs has deviated along an 
alternate trajectory which can be traced to the gradual separation of economic coordination 
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responsibilities between central and local governments underpinning a recalibration of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations (Li et al., 2014). During the 1990s, control rights over many 
SOEs became increasingly decentralized to local state authorities (Huang, Li, Ma, & Xu, 2014). 
For example, in 1998 the State Council decreed that all 94 SOEs and their subsidiaries in the coal 
industry would be transferred from central to local jurisdiction. Following this transfer, provincial 
governments assumed fiscal responsibility for 3.2 million workers and 1.3 million retirees (Nie & 
Jiang, 2011). In accordance with the state’s new decentralization initiative, local governments were 
charged with the mandate to ‘first decentralize, then restructure ownership’ of local SOEs (Huang 
et al., 2014). By the end of the 1990s, over 80% of local SOEs were transformed into LMSOEs 
through partial privatization and reorganizations.  
At the same time, local governments were assigned greater roles to support burgeoning 
social welfare, education, employment, pension and infrastructure costs through self-generated 
revenues (Jin & Zou, 2005; Steinfeld, 1998). Although fiscal decentralization increased the ability 
of local governments to collect revenues from LMSOEs, it also obligated local governments to 
cover a rising portion of economic development costs which the central government no longer 
supports. However, according to Jin & Zou (2005: 1051), ‘local governments simply do not have 
the social and economic endowments to generate the revenue required to finance their spending 
requirements.’ As local governments assumed responsibility for their financial survival, they began 
to push LMSOEs to perform (Oi, 1992; Jin, Qian, & Weingast, 2005) which placed LMSOEs under 
heightened institutional pressure to address local domestic growth and fiscal priorities.  
            To summarize, the emergence of a new division of responsibilities between central and 
local governments flowing from decentralization has led to differential patterns of corporate 
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restructuring for central and local SOEs, which not only redefined their priorities but also their 
ability to access to institutional resources. As a result of such distance in the legitimating 
expectations of central and local governments, LMSOEs are less likely to enjoy the same 
institutional competitive advantages for engaging in OFDI compared to CMSOEs. Therefore, we 
predict: 
Hypothesis 1b: The positive effect of marketized state ownership is stronger for central marketized 
state ownership than local marketized state ownership. 
 
Moderating Effects of State-Owned Business Group Affiliation 
 To acquire institutional competitive advantages, firms interact with their surrounding institutions 
which can create enabling conditions for them to acquire resources or engage in strategic behavior 
which are conducive to outward FDI. Such interactions can be channeled through equity-based 
ownership arrangements or through meso-level institutional mechanisms for coordination and 
governance such as business group affiliation. A plethora of studies have linked the popularity of 
business group structures in emerging markets to institutional antecedents by suggesting that 
business groups help to mitigate the factor market imperfections, information asymmetries, and 
underdeveloped capital markets created by ‘institutional voids’ in these countries (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997). Some researchers also argue that business group conglomeration as an 
organizational form evolved partly due to distinct patterns of institutional change and adaptation 
(Carney & Gedajlovic, 2001; Keister, 1998; Zattoni, Pedersen, & Kumar, 2009). In China, where 
the government wielded strict control over reform directions, the formation of state owned business 
groups into economic clusters was aimed to reduce transaction costs, build collaborative synergies, 
and improve economies of scale during its economic transition (Keister, 1998).  
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While most studies have either focused on the direct effects of business group affiliation or 
ownership structure on EMNCs’ ability to engage in outward FDI (Chittor et al., 2009; Kumar, 
Gaur, & Pattnaik, 2012; Tan & Meyer, 2010; Yiu, 2011), scant attention has been dedicated to 
exploring how firms’ interactions with institutions via equity-based ownership arrangements may 
be influenced by other potential non-equity based channels such as business group affiliation. In 
other words, firms may derive their institutional competitive advantages from both sources so it is 
essential to consider their joint effects. From an institutional standpoint, group affiliation may bring 
both positive advantages and costs. On the one hand business groups are viewed as constituting a 
‘micro-institutional’ platform for international venturing (Yiu, 2011). Leveraging group specific 
advantages such as resource-pooling, bridging market imperfections, and inter-firm linkages can 
significantly reduce the costs and barriers to establishing foreign operations. An affiliated firm may 
not only benefit from the internal financial market formed by the group to allocate capital among 
its members, but also shared reputational capital and intra-organizational relationships within the 
group umbrella (He, Mao, Rui, & Zha, 2013; Ma, Yao, & Xi, 2006; Lamin, 2013). However, such 
benefits are balanced by the challenges of reconciling multiple agency relationships associated with 
the complexities of internal cross-lending, coordinating intra-group decisions and managing 
divergent group interests (Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, Van Essen & Oosterhout, 2011).  
In China, the formative conditions underlying the creation of business groups  reflects to a 
larger degree earlier efforts by the government to cluster firms into coalitions characterized by 
orchestrated economic coordination. In contrast to countries such as India, where most business 
groups are private or family-owned, the majority of business groups in China are typically owned 
by the state. During the 1990s, the Chinese government rearranged various organizational units 
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across the country into larger pilot business groups to consolidate their resources, organizational 
capital and capabilities (Keister, 1998; Lin & Milhaupt, 2013). In this reform period, the 
government endeavored to minimize losses from underperforming SOEs while strengthening their 
autonomy and market competitiveness.  
A significant number of SOEs and former government ministries were restructured into multi-
tiered business groups in which stronger members served as core companies to coordinate resource 
allocation and information flow to lesser tiers.  Policies from the state would also be transmitted 
down the chain of command within the group. The formation of state business groups also served 
another purpose. By clustering SOEs together into groups, the state could exercise oversight over 
backbone industries and key economic sectors by monitoring only a few hundred large state-owned 
business groups (Lin & Milhaupt, 2013). The prevalence of state business groups suggests that 
there are two channels by which firms could derive strategic resources from the state. First, firms 
may obtain benefits from their immediate state shareholders or they could also extract tangible and 
intangible resources through their  affiliation to a state business group.                                              
Logically, this observation implies that firms’ institutional competitive advantages may not only 
be determined from their ownership by state shareholders, but also from their association with state 
controlled business groups. Consequently, their effects should be jointly taken into consideration 
when evaluating the ability of firms to acquire institutional competitive advantages for 
internationalization.  
Given the insights obtained from previous studies on the resource allocation role of business 
groups, it is likely that affiliated members with more munificent resources, better performance, and 
knowledge may fall under greater institutional obligation to share their capital with less endowed 
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group members. Prior studies on business groups in Asian countries have found that comparatively 
weaker firms have leveraged their business groups via resource sharing and internal group 
transactions to sustain performance and mitigate risk (Chang & Hong, 2000; Friedman, Johnson & 
Mitton, 2003; Kim & Hoskisson, 1996). This widely studied resource distribution mechanism is 
administered via internal finance companies embedded within business groups to facilitate 
intercompany lending (Colpan, Hikino, & Lincoln, 2010; Keister, 1998; Lin & Milhaupt, 2013) 
and may enable some group members to derive greater institutional advantages relative to others. 
For CMSOEs which possess abundant capital, stronger networks and other tangible and intangible 
resources, membership to a state business group can task them with added responsibilities such as 
helping less resourceful affiliate firms. Since one of the primary purposes behind state business 
group formation is for the government to establish a scaffolding system during its transition reform 
period to enable stronger firms to insulate weaker members, such business group affiliation may 
diminish the beneficial impact of CMSOE shareholding on firms’ ability to derive resources for 
overseas investment. 
 In a recent empirical study on Chinese business groups, He et al. (2013) investigated the 
effect of ownership type on the role of internal capital markets played by Chinese business groups 
by comparing the investment-cash flow sensitivity of group affiliated firms with private, local 
government and central government ownership. They found that the internal financial market of 
business groups is more likely to help those group-affiliated SOEs with private and local 
government ownership relative to those with central government ownership. Based on their 
findings, they propose that both private firms and local SOEs face larger financial constraints which 
render them more reliant on group resources to support their business operations. This finding 
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suggests that LMSOEs may derive greater benefits from state business group affiliation compared 
to CSMOEs. In essence, affiliation to a business group situates its members in a complex 
institutional field characterized by multiple agency relationships which sacrifices the resource 
advantages of stronger members to subsidize weaker members. Therefore we predict: 
Hypothesis 2a: State business group affiliation weakens the positive effect of CMSOE ownership 
on firms’ foreign market entry, in that the effect of CMSOE ownership will be less positive for firms 
affiliated with state business groups than unaffiliated firms.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: State business group affiliation strengthens the positive effect of LMSOE ownership 
on firms’ foreign market entry, in that the effect of LMSOE ownership will be stronger for firms 
affiliated with state business groups than unaffiliated firms. 
 
3.4 METHODOLOGY  
 
Sample Description 
Given the longitudinal nature of corporate ownership reform, our sample consists of publicly traded 
Chinese firms which remain consecutively listed from 2002-2009 on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges. Our data was constructed by manually coding data on all foreign subsidiaries, 
including domestic and foreign subsidiaries from annual reports and matching them with detailed 
firm-level ownership and financial data compiled from the WIND database has been used in other 
empirical studies (Peng, Sun, & Tan; 2008). The primary reason for utilizing data from publicly 
listed firms can be attributed to the transparency of their shareholding structure. Thus, it is possible 
not only to trace the identities of immediate shareholders but also intermediate and ultimate 
shareholders to observe their ownership restructuring patterns. After accounting for missing data 
and reporting errors, our sample includes 973 firms over an 8 year period consisting of 7784 
observations. Out of this sample, 589 firms were in manufacturing, 349 firms in service-related 
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industries and 35 firms in the primary sector. We identify 801 overseas subsidiaries established by 
225 listed firms in 79 countries from 2002-2009. Our data coverage begins immediately following 
China’s WTO entry in 2001 to account for the rapidly growing outward FDI flows by Chinese 
firms in these subsequent years.  
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable, new FDI entry, records the number of newly established overseas 
subsidiaries by a firm in a given year. A longitudinal record of new foreign subsidiaries on yearly 
basis captures the firm’s on-going engagement in FDI. Compared to other measures of 
internationalization such as firm exports and international sales ratio, the number of new FDI 
entries captures more solid evidence of firms’ ability to establish a tangible presence in foreign 
markets. We determined the establishment year of each overseas subsidiary by comparing 
subsidiary lists of the listed firm during our sample period. If an overseas subsidiary appears in the 
annual report of a firm during one year but not in previous years, we further check the annual report 
and other public announcements to confirm that subsidiary’s establishment. We code all new 
foreign entries from 2002-2009 and account for delayed temporal effects of our explanatory 
variables by applying a one year lag between explanatory and dependent variables. The lag reduces 
our sample size from 7784 to 6653 observations and shortens our dataset to 7 years.   
Independent Variables 
Our key explanatory variables capture two main categories of reformed ownership and non-
marketized ownership. We obtain the ownership percentages for each firm’s top 10 shareholders 
from the WIND database since listed companies must report top 10 shareholders’ equity 
percentages and their ultimate owner. This higher level of transparency enables us to accurately 
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classify these shareholders according to the new corporate ownership classification system 
developed by Delios et al., (2006) which account for the reformed status of Chinese listed firms. 
The corporate structures of Chinese firms are noted to be complex and obfuscating (Lin & Milhaupt, 
2013) with some conglomerates nested below many ownership tiers. Listed firms, as conglomerates 
in their own right, are usually situated in the second or third level of ownership beneath an 
intermediary holding company and a core parent company. Since listed firms are positioned in 
upper ownership tiers, we can obtain detailed information about their immediate and ultimate 
shareholders which facilitates identification of their ownership identities.  
Given this extensively available data, we coded the top 10 shareholders of each firm 
according to Delios et al.’s (2006) fine-grained classification scheme. In their framework, Delios 
et al., (2006) established three comprehensive categories of ownership, namely government, 
marketized, and private ownership to which they assigned 16 shareholding subcategories. This new 
ownership classification scheme was developed to capture recent changes in shareholding identities 
associated with corporate ownership reform in China. In particular, the first wave of ownership 
reform was characterized by partial privatization of SOEs starting in the 1990s with many large 
SOEs going public to raise minority tradable shares by selling them to private actors while the state 
retained majority control over non-tradable shares (Liao, Liu, & Wang, 2014). However, the dual 
existence of tradable and non-tradable shares also created a cumbersome split-share stock structure 
which curtailed the trading of state shares on the secondary market. In other words, non-tradable 
shares which comprise of state shares and legal person shares were not listed and could only be 
transferred via agreement between relevant parties. Only tradable shares of firms could be listed 
and issued to institutional legal persons, individuals or foreigners. Moreover, tradable shares are 
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classified under different schemes which include A-shares issued by mainland incorporated firms 
which are traded in Shanghai and Shenzhen and quoted in RMB, B-shares issued by mainland 
companies which are traded in Shanghai and Shenzen but quoted in HK dollars and H–shares issued 
by mainland companies but traded only in Hong Kong. Firms may list these different categories of 
shares on both the mainland markets and the HK market which is more accessible to foreign 
investors.   
While this initial ownership classification system is nominally demarcated by the share 
transaction regulations set forth by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, it does not 
provide a clear link to the actual ownership identities of different shareholders. According to Delios 
et al., (2006: 325), ‘we can clearly see that state-owned shares (guoyou gu) consist of two parts: 
state shares (guojia gu) and state-owned legal person shares (guoyou faren gu). Yet, these two parts 
rest in two different categories in the official classification. Even this simple description reveals a 
problem in the content validity as it relates to the identities of shareholders in the official 
classification scheme.’ Given such obfuscation of the shareholding identities of Chinese listed 
firms, Delios et al., (2006) proposed a new classification system by identifying shareholders based 
on substantive criteria relating to their functional and strategic characteristics (please see Appendix 
3.2 for a comparison between the official and new ownership classification scheme). Reflecting 
the tangible impact of ownership reforms, a new category of marketized shareholding was 
incorporated into the new classification system to complement the non-marketized state 
shareholding category while newly privatized security companies and investment funds were added 
to the existing category of private firms.    
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Based on Delios et al.’s (2006) updated shareholding classification system which more 
accurately captures new trends and incentives in the strategic behaviour of Chinese firms, we 
utilized this matrix to group shareholders into detailed ownership categories. Four independent 
coders were tasked with coding shareholders by verifying their backgrounds using information 
from shareholders’ annual reports, company websites, financial articles in newspapers, and public 
announcements. Our coding method followed rigorous procedures in which coders switched 
between their own coding and checking each other’s work every other day. A fifth coder was 
responsible for independently monitoring their work and performing extra background searches to 
resolve any disagreements between coders to clarify ambiguous cases. First, shareholders were 
assigned into one of the 16 shareholding subcategories. Then they were sorted into the three broad 
ownership categories. We separated out private shareholders, and re-categorized marketized and 
non-marketized shareholders by process of elimination. Firms which were directly owned by 
government ministries and bureaus, state asset investment and management bureaus, government 
research institutes, industry companies and state owned banks were generally categorized as non-
marketized shareholders.  
In addition to filtering out these firms, we identified marketized shareholders based on the 
important criteria of whether they had successfully engaged in shareholding diversification under 
the joint-stock reform through the introduction of institutional, private, or foreign owners at the 
holding group level (Li, 2006). Firms which have diversified their shareholding by transferring no 
less than 5% of their total shares to individual non-state block shareholders qualify under this 
requirement (Zhang, 2011). We apply this procedure since block shareholders do not typically hold 
large blocks of shares for the purpose of trading them in the secondary market. They represent 
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important stakeholders serving the role of strategic investors with an interest to improve the long-
term managerial performance and corporate governance of their invested firms. In practice, firms 
with diversified corporate ownership often have multiple non-state minority block shareholders 
and a controlling state majority owner which typifies the vast number of listed SOEs falling under 
this category. 
According to China’s State Economic and Trade Commission, by 2001, over 64.18% of all 
SOEs have undergone such shareholding diversification. Firms which have not undergone such 
restructuring process were excluded. In our selection process, we found that several industry 
companies which were separated from former ministries such as ZTE had not only implemented 
shareholding diversification but also introduced mixed private ownership by the early 2000s. 
Meanwhile, military owned companies such as NORINCO remain 100% controlled by the 
government and were not subject to shareholding diversification. This led us to observe some 
exceptions to the Delios et al.,’s (2006) classification scheme. Another category of firms which 
have not received much attention in this classification system are university-run S&T enterprises 
which are majority owned by a university holding company reporting to the Ministry of Education 
but founded and managed by university professors turned entrepreneurs (Eun et al., 2006). To 
encourage their managerial and profit incentives, minority shares in these companies are often 
allocated to these founding academics. For example, Peking University Founder Group, a large 
conglomerate with stakes in IT, healthcare, real estate, and banking industries is 70% owned by 
Peking University Asset Management Company and 30% owned by its senior management team 
through Beijing Zhaorun Investment Management Company.  
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Furthermore, a recent empirical study by Jefferson, Jiang & Tortorice (2014) on the 
restructuring of Chinese research institutes found that university-run S&T firms had substantially 
augmented their non-government revenues and patent productivity after shifting their reliance away 
from government grants.  Given their strong commercial orientation and mixed ownership, these 
university-run firms should be distinguished from government research institutes and universities 
which are categorized as non-marketized firms by Delios et al., (2006). Lastly we separated 
marketized firms into CMSOEs and LMSOEs based on their level of government affiliation. We 
repeated this coding process for each year of our sample, thus capturing any changes in 
shareholding identities associated with the ongoing process of corporate ownership reform.  
In addition to shareholding diversification, marketized firms have also undergone significant 
corporate governance reforms which coincide with their ownership transformation and 
restructuring. In the vast majority of cases, ownership reform through the introduction of non-state 
strategic investors is accompanied by the adoption of new governance practices relating to the 
appointment of senior managers, operational autonomy and disclosure which are brought in by 
those investors. Following a survey of 950 Chinese firms, Zhang (2011) found that after 
restructuring, the majority of marketized firms have adopted shareholding covenants between new 
strategic investors and government shareholders which govern the conditions for establishing the 
shareholding proportion, the distribution of voting rights, composition of board of directors, and 
exit arrangements.  
As of 2001, the State Economic and Trade Commission estimated that over 89.9% of 
marketized firms and 76.4% of non-marketized firms appointed their senior managers using 
market-based selection approaches. This figure indicates that ownership reform is still the more 
105 
 
rigorous criteria to serve as a basis for evaluating the extent of a firm’s marketization. Nonetheless, 
we dedicated careful attention to corroborating marketized firms’ ownership reform with any 
corresponding improvements in corporate governance practices by examining whether they had 
introduced new codes regulating the hiring of independent board members and professional 
managers, protection of minority shareholders, and corporate disclosure. Such information was 
collected and triangulated by combing through their annual reports, related newspaper articles, 
company websites, and investment reports.  
We coded marketized shareholders based on their shareholding reform history and corporate 
governance improvements described above. An inter-coder reliability check showed that the four 
coders reached agreement in 93.2% of all cases without further clarifications. The remaining cases 
were resolved together with the fifth coder. Owing to the transitional nature of ownership reform, 
some firms which appeared to belong to one shareholding subcategory may also fit into another 
category especially when the ownership composition of the holding company changes and state 
shares are transferred to legal person and private shareholders. Therefore more extensive research 
was needed to examine available public information on the shareholding structure of these firms to 
reach clarification. For a detailed summary of Delios et al.’s (2006) ownership classification system 
which we adapted to incorporate new categories of marketized and non-marketized state 
shareholders, please see Appendix 3.1.  
Moderator and Control Variables  
 We coded the business group affiliations of each firm in our sample based on the official annual 
publication Large Corporations of China, a directory of China’s largest business groups collected 
by the National Bureau of Statistics from China (Lu & Ma, 2008). Further research into the 
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backgrounds of each business group through company websites and annual reports revealed that 
the majority of such registered business groups are state-owned. Our variable is a dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if a listed firm is an affiliate of a qualifying state-owned business group in a 
given year. Since some listed firms may be affiliated with more than one state-owned business 
group, we took measures not to double-count their status.  
In addition to our moderating effects, we control for the private shareholding category 
specified by Delios et al., (2006) as comprising of security companies, investment funds, 
individuals, as well as foreign and private entities. Following previous studies, we also include 
other typical factors which may influence firms’ FDI decisions which include firm size proxied by 
the natural log of total firm assets which broadly reflects the resources available to the (Cui & Jiang, 
2012), international performance measured by foreign sales ratio which is an indicator of firm 
success and exposure in overseas markets (Sullivan, 1994), previous FDI entry to capture firm 
internationalization experience (Boeh & Beamish, 2012), firm age which consists of the total 
number of years of firm operation and reflects a firm’s maturity (Tallman & Li, 1996), overall firm 
performance measured by ROE (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997), and access to liquidity proxied by 
the current ratio (ratio of current assets to current liabilities) to measure the firm’s ability to meet 
its short-term cash obligations without having to raise additional capital for investment (Palepu, 
1986).  
 
3.5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Since our dependent variable is a count variable measuring the number of new FDI entries made 
by firms and our initial examination of the data presents evidence of over-dispersion in the outcome 
variable, the negative binomial (NB) model would serve as an appropriate estimation technique. A 
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cursory tabulation of our data also reveals the presence of zero-inflation since 748 out of 973 firms 
did not establish foreign subsidiaries, and the majority of those firms which did engage in FDI did 
not make many repetitive entries over the eight year sample period. Out of a total number of 7784 
observations, 7380 of these observations had a value of zero for the dependent variable. Due to this 
overabundance of zeros, the zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) might serve as a more 
suitable substitute for the NB model. The Vuong (1989) test is typically performed to determine 
which model would offer the best fit, although recent studies (Allison, 2012) have found that the 
difference in the quality of fit between NB and ZINB models is typically negligible. Applying the 
Vuong test which compares the NB model with the ZINB model, we obtain a test statistic of z = 
0.81. The z-value was insignificant which indicates that the ZINB model does not offer more 
accurate fit compared to the NB model. Given this result, we adopt the NB model for our study. 
Due to our longitudinal data structure, applying a fixed effects approach in combination with 
the NB model would be preferable to account for within firm variation that may lead to unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity among them. However, current techniques for estimating fixed-effects 
over-dispersion models are only available for conditional fixed effects which do not qualify as a 
true unconditional fixed effects method (Allison & Waters, 2002). To circumvent this challenge, 
Allison & Waters (2002) recommended a conventional NB estimation with dummy variables for 
all individuals to represent fixed effects but they acknowledged this estimation method is only 
computationally feasible when the number of dummies for individuals is low. Since unconditional 
fixed effects for NB models are not available for panel data with large number of individuals, we 
use a pooled cross-section estimation approach where all observations for the period between 2002 
and 2009 are included along with year dummies and a forward lag structure for the dependent 
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variable to account for time. We run the model using cluster-robust standard errors to control for 
correlation across firms over time (Rabe-Hasketh & Skrondal, 2012).  
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations matrix of the independent 
variables. Correlations between most independent variables are quite low which reduces potential 
for multicollinearity. Since the correlation between lag of New FDI Entry and Past FDI Entry is 
slightly higher than normal (0.68), we run additional diagnostic measures to obtain the variance 
inflation factor (1.11) and the matrix condition number (2.65) which both fall well beneath critical 
thresholds thus minimizing any collinearity concerns. Following Chang et al. (2006), we control 
for such dynamic feedback effect in our NB regressions. Table 3.2 presents our findings on the 
differential effects of CMSOE, LMSOE and non-marketized shareholding on firms’ outward FDI 
propensity.  
 
[Place Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 about here] 
 
As shown in Table 3.2, we report results from our NB estimation model. In Model 1a, we 
include our three key independent variables distinguishing the three types of shareholding along 
with control variables to shed light on their main effects. CMSOE ownership yielded a positive 
coefficient significant (p<0.05) in Model 1a, indicating that CMSOE has a positive effect on FDI 
engagement. To provide a more accurate interpretation of our results, we calculate the marginal 
effect of CMSOE ownership holding other independent variables at their mean value. The marginal 
effects obtained for the NB model indicate that for one standard deviation increase in CMSOE 
ownership from its mean, the probability for foreign market entry increases by 14.73%. Meanwhile, 
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LMSOE ownership had a positive coefficient as expected but was insignificant in Model 1a. The 
marginal effect of LMSOE ownership was 0.004%, which was also much smaller than that of 
CMSOE ownership, as can be expected due to its insignificant effect. Non-marketized ownership 
also yielded a positive but insignificant coefficient of 0.0008% which was even smaller compared 
to the coefficient for LMSOE ownership. Hence, we found support for H1b, while H1a was 
partially supported.  
The interaction effects between state-owned business group affiliation and reformed 
ownership types are displayed in Model 1b-1c. We had proposed that such interaction may yield 
differential impacts on firms’ FDI entry. Our results show a significant negative interaction 
between CMSOE ownership and state business group affiliation (p<0.05) in Model 1b, supporting 
a negative moderating effect proposed in H2a. Conversely, the interaction between LMSOE 
ownership and state business group affiliation was positive and significant (p<0.05), providing 
support for H2b. Since the coefficient for interaction terms is not very informative for non-linear 
models (Ai & Norton, 2003) it is necessary to test the robustness of the interaction term which 
requires computing its cross-partial derivative effect. Although STATA’s margins command can 
only generate the derivative of a single variable at a time, it is nonetheless possible to obtain the 
interaction effect by calculating the derivative with respect to one variable at different values of 
the other variable to obtain the cross-partial effect (Karaca-Mandic, Norton, & Dowd, 2012: 270-
271). Applying this approach, the interaction effect would be the difference in the marginal effect 
of CMSOE ownership on FDI entry when state-owned business group affiliation shifts from 0 to 
1. Subtracting the difference in the marginal effects of CMSOE ownership as state group affiliation 
changes from 0 to 1, we find that the positive marginal effect of CMSOE ownership decreased by 
110 
 
63.45%. For LMSOE ownership, we find that the marginal effects increased significantly by 153.46% 
when state business group affiliation shifts from 0 to 1. These findings show support for H2a and 
H2b indicating that business group affiliation exerts operate moderating effects on CMSOE and 
LMSOE ownership. The graphical results of both moderating effects while holding all other 
explanatory variables at their mean levels are displayed in Figures 3.1a and 3.1b. 
 
 
[Place Figures 3.1a and 3.1b about here] 
 
In addition to applying the NB estimation model, we performed an alternative specification model 
in order to verify the robustness of our results. We reran our tests using the pooled Poisson model 
with cluster-robust standard errors to account for over-dispersion and correlation issues.  This is a 
valid substitute to the NB and ZINB approaches. The results obtained from this test (presented 
alongside our main results in Table 3.2) are highly consistent with our original results and do not 
affect our findings.   
Among our control variables, private ownership, international sales ratio, total asset size, and 
past foreign entry experience are consistently significant and positive across all models (p<.001). 
The positive effect of private ownership on FDI has also been corroborated in other studies which 
indicate that private firms which are handicapped by domestic government restrictions from 
operating in a number of industries as well as lack of access to domestic credit channels may engage 
in institutional escape by investing overseas to leverage their entrepreneurial skills (Luo et al., 2011; 
Wright et al., 2005). With the freedom to pursue their independent business agendas, private firms 
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may also go abroad to access more efficient factor markets, cultivate R&D capabilities, and benefit 
from stronger IP protection unavailable at home.  
The strong positive association between past FDI experience and new market entry is also 
anticipated since previous experience confers greater confidence and specific knowledge to firms 
which improves their success in future foreign operations. Likewise, the higher a firm’s 
international sales ratio, the greater its foreign profits are compared to its domestic revenues which 
supports the rationale that it may augment its international operations to sustain its growth. The 
positive effect of firm size reflected in total assets suggests that firms which have access to greater 
financial resources are inherently more capable of absorbing the risks associated with international 
investment and more able to dedicate a steady stream of resources for foreign expansion. 
 
3.6 DISCUSSION  
 
What are the consequences of home country institutional reforms for the overseas FDI behavior of 
firms from emerging market countries such as China? We investigate this question by unraveling 
the multifaceted role of corporate ownership reform in reconfiguring the shareholding identities of 
listed firms. The heterogeneous manner in which government shareholders have been restructured 
contributes to an uneven stratification of their institutional endowments, performance capabilities 
and strategic incentives leading them to evolve differential competitive advantages and prospects 
for overseas venturing. In this study we examine the emergence of different categories of reformed 
shareholding on Chinese firms’ propensity to invest abroad as well as how other institutional 
affiliations such as state business group membership may moderate firms’ ownership derived 
resources for cross-border venturing. Drawing from the literature on corporate ownership reform 
in China (Delios et al., 2006; Jefferson & Su, 2006; Nee, 1992; Peng et al., 2004) which links the 
112 
 
effects of such reforms to firm behavior and characteristics, we propose that different types of 
shareholding such as marketized and non-marketized ownership confer varying levels of 
institutional competitive advantages for firms’ overseas expansion. Our research builds on recent 
research which links firm’s ownership structure to its internationalization behavior (Filatotchev, 
Strange, Lien, Piesse, 2007; Bhaumik, Driffield, & Pal, 2010). As firms’ shareholding identities 
evolve, such changes precipitate corresponding adaptation in their capabilities and strategic 
orientations which are likely reflected in their overseas strategies. The results of our study show 
that marketized ownership is positively associated with internationalization especially for 
CMSOEs which were restructured into more dynamic commercial enterprises and receive greater 
institutional support from the central government. However, our findings are less conclusive for 
LMSOE ownership due to its insignificant coefficient while non-marketized ownership yielded an 
unequivocal negligible impact on firms’ likelihood for conducting overseas FDI.  
In addition to our main effects, we examine the moderating effects of state business group 
affiliation which we propose provides a different channel from which institutional resources could 
be extracted for firms’ overseas expansion. Specifically, we argue that affiliation to a state business 
group may complement or erode the benefits derived from ownership on firms’ foreign market 
entry. A firm’s membership to a business group exposes firms to a more complex institutional field 
which subjects them to the expectations of the group. For CMSOE shareholders which already 
possess strong organizational and financial resources for expanding abroad, such affiliation may 
not offer added benefits but render them more susceptible to the priorities of the state business 
group to redistribute and share their resources with weaker group members. However, for LMSOE 
shareholders, firm membership to a state owned business group may improve their access to intra-
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group resources and new sources of information which enable them to proactively engage in FDI. 
The findings of our study corroborates with He et al.,’s (2013) empirical observations that 
ownership is not the sole mechanism for channeling institutional resources but that state business 
group affiliation can facilitate resource redistribution among firms and influence their FDI behavior. 
It also calls attention for a greater need to investigate the interplay between micro and meso-level 
home country institutions to understand their interrelationships and how firms leverage both for 
orchestrating their international business activities.  
 
Contributions and Implications 
 
Recent research has highlighted how changes in the identity and characteristics of firms can be 
triggered by institutional change processes (Cambell, 2004; Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010; 
Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). By evaluating how corporate ownership reforms can alter firms’ 
resource endowments and organizational behavior, we show how home country ‘institution-
enabling’ sources of competitive advantage (Martin, 2014: 55) can be derived, allowing some types 
of ownership-transformed firms to exhibit a higher propensity for overseas commitment of capital 
and resources. Moreover, corporate ownership reform can unfold differently at various levels of 
government, thus differentially reshaping shareholders’ interactions with local institutions and the 
extent and ways in which resource inputs from such institutions are channeled and utilized. In this 
way, the institutional competitive advantage perspective provides a useful framework for analyzing 
the strategic implications of a range of institutional distinctive organizational features which can 
emerge from institutional change including reformed state ownership. In our cataloging of the wide 
array of ownership identities emerging from corporate ownership reform, we have also identified 
new categories of marketized and non-marketized shareholders including military-owned firms, 
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restructured industry companies and university-run enterprises which have not been factored into 
previous studies. The existence of these alternative ownership forms indicates the rise of a greater 
heterogeneity among firms in emerging market countries due to active restructuring programs, and 
the need to broaden the existing domain of research on firm ownership structure and 
internationalization strategy.  
           Another interesting observation from our results is the differential interaction effects 
between firms’ state business group affiliation and their ownership identities on their tendency to 
invest overseas. The exposure of firms to multiple institutional pressures characterizing business 
group affiliation may impinge upon the resource advantages of stronger members while improving 
the endowments of weaker members. In showing how this moderating effect varies for group 
affiliated firms with CSMOE ownership and LSMOE ownership, we contribute a novel perspective 
on how firms’ equity based ownership arrangements may interact synergistically or less compatibly 
with non-equity based institutional affiliation such as state business group membership. Our results 
shed light on some of the multidimensional and contrasting forces at play which reconfigure the 
institutional advantages of firms for undertaking foreign expansion.  
         In relation to practical implications, our study emphasizes the importance for policy-makers 
to understand how the reforms they orchestrate can impart long-lasting consequences for SOEs’ 
FDI prospects. Despite significant measures taken by the Chinese government to establish 
favorable policies and conditions to promote the ‘Going Global’ of Chinese SOEs, such policy 
initiatives have not filtered through various government levels. According to Luo et al., (2010: 70) 
‘the role of provincial governments in OFDI policy-making is limited only to feedback sharing and 
administrative support needed by the central government’. One reason why our H1a was not fully 
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supported may be due to the combined dual effects of delaying such FDI promotion policies from 
reaching the local level and sustained expectations for local SOEs to contribute to local economic 
growth which restricts their willingness to undertake the enhanced risk of offshore investment. In 
addition to favorable financing terms and subsidies for FDI, such policy support comprises of 
overseas market intelligence and practical knowledge on foreign approval procedures and legal 
systems. As a result LSMOEs may be less confident of their ability to navigate foreign markets. 
However, as reforms continue and some entrepreneurial LMSOEs such as Pearl River Piano 
Corporation and Hisense establish stronger footholds in overseas markets, local governments are 
likely to take notice and shift their attention towards soliciting support for these firms. While the 
agenda setting for FDI policies has emanated from the center, local governments can take a more 
active role to influence central government policies and promote more favorable measures that are 
in better alignment with their core business interests.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
While our study is one of the first to examine the effect the effects of reformed ownership on 
emerging market firms’ internationalization patterns, we also identify several limitations which 
lead to future research possibilities. First, our study mainly focuses on the propensity for FDI by 
firms with reformed ownership. Future studies can incorporate the use of other dependent variables 
to capture additional differences in FDI behaviors reflected in reformed firms’ entry mode or 
location choice. Secondly, due to the idiosyncratic nature of institutional reforms in China, the 
findings of our study are mainly applicable to the Chinese context where ownership reforms have 
been implemented more gradually, allowing for the evolution of a spectrum of diverse shareholding 
identities. Future studies can deepen this vein of inquiry by examining the conditions for such 
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underlying institutional heterogeneity in other emerging market countries and investigate how such 
diversity may influence EMNCs’ strategies for outward FDI. 
          To this extent, our findings indicate that country-of-origin effects play a role in shaping the 
micro-level strategies and capabilities of firms to venture overseas. Indeed, not only may 
institutional environments be heterogeneous across countries, but as our paper demonstrates, they 
may also be heterogeneous within countries since reforms do not unfold homogenously inside 
national boundaries. The differential reforms taking place at local and central levels of government 
in China lead to substantive variation in the vital resource endowments and institutional pressures 
for LMSOEs and CMSOEs. Through the analytical lens of institutional diversity, it is possible to 
shed new insights on why they exhibit different institutional competitive advantages for outward 
FDI activity.  
           Finally, while this study does not examine host country institutional or market 
characteristics in tandem with home country institutions, we believe that this research area remains 
under-investigated and portends significant potential. Recent research has found that firms’ host 
country regulatory institutions and level of technological development may influence the entry 
mode decisions of state owned firms (Meyer, Ding, Li & Zhang, 2014). Furthermore, firms which 
have evolved certain specialized capabilities and behavioral features through interactions with their 
domestic institutional context may also be more likely to find a better fit with a designated range 
of overseas markets characterized by complementary institutional environments. This notion of 
‘institutional complementarity’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 2008) highlights the 
possibilities for EMNCs to benefit by pairing FSAs developed under different institutional 
arrangements in the same way that conventional MNCs locate in various countries to optimizvalue  
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creation. By relocating offshore operations in host countries with favorable institutions, firm can 
nurture new capabilities not feasible back home and reconfigure their existing FSAs with these 
capabilities to create novel sources of competitive advantage. Future studies can investigate this 
potential research avenue by simultaneously taking into consideration both domestic and foreign 
institutional conditions in evaluating firms’ foreign location preferences. 
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Figure 3.1a Moderating effect of state business group affiliation on CSMOE ownership 
 
Figure 3.1b Moderating effect of state business group affiliation on LSMOE ownership 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
 Mean S.D. 
Correlations1 
1 2    3    4   5    6 7     8     9  10   11    12  
1. New FDI Entryt+1 .106 0.80 1.00             
2. Central marketized state ownership 2.82 11.2 0.17* 1.00            
3. Local marketized state ownership 23.9 24.4 -0.04* -0.19* 1.00           
4. Non-marketized state ownership 6.24 13.7 -0.01 -0.08* -0.29* 1.00          
5. Private ownership 17.0 18.8  0.01 -0.08* -0.44* -0.17*        1.00         
5. Business group affiliation 0.50 0.49  0.03*  0.14*  0.36* -0.25* -0.47* 1.00        
6. Past FDI Entry 0.27 1.22  0.68*  0.21* -0.08*  -0.01* 0.03* 0.02* 1.00       
7. International Sales Ratio 0.07 0.17  0.05*  0.10* -0.05*  -0.01* 0.03* 0.06* 0.11* 1.00      
8. Total Assets 21.4 1.17  0.14*  0.15*  0.07* -0.07* -0.10* 0.25* 0.17* 0.00 1.00     
9. Firm Age  11.5 6.68 -0.04* -0.04* -0.16*   0.06  -0.04* -0.10* 0.11* 0.02* -0.04* 1.00    
10. ROE 4.86 13.4  0.03*  0.04*  0.04*  -0.05* 0.04* 0.09* 0.04 0.00*  0.23* -0.06* 1.00   
11. Current Ratio 1.44 1.55  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01 -0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.04* -0.07* -0.05* 0.07 1.00  
1 N =7784, * p < .05 
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Table 3.2 Results of negative binomial estimation and pooled Poisson robustness check  
 
DV = Rate of New Foreign Market Entryt+1 
Negative Binomial Pooled Poisson 
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d     Model 2a     Model 2b      Model 2c 
 
Model 2d 
 
Central marketized state ownership (CMSOE) 
 
0.012 (0.004)** 
  
0.028 (0.007)*** 0.013 (0.005)**  0.026 (0.007)*** 0.019 (0.007)** 0.035 (0.007)*** 0.021 (0.007)**  0.035 (0.008)*** 
Local marketized state ownership (LMSOE) 0.001 (0.003)  0.001 (0.0034) -0.009 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005) 0.006 (0.007) 0.006 (0.078) -0.017 (0.009) -0.014 (0.009) 
Non-marketized state ownership 0.0008 (0.007)  0.002 (0.007) -0.001 (0.007) -0.001 (0.007) 0.003 (0.008) 0.013 (0.008) 0.007 (0.008)  0.008 (0.008) 
Private ownership 0.013 (0.003) *** 0.015 (0.003)*** 0.011 (0.003)***  0.012 (0.003)*** 0.020 (0.006)** 0.020 (0.193)** 0.013 (0.006)*  0.015 (0.006)* 
State Business Group Affiliation  0.092 (0.150) 0.088 (0.150)  0.111 (0.165)  -0.052 (0.193) 0.040 (0.239)  0.091 (0.239) 
CMSOE x State Business Group  -0.257 (0.100)*  -0.183 (0.094)*  -0.199 (0.086)*  -0.188 (0.096)* 
LMSOE x State Business Group   0.361 (0.151)*  0.311 (0.154)*   0.726 (0.221)**  0.646 (0.228)** 
Past FDI Entry 0.813 (0.132)*** 0.814 (0.133)*** 0.801 (0.134)***  0.799 (0.135)***  0.158 (0.018)*** 0.158 (0.018)*** 0.159 (0.181)***  0.160 (0.018)*** 
International sales ratio 1.370 (0.274)*** 1.367 (0.277)*** 1.377 (0.272)***  1. 398 (0.277)*** 1.906 (0.276)*** 1.937 (0.277)*** 1.961 (0.271)***  1.978 (0.275)*** 
Total Assets 0.391 (0.067)***  0.392 (0.069)***  0.396 (0.068)***  0.397 (0.069)*** 0.498 (0.058)*** 0.513 (0.066)*** 0.517 (0.067)***  0.525 (0.067)*** 
Firm Age -0.001(0.012)  0.000 (0.012)  -0.0004 (0.012)  0.0004 (0.012) 0.0139 (0.015) 0.014 (0.014) 0.015 (0.015)  0.015 (0.014) 
ROE -0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) -0.0028 (0.004) -0.001 (0.006) -0.001 (0.006) -0.0005 (0.006) -0.001 (0.006) 
Current Ratio 0 .008 (0.032) 0.010 (0.031) 0.009 (0.031)  0.010 (0.030) 0.034 (0.026) 0.037 (0.024) 0.032 (0.025)  0.034 (0.024) 
Year dummies Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included  Included 
Constant -11.62 (1.438)*** -11.76 (1.470)*** -11.50 (1.441)*** -11.62 (1.461)*** -13.61 (1.606)*** -13.94 (1.609)*** -13.50 (1.595)*** -13.81 (1.594)*** 
Log pseudo likelihood -1307.44 -1306.06 -1305.38 -1304.27 -1745.24 -1740.91 -1728.20 -1723.80 
Wald chi2 433.41*** 436.83*** 445.13*** 458.56*** 1170.44*** 1193.91*** 1243.90*** 1251.28*** 
N 6653  6653  6653  6653 6653 6653 6653 6653 
+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p< 0.001 (significance levels based on two-tailed test) 
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Appendix 3.1 Shareholder categories of China’s listed companies under new ownership classification scheme 
 
 
Broad Category 
 
 
Sub-group category  
 
Example 
Non-marketized State Shareholding Local Government Yunnan Provincial Government 
 Government Ministry Watery Ministry 
 Government Bureau Department of Finance of Fuzhou 
 Industry Company (previous government ministry) Yunnan Metallurgy Corporate Group 
 State Asset Investment Bureau Beijing International Trust and Investment Co. Ltd 
 State Asset Management Bureau Jing Shan State Asset Management Bureau 
 Research Institute Fudan University 
 State Owned Bank Commercial Bank of China 
 Military Owned Company China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) 
Marketized Corporate Shareholding Infrastructure Construction Company Hunan Highway Construction and Development Co. Ltd 
 Market-Oriented State Owned Enterprise Baosteel Ltd.  
 Reformed Industry Company  ZTE Corporation 
 University-Run Enterprises Peking University Founder Group 
Non-state shareholding Security Company Shenyin Wanguo Security Company 
 Investment Fund Hongfei Security and Investment Fund 
 Private Shanghai Hua Xin Investment Limited 
 Individual Lu Weiwei 
 Foreign (Hong Kong, Taiwan, other countries) Standard Charted Bank Hong Kong Credit Ltd 
 Work Union The Work Union of Hu Bei Fiber Ltd 
 
Note: Such-group categories and examples are adapted from Delios et al. (2006) 
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Appendix 3.2 Comparison between the official and new ownership classification scheme 
 
 
                         Source: Delios et al (2006) 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
INCUBATING PLATFORMS FOR INTERNATIONAL ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIN-OFFS: 
THE OVERSEAS STRATEGIES OF UNIVERSITY-RUN ENTERPRISES FROM CHINA1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The paper investigates and reveals the different stages of incubation for Chinese university-owned 
enterprises' international start-ups culminating in their IPO and eventual international spin-off for 
global expansion. We argue that this unique ‘incubating platform’ model can serve as an important 
launching pad for emerging market high technology firms seeking to compete with leading 
advanced country multinationals. By platform - we imply that the URE provides a diverse array of 
resources including seed capital, brand name, core technology, management leadership, and market 
legitimacy which supports the startup until it can stage a successful IPO in a foreign stock exchange, 
after which it develops its own capital structure for fully fledged global operations. The notion of 
platform also encapsulates a second dimension - the URE continuously 'hatches' a fleet of domestic 
and international offspring firms organized into related clusters which constitute a business 
platform ecosystem. The presence of this phenomenon is explored via comparative case studies of 
PUC Founder Berhad and Technovator International, subsidiaries of Peking University Founder 
Group and Tsinghua University Tong Fang Group which established their respective overseas 
headquarters in Malaysia and Singapore. The results of the study offer important implications for 
how emerging market new ventures can leverage organizational solutions to springboard into 
global markets. 
 
Keywords: incubating platform, emerging market multinationals, university-run enterprises, international 
entrepreneurial spin-offs, China 
 
 ______________________________________  
1 This article is sole-authored. It has been accepted to the 2014 SMS special conference in Sydney, Australia.  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A prominent feature characterizing many emerging economy countries is the evolving 
resynchronization and transformation of their institutional corporate architectures through market 
reforms which exert far-reaching impacts on their economic systems (Chitoor, Sarkar, Ray & 
Aulakh, 2009; Dau, 2012). Such profound changes to firms’ surrounding operational environment 
have led to fundamental shifts in their strategic responses as they experiment with new 
organizational structures, coordination mechanisms, and practices to optimize their survival 
capabilities. To achieve congruence, emerging economy multinational firms (EMNCs) have 
‘coevolved their structures and practices within idiosyncratic environments’ (Gammeltoft, 
Filatotchev, & Hobdari, 2012) which lead them develop specialized attributes. Owing to resource 
scarcity and challenging environmental contingencies characterized by underdeveloped and rapidly 
changing institutions, EMNCs may lack adequate skills, preparation or leverage compared to 
developed country multinationals (DMNCs) to expand overseas. Despite the lack of required 
capabilities, EMNCs tend to exhibit stronger motives to catch up with DMNCs in the international 
arena. Hence, the salient question is how can they overcome their inherent disadvantages by relying 
on existing capability structures to conduct overseas boundary-spanning activities? 
While earlier studies of EMNCs have highlighted their underdeveloped markets and weak 
institutions as key obstacles to their development abroad, an emergent literature stream seeks to 
identify how such disadvantages may be converted into advantages. Rather than comparing 
characteristics of EMNCs and DMNCs as being better or worse for internationalization, these 
studies avoid generalizations by exploring how the formative environment underpinning such firms’ 
development are merely different from one another, conferring discrete context-specific 
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advantages and disadvantages (Cuervo-Cazura & Genc, 2010; Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). For 
instance, EMNCs may benefit from asymmetrical capabilities stemming from their unusual 
institutional development paths and learning experiences which can be transformed into advantages 
for international venturing (Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). Such advantages may include 
organizational improvisation, versatile adaptation, and opportunistic entrepreneurialism to 
‘squeeze the most out of adverse circumstances’ (Madhok & Keyani, 2012; Guillen & Garcia-
Canal, 2009; Luo, Sun, & Wang, 2011). In other words, the atypical organizational structures, 
entrepreneurial strategies or business models which EM firms have fabricated to bridge domestic 
institutional voids may also be deployed in foreign environments, even if they were not designed 
with such original purpose.  
While recent research has identified organizational and management innovation by EM 
firms as a crucial element in their arsenal of advantages for internationalization (Ghemawat & Hout, 
2008), only a handful of studies have concretely investigated how EMNCs creatively structure their 
management teams and establish boundary-spanning organizational practices to build synergies 
and capture value abroad (Girod & Bellin, 2011; Martinez, Esperanca, & De La Torre, 2005). 
Moreover, there is a paucity of research exploring how the evolutionary pressures associated with 
institutional transitions can induce the genesis of new organizational forms and practices which 
may be leveraged by EMNCs for internationalization. Most studies have focused on EMNCs with 
established organizational profiles such as large business groups, SMEs, state-owned enterprises, 
family-owned firms, and private firms whose identities have been well defined, examined, and 
established in the international business literature. Lastly, despite abundant research into the 
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international entrepreneurship activities of ‘born globals’, only a handful of studies have focused 
on corporate entrepreneurship by EMNCs (Yiu, Lau, & Bruton, 2007; Yiu & Lau, 2008).  
To remedy this oversight, this paper seeks to break new ground by exploring the cross-
border venturing strategies of a relatively new and underexplored species of firms known as 
university-run enterprises (UREs) which emerged as a new organizational form to support market-
based development of China’s innovation and high technology sectors (Kroll & Liefner, 2008; Eun, 
Lee, & Wu, 2006). While UREs are more known for their boundary-spanning role to facilitate 
collaborations between academia and industry, their unique organizational features have rarely 
been studied in relation to international venturing. Focusing on the hybrid form of UREs which is 
built upon a foundation of co-governance between Chinese universities and the state, we examine, 
by applying case study methodology, how their distinctive features enable them to serve as 
‘incubating platform’ organizations for international spin-offs. Engaging primarily with the 
expanded research on international entrepreneurship by emerging market firms, we seek to make a 
two-fold contribution. First, we elucidate how the platform organizational model of UREs can 
become a launching pad for entrepreneurial start-ups across borders. Second, we illuminate the 
temporal pattern of UREs’ incubating role unfolding in a multi-staged process starting from initial 
incubation of its offspring firms to extended parenting and final overseas spin-off. In so doing, we 
contribute to the literature on organizational strategies by EMNCs to address latecomer deficiencies 
for penetrating global markets.         
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4.2 RISE OF NEW ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS DURING INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION 
 
The past twenty years has witnessed a remarkable transformation in the institutional environments 
of emerging economy countries with the simultaneous dismantling and reshaping of existing 
economic institutions to create new ones for market-based growth. Actions by governments to 
overhaul their institutional systems are accompanied by mutually reinforcing policy adjustments 
such as corporate ownership and governance reform, deregulation, capital market reforms, market 
liberalization, and industrial restructuring. The evolutionary dynamics of such institutional 
transitions are nonetheless characterized by ‘institutional imperfections’ which arise from ‘the gaps 
between the existing and desired institutional arrangements and governance systems (Roth & 
Kostova, 2003: 315). Such gaps may not only emerge due to underdeveloped institutions but also 
from incongruence between prior and new institutional arrangements and the lack of strategic 
complementarity between them.  
Organizational responses by firms to deal with profound institutional change has been of 
vital interest to institutional theorists and fresh efforts to understand how firms cope with rapid 
environmental change have generated a volume of literature (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; 
Suhomlinova, 2006; Pettigrew, Woodman & Cameron, 2001; Ulenbruck, Meyer & Hitt, 2003; 
Zhou, Tse & Li, 2006). However, the majority of studies have tended to interpret firm responses 
via the lens of gradual organizational adaptation to changing institutional circumstances rather than 
through the creation of radically new organizational forms. Despite renewed interest into how firms 
realign themselves with kaleidoscopic institutional change, it has also been acknowledged that 
‘current taxonomies of environmental change are insufficiently sensitive to all the granularity of 
the relationship between environmental and organizational change’ (Suarez & Olivia, 2005). 
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Indeed, the assorted dynamics and patterns of change and their implications on firm organizational 
adaptation have yet to be fully explored. One form of institution-building that has lately revived 
the attention of institutional theorists is the concept of ‘institutional bricolage’ (Crouch, 2005; 
Yeung, 2004), which is characterized by the cobbling together of different institutional elements 
drawn from various sources to synthesize a new institutional schema capable of reconciling 
multiple, possibly incompatible institutional logics.  
In the context of emerging market countries such as China, such recombinant dynamics of 
institutional transition has important implications on firm organizational behavior. Nested in a 
complex institutional environment straddling state-led and market-based capitalism, firms make 
novel use of the eclectic resources and institutions at their disposal ‘to craft new institutional 
solutions by combining elements drawn from a repertoire whereby new forms differ but resemble 
old forms’ (Carney, Gedajlovic & Yang, 2009: 372). To survive, they must navigate and embed 
themselves across different institutional domains to align with the opportunities that arise from 
partial transformations in both state and market spheres. According to Nee (1992: 4), ‘this 
characteristic of partial reform creates an institutional environment in which hybrid forms enjoy a 
transaction cost advantage over alternative governance structures’. Hence, the phenomena of 
institutional bricolage can serve as a precursor to the rise of new organizational forms during 
sustained periods of institutional transition.  
Recent studies on organizational hybridity have started to investigate how such 
organizations can embed a diversity of perspectives, skills, and resources by combining and 
integrating the identities, practices, and structures of old and new institutions to generate novel 
forms that not only imbue them with strategic flexibility, but also the ability to extract resources 
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and sustain legitimacy from different institutional stakeholders (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Thornton, 
Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012). Such organizations may also be purposefully created to bridge 
different institutional boundaries and understandings (Besharov & Smith, 2013; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008). They may hire individuals with qualities that embody each of the institutional logics 
or archetypes they seek to combine (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Due to the idiosyncratic 
discontinuities and sequencing of reforms characterizing institutional transitions which are unique 
to each emerging economy, the creation of hybrid organizational forms cannot rely on any existing 
models to reconcile the tensions between the institutional logics they combine. Not all hybrids are 
capable of handling the strain of reconciling different institutional pressures and nor can they all 
keep abreast of turbulent institutional change. However, those hybrids which manage to develop 
into robust entities are likely to have formulated prescriptions for achieving viability by matching 
complementarities residing among different institutional elements which add up to more than the 
sum of their parts (Ennen & Richter, 2010). 
 
4.3 ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AND INTERNATIONALIZATION 
 
In their efforts to combine and reconfigure elements from different institutional spheres, hybrid 
organizations engage in a form of organizational innovation that gives rise not only to incremental 
evolutionary adaptation but also the potential emergence of radically novel organizational 
templates and business models. The trial-and error iterative nature of their development process 
and their ability to mobilize resources from multiple institutional fields may allow them to evolve 
new organizational architectures, internal coordination mechanisms, and growth strategies to drive 
performance outcomes. Over the past decade, studies have occasionally highlighted the role of 
organizational innovation as an under-recognized but critical ingredient in the internationalization 
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strategies of EMNCs. In elaborating his linkage-leverage-learning (LLL) framework, Mathews 
(2006) illustrated how EMNCs can devise new organizational structures such as Acer’s global 
cellular architecture to create a worldwide cluster of semi-autonomous business units to circumvent 
the typical subsidiary-headquarter coordination issues that burden conventional MNEs. However, 
apart from a few studies (Bonaglia, Goldstein & Mathews, 2007), this stream of research remains 
under-investigated and underdeveloped.  The extant literature has also yet to capture how hybrid 
firm types from emerging markets can leverage their organizational innovations to leapfrog into 
global industries traditionally dominated by established MNEs.  
To address this lacuna, we examine a relatively new kind of hybrid organization which 
emerged from China’s transitional context known as university-run enterprises (UREs). We 
evaluate their institutional origins and investigate how they have evolved hybrid organizational 
features by combining elements derived from their institutional heritage and features of Western 
university-spinoffs and industrial clusters. By unraveling their hybrid organizational attributes, we 
shed light on how such latent characteristics can enable UREs to serve as ‘incubating platforms’ 
for nascent start-ups which are nurtured into successful international spin-offs. We support our 
theoretical development through a comparative case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989) of two companies 
– Peking University Founder Group and Tsinghua University Tong Fang Group which were both 
established by leading Chinese universities in the 1990s as a response to public initiatives by the 
government to promote the role of university-run enterprises in the formation of China’s embryonic 
high technology sector. Both firms established international spin-off companies in Malaysia and 
Singapore and thus provide an ideal field setting for exploring the ‘incubator platform’ model for 
international expansion. As of 2012, Tong Fang Group is ranked at No. 44 among the top 100 
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Chinese multinationals with $1.66 billion USD in overseas assets and $101 million USD in foreign 
revenues while Founder Group’s listed subsidiary Beijing Founder Electronics Corporation was 
individually ranked at No. 86 with over $320 million USD in overseas assets and $237 million 
USD in foreign revenues. Together these two firms are considered among the most dynamic 
Chinese multinationals to emerge over the past decade. 
 
4.3 HYBRID ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF URES AND THEIR 
INCUBATING PLATFORM MODEL 
 
The particular manifestation of UREs as hybrid firms owned by the state but managed by 
universities can be viewed as a response to outgrow the constraints of China’s underdeveloped 
institutions and form a de novo ecosystem for industrial innovation. Following the initial economic 
liberalization period, the first wave of entrepreneurial dynamism in China was overshadowed by 
the absence of critical innovation skills, human capital and absorptive capabilities for building 
technological competence within industrial firms (Wu, 2010). The majority of state-owned firms 
were burdened with the legacy of centralized planning while the nascent private sector was in no 
better position to spearhead China’s technological industrial development. According to Chen, Li, 
Zhang & Shapiro (2014), the distortion of factor markets for labor, capital and knowledge due to 
China’s command economy heritage leveraged high transaction costs which hampered innovation 
among non-state-owned firms. Due to such distortions, the availability of human talent and 
expertise required for technological upgrading was largely confined to research institutions 
publicly financed by the state. 
While Chinese research institutions possessed the potential for developing breakthrough 
innovations, the ‘barren’ external environment surrounding academic institutions made it difficult 
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for researchers to identify suitable firms capable of commercializing their research (Eun et al, 2006). 
In contrast to advanced economies where R&D activities are undertaken in parallel by both 
corporations and universities alike, the structural misalignment in the capabilities of state-owned 
and private industrial firms to promote knowledge industrialization in China left policy-makers 
with few options but to call upon universities to take the risk of directly entering the market (Kroll, 
2008). However, the development of new technologies involved substantial upfront investment and 
learning costs which magnified the risk for market failure. To address such uncertainties, the 
government sponsored various incentive schemes including royalties and preferential tax 
exemptions for universities to set up enterprises which ‘were meant to integrate several stages of 
the research, development and commercialization process into one organizational entity’ (Kroll & 
Liefner, 2008: 302). Through this large-scale joint mobilization of university and government 
resources, thousands of UREs were established during the 1990s to promote technological growth 
in China. 
The hybrid design of UREs emerged from efforts to create an internal system for pooling a 
dynamic mix of resources and incentives to support innovation. In partnering to form UREs, the 
state became a key source of resources such as land, infrastructure, credit, subsidies, tax benefits, 
and policy support whereas universities contributed critical intangible resources such as human 
talent, brand recognition, intellectual property, and international research networks.  This form of 
‘resource bricolage’ embodied in the integration of inherited resources from state and universities 
not only functioned to minimize transaction costs, but also to develop new organizational platforms 
for innovation. While the trend of establishing ‘entrepreneurial universities’ had also gained 
momentum in other countries around the world (Etzkowitz, 1998), the particular recombinant 
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features of the URE have eluded most typical characterizations attributed to Western university 
spin-offs. According the Eun et al (2006), the phenomenon of UREs has been described as a new 
‘governance form’ of knowledge industrialization.  
As Eun & Lee (2010) aptly pinpointed, UREs were essentially business enterprises 
integrated into their parent universities. This tight coupling mechanism ensured that they remained 
connected to their mother institutions ‘through a sort of umbilical cord’ (Eun et al, 2006). Relying 
closely on the resources, staff, and research facilities concentrated within their university, UREs 
also incorporated their university names in their commercial brands. While the utility of this feature 
has been highlighted with respect to integrating the R&D and commercialization activities of UREs 
(Kroll & Liefner, 2008; Eun et al, 2006; Eun & Lee, 2010), we argue that there is another, perhaps 
more imminent strategic purpose being served through the intertwining of UREs and their parent 
institutions. In sharp contrast to university spin-offs in advanced countries such as the US or Europe, 
UREs emerged from a backdrop of scarcity characterized by poor resource munificence in venture 
capital and private industrial R&D funding. The paucity of alternative sources of early stage 
investment obviates the motive for UREs to separate from their parent institutions. Moreover, as 
hybrid entities, they were infused with a public mandate to help revitalize China’s innovation sector 
while serving as commercial vehicles.  This dual-purpose market-shaping prerogative for 
cultivating an innovation ecosystem remains at the heart of UREs’ overarching business strategy 
and has significant implications on the subsequent development of their organizational architecture.  
Undoubtedly, the emergence of UREs was inspired by the rise of regional high technology 
clusters, science parks, and incubators in the US, UK, Japan, Israel and Taiwan which have been 
covered extensively in the innovation literature (Clarysse, Wright, Lockett, Van de Velde, & 
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Vohora, 2005; Phan, Siegel, & Wright, 2005; Bresnahan, Gambardella & Saxenian, 2001). 
However, unlike these vibrant and dynamic start-up environments which were fostered by a diverse 
mix of supporting public policies and private entrepreneurial initiatives, the institutional vacuum 
characterizing UREs’ surrounding environment left them with multifaceted unprecedented 
challenge – how to simultaneously develop new innovative businesses while contributing to the 
formation of supportive market infrastructure to nurture their growth?  Moreover, UREs’ initially 
low technological starting point meant they faced a steeper learning curve in their R&D efforts and 
therefore required more extensive technical, administrative, and organizational support to reach 
commercial take-off stage. 
Such tactical considerations combined with the high risk nature of creating innovative 
ventures led UREs to adopt what we define as an extended ‘incubating platform’ organizational 
model of entrepreneurial development. We evoke the notion of ‘platform’ to illustrate how UREs 
have evolved ambidextrous business structures for the continuous propagation of offspring start-
up firms to commercialize new technologies developed by their affiliated universities. The basic 
tenant of the ‘incubating platform’ concept is the URE’s ability to spawn a fleet of smaller 
companies which are incubated into related industrial clusters resembling an innovation ecosystem 
to support a family of products and services. The core essence of the business platform concept is 
to provide an enabling foundation or common organizational structure which supports the 
development of derivative products developed by internal or external teams (Meyer & Lehnerd, 
1997). In the case of the URE, the primary assets constituting its platform may comprise of 
individuals, processes, proprietary knowledge, networks, components and university facilities 
which could be shared among its offspring firms. While a substantial body of literature has emerged 
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to explain the phenomenon of platforms in a variety of business contexts (Bresnahan & Greenstein, 
1999; Ciborra, 1996; Gawer & Gusumano, 2013; Lansiti & Levien, 2004; Gawer, 2010; Thomas, 
Autio & Gann, in press), the particular hybrid characteristics of UREs which combine the interplay 
between its incubator and platform functions have been under-investigated.  
In contrast to other typical incubators such as science and technology parks which are 
populated by start-ups with individual business agendas, the platform characteristics of the URE 
help its offspring firms to orchestrate their business and technological decisions ‘in the context of 
a coherent set of strategic moves’ (Gawer & Gusumano, 2013). Such firms are not only embedded 
in the URE’s existing platform but also help to strategically orchestrate its evolution in alignment 
with changes in the surrounding market and technological landscape. However, the scope of the 
platform remains broad enough to accommodate the emergence of diverse or even unforeseen 
commercialization possibilities arising from spillovers of large-scale R&D activities (Wallen & 
Dahlstrand, 2006). Such spillovers may be explored through the formation of new offshoot firms 
with their own assets, competencies, and business lines. The creation of varied offspring ventures 
also forms the basis which enables UREs to identify, select and exploit valuable diversification 
opportunities. Figure 4.1 provides a conceptual model of the URE as a hybrid organizational entity 
integrating both business enterprise and incubator functions.  
 
 
[Insert Figure 4.1 about here] 
 
 
Moreover, unlike Western university spin-offs which typically receive limited incubation 
time and resources before they must split off to secure venture capital for survival, the offspring 
firms of UREs undergo prolonged incubation which facilitates their growth while shielding them 
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from initial market risks and obstacles. This extended incubation treatment which resembles the 
‘sponsored-spin-offs’ by Japanese multinational firms (Ito, 1995; Ito & Rose, 1994), provides 
UREs’ offspring firms the advantage of utilizing the existing assets of their parent firm while 
preserving the entrepreneurial qualities of a smaller firm. Moreover, owing to the initial lack of 
industrial firms with strong commercialization abilities, the offspring firms are incubated for longer 
periods to reach maturation. Over the past 20 years, UREs such as Fudan Fuhua Group, Neusoft 
Group, and Tsinghua Tong Fang Group have each incubated a portfolio of 80-100 companies which 
are organized under core technology areas. For instance, Tong Fang Group has structured its firms 
under an umbrella consisting of 10 core groups: computers, digital city, internet of all things, micro-
electronics & radio frequency technology, multi-media, semiconductor & lighting, knowledge 
network, military applications, digital TV, and environmental industry.  While initially designed to 
address the absence of venture capital and supporting innovation architecture, it is precisely the 
added resilience and recombinant potential of this ‘incubation platform’ approach which we seek 
to explore as a critical enabler of UREs’ ability to launch successful international spin-offs. 
 
4.4 RESEARCH METHODLOGY 
 
Owing to the special circumstances characterizing the ‘incubating platform’ model of 
internationalization, we adopt an exploratory comparative case study approach to unearth new 
theoretical insights (Eisenhardt, 1989). The focal companies of our study, PKU Founder Group and 
Tsinghua Tong Fang Group were created respectively by Peking and Tsinghua Universities during 
the early stages of China’s reform period and have similar organizational layouts. Both groups 
operate under the auspices of large holding companies which are supervised by state asset 
management committees that are approved by the State Council and report to the Ministry of 
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Education. Each holding company is headed by a management team consisting of senior professors, 
some of whom served as the group’s original founders. This unique blend of university 
management and government oversight reflects the hybrid nature of the URE as a unique 
organizational form among other corporatized entities in China’s transitioning economic system. 
Managers of both companies are simultaneously motivated by commercial incentives to develop 
profitable applications while fulfilling state mandates to promote technology diffusion to the 
industrial sector. A substantial portion of the profits are rechanneled back to their universities to 
support ongoing R&D initiatives. 
From its inception, both firms received substantial priority support from central and 
municipal-level governments owing to their affiliation with China’s leading elite universities. 
Although both groups follow state directives to innovate certain technologies which are critical to 
China’s development, they also possess significant managerial autonomy and considerable 
entrepreneurial prowess which distinguish them from typical state-owned enterprises. Among the 
various types of university-industry linkages comprising of joint research centers with industrial 
firms, university science parks, and incubators identified in a typology framework developed by 
Eun et al (2006), UREs are classified as exhibiting the highest level of entrepreneurship. Both PKU 
Founder Group and Tsinghua Tong Fang Group have actively promoted an entrepreneurial 
organizational culture to foster the commercialization of innovative ideas and scientific discoveries 
in the marketplace. According Tong Fang’s president Lu Zhicheng, the commercialization strategy 
of Tong Fang centers around ‘three clever steps’ organized under successive stages of development 
known as ‘Technology + Capital’, ‘Collaboration + Development’, and ‘Brand + Globalization’. 
The first stage involved intensive investment in R&D, subsequently followed by the hatching of 
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multiple mutually-supporting industrial clusters. The large scale growth of these clusters 
contributes to its brand recognition and overarching aim to become globally competitive. Similarly, 
Founder Group exhibits a similar managerial mindset, adopting the motto ‘Forever Innovative’ in 
their entrepreneurial endeavors. 
However, the cultivation of an active entrepreneurial environment in both companies 
required a creative organizational design solution. A significant challenge to sustaining an 
innovative and open-minded organizational culture lies in the inherent bureaucratic inertia and 
rigidity which arises in large corporations especially with respect to diversification decisions. 
According to Prahalad & Bettis (1986), managers with experience in utilizing a particular set of 
administrative and analytical tools to manage their business lines acquire a dominant logic or 
conditioned mental representation which constrains their ability to pursue diverse entrepreneurial 
opportunities due to their limited capacity for accommodating multiple dominant logics. The 
decision to incorporate greater variety by diversifying into new unfamiliar business areas involves 
hidden tradeoffs such as slower strategic responsiveness and unforeseen challenges to address 
potentially conflicting demands. Such costs may deter managers from entering into new business 
lines which do not fit into the company’s existing organizational structure or management system.  
From its inception UREs such as Founder Group and Tong Fang Group made efforts to 
circumvent such bottlenecks. One way to experiment with entrepreneurial business development 
involved adopting an ‘incubation platform’ organizational structure by nurturing clusters of 
domestic and foreign offspring firms were provided with baseline resources and managerial 
autonomy to develop their own core competencies. For instance, Founder has evolved five clusters 
including IT, healthcare, real estate, financial and commodities groups. Within each cluster, 
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offspring firms are provided with wider degrees of freedom to develop their own product range and 
pursue entrepreneurial opportunities. While critical functions such as financial management, 
marketing, and hiring are centralized, investment decisions are not scrutinized at the group level. 
Rather, performance is assessed by offspring firms’ return on investment. The offspring firms are 
given access to relevant resources of the parent firm until reaching sufficient maturity for a public 
listing to infuse them more capital for growth. However, rather than spinning off completely, the 
offspring firm may remain tied to its parent institution as a partial-spinoff through an equity share-
holding arrangement. The arrangement also benefits the parent company as listed subsidiaries help 
to raise capital for the parent firm. Depending on the evolving business conditions, some 
subsidiaries may eventually fully spin off, while others remain tethered to their mother company. 
In this study we investigate how such an extended incubating platform approach has been 
successfully leveraged by Founder Group and Tong Fang Group for overseas entrepreneurial 
venturing.   
 
Data Sources and Analysis 
 
In order to study how Founder Group and Tong Fang Group incubated their international spin-offs, 
we employ a longitudinal approach to evaluate how the different stages of incubation facilitated 
the initial overseas venturing and subsequent public listing of their offspring firms which further 
served to consolidate their overseas expansion.  Our approach takes into consideration the 
importance of the ‘entrepreneurial journey’ to understand the sequence of events which yield 
transformative effects on the capabilities of firms to engage in international entrepreneurship 
(McMullen & Dimov, 2013). Moreover, it provides us with a basis to compare how the different 
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phases of incubation unfolded in both firms to illustrate a coherent pattern of events reflecting the 
‘incubating platform’ model of internationalization.  
Data gathering focused not only at the holding company level of both firms, but also on 
their respective offspring firms, one from each group which was successfully launched through 
public listing in overseas stock exchanges. Among the two offspring firms which constitute the 
primary objects of our study is PUC Founder (MSC) Berhad, the Malaysian subsidiary of Founder 
Group specializing in biometric and electronic publishing products. Founded in 1997, it was 
subsequently listed on the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange in 2000. The other offspring firm is 
Technovator International, the Singaporean subsidiary of Tong Fang Group, a leading building 
energy management solution provider established in 2005 and publicly listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange in 2011. Both Tong Fang Group and Founder Group initially held controlling 
ownership of their foreign subsidiaries (30-35%) which were established as joint ventures while 
their foreign partners became secondary minority shareholders (10-15%) with multiple strategic 
investors accounting for remaining shares. The composition of the board of directors for each firm 
mirrored the aforementioned ownership structure with both parent UREs initially providing over 
half of their subsidiaries’ management teams. Multiple sources of data were solicited for 
triangulation purposes including semi-structured interviews with top management teams from both 
firms, archival data from annual reports and IPO listing prospectuses, quarterly financial and 
investment reports, dedicated blog archives maintained by the founder of PUC Founder Berhad for 
the past 7 years, publications from both parent and offspring companies, proprietary archival 
documents shared by both companies and newspaper articles. Tables 4.1a and 4.1b summarize the 
archival documents gathered in support of our study.  
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[Insert Tables 4.1a and 4.1b about here] 
 
 
 
Emerging Multi-stage Process Model 
 
Two streams of data are obtained from the primary and archival data. The first stream consists of 
archival materials documenting the overseas international expansion of both PUC Founder and 
Technovator International. It charts the key initiatives, events and decisions which characterize the 
extended process of international incubation and spin-off. The second stream is derived from blog 
archives, published interviews, and face-to-face interviews with the top management team of both 
firms to provide a basis for interpretation of the events and circumstances, as well as the underlying 
rationale behind the incubation process. In May 2014, the author made several field visits to the 
offices of PUC Founder and Technovator International in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, and 
engaged in extensive semi-structured interviews with founding executives of both overseas 
subsidiaries and group headquarters in Beijing. The availability of online archival materials enabled 
the author to identify relevant interview questions which were formulated to pinpoint and confirm 
the strategic mindset of senior executives as well as unravel how certain events unfolded based on 
triangulation with archival data. A total of 30 hours of intensive interviews were conducted over a 
2 week period split approximately between each company and separated by several days for data 
consolidation purposes, with key parent company board members, including founding executive 
directors and subsidiary office CEO or COO supplemented by ongoing email correspondence and 
exchange of company reports and documents. Senior executives who are cited in this paper have 
given consent to the disclosure of their names and titles. Two other top executives who extensively 
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shared their insights and agreed to be identified but were not quoted include Mr. Wei Xin, the 
chairman of Founder Group and Mr. Cheong Chia Chieh, the new managing director of PUC 
Founder Berhad.  
Following initial interviews which helped the author gain familiarity with the entrepreneurial 
challenges and critical junctures faced by both companies, efforts were made to identify different 
transition periods in their development characterized by varying patterns of strategy deployment. 
Particular attention was paid to how the overseas senior executives portrayed their companies’ early, 
emergent, and evolving organizational identity – especially their decisions to establish independent 
brand names which differentiated them from their parent company. Detailed questions were 
supplemented by broader guiding questions such as: “What early circumstances or conditions enabled 
you to establish Founder Group and Tong Fang Group’s overseas subsidiary?” and “How did you 
identify your entrepreneurial opportunities and convince other executives at HQ to transfer their core 
technologies and invest in your start-up?” and “What was your strategic vision and how did your 
company build its early momentum leading to its IPO?”. Efforts were made to evaluate how 
combinations of different resources were channeled from the parent company into the offspring start-
up to support the formation of capabilities for R&D, capital-raising, brand management, and product 
development to orchestrate an international take-off. 
In addition to demarcating the different phases of the ‘incubating platform’ utilized by both 
companies for overseas venturing, the author set about to examine the dual contextual levels in 
which the offspring firm was embedded. While the offspring start-ups of both Founder Group and 
Tong Fang Group were undergoing successive rounds of incubation, new restructuring efforts and 
shifts in strategic positioning were simultaneously unfolding at the parent level which corresponded 
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to the parent firm’s own idiosyncratic life cycle. To assess how the offspring firm was coevolving 
with changes at the parent level, questions were posed to explore how the subsidiaries adapted and 
what kinds of impacts such changes exerted on their overseas survival and performance.  
During the second phase of interviews, the author began to reconcile the archival data with 
details gathered during the initial interviews. The overarching goal was to cluster information and 
identify missing gaps which required further clarification or explanation during follow-up 
interviews. This process involved filtering out surplus information derived from archival data and 
focusing on particular emergent patterns or recurrent themes which had been repeatedly touched 
upon by senior executives. Efforts were made to clarify any contradictory or ambiguous strands of 
information gathered from the archival data with the informants. At this stage, the author iterated 
between both streams of data to develop clarity around theoretical concepts such as ‘prolonged 
incubation’ and ‘incubating platform’ after mapping out the linkages between platform resources 
utilized for incubation and subsequent developmental outcomes associated with each stage of PUC 
Founder and Technovator’s evolution. This theoretical exercise was supplemented by consulting 
relevant literature on platform organizations, academic spin-offs and incubators to fine-tune the 
notion of ‘incubating/parenting platform’ for international spin-offs. Due to the exploratory focus 
of this research topic, efforts were made to iterate between interviews to obtain new information, 
theorize, and retrace old data to enhance triangulation for sharpening our conceptual development.  
Our analysis focused on strategies deployed by senior executives to coordinate and mobilize 
various resource streams at each stage of incubation to achieve a range of targeted outcomes. The 
aim was to understand how specific competencies were cultivated and layered upon each other or 
dissolved if they were not deemed effective to optimize strategy formulation for international 
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growth and survival. Secondly, by disaggregating the evolution of PUC Founder and Technovator 
as a series of incubating stages, our analysis reveals a shift in the organizational identity of both 
firms. For PUC Founder, this transition was marked by a change in its business focus from simple 
biometric access control applications during the first years of incubation to real time digital 
multimedia services and web-based human resource management during later incubation stages. 
The latter decision to pursue software development/digital services was initiated by PUC Founder’s 
founding CEO – Mr. Teh Hong Seng – for two main reasons. First, while Founder Group’s 
traditional core competency included digital media, less attention was paid to the provision of real 
time web-based services to complement its hardware and software offerings. The delivery of 
internet-based services complementing PUC Founder’s biometric devices represents both a cost-
saving and value enhancing measure made possible through the introduction of cloud computing 
technology. Adoption of such design features over the past several years has led PUC Founder to 
evolve a much stronger social media presence to promote its ‘Going Global’ strategy.  
For Technovator International, the founding COO – Mr. Seah Han Leong – placed a strong 
emphasis on repositioning its core business from integrated building automation systems (iBAS) 
to energy management systems. This strategic shift was motivated by two critical factors. First, it 
was a response to reap the opportunities availed by the Chinese government to offer preferential 
tax treatment to high technology firms providing environmental protection solutions. Due to the 
high rate of urbanization and construction in China, the installation of energy management systems 
to monitor and reduce energy consumption via intelligent building design is becoming increasingly 
prevalent. Since up to 40% of building costs alone are derived from energy use, the installation of 
energy management systems could reduce such costs by 10-20%. Moreover, similar to the industry 
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conditions facing PUC Founder, Technovator has benefited from improvements in cloud 
computing technology which significantly boosts the agility and speed of machine-to-machine 
communications. This permits for the embedding of various smart sensors and control devices to 
collect environmental data which can be uploaded to the cloud, analyzed in real time, and then fed 
back into the energy management system to regulate energy use. The rapid feedback loop also 
enables the company to monitor patterns of usage by customers and to tailor its products and 
services to anticipate their specific needs.  
The final stage of interview involved the author summarizing and drafting her observations 
in written form which were shared with both companies’ senior executives, enabling them to 
provide further clarifications and feedback. Through this iterative and extensive dialogue, the 
author gathered additional insights on the external and internal relationships, organizational 
practices and routines, and targeted initiatives set by top executives to navigate their overseas 
business environments. In these meetings and written correspondence, the senior executives of both 
companies were impressively transparent and candid which were facilitated by the author’s offer 
to share her draft with them prior to publication.  
Figures 4.2a and 4.2b present a detailed timeline of the main players and the key events 
underpinning PUC Founder and Technovator’s overseas incubation, serving as markers to identify 
the operational milestones achieved during each incubation cycle. In analyzing this information we 
adopt a process-driven approach (Mohr, 1982) rather than a variance-based method to capture the 
overarching pattern of events which unfold through the various stages of incubation. The process 
analytical approach is motivated by the logic that ‘each event on the path to the eventual outcome 
is necessary to explain that outcome, but by itself is not sufficient: what is sufficient are all the 
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events that occur after it, without which it would be plausible to presume that the outcome would 
not occur as actually observed. This is consistent with the entire chain of events being the 
explanatory unit.’ (McMullen & Dimov, 2013: 1488).  
 
 
 
[Insert Figures 4.2a and 4.2b about here] 
 
 
 
 
Pre-incubation and Early Parenting Stage: From birth and parenting of offspring firm to 
early childhood 
 
Over the past two decades a volume of literature has emerged covering the rise of international new 
ventures in international business (Knight & Cavusgil, 1996; Jones & Coviello, 2005; Mudambi & 
Zahara, 2007). However, the formative process of creating such ventures through the discovery 
and exploitation of new opportunities for overseas venturing remains underexamined (Prashantham 
& Young, 2011; Zahra, 2005). The establishment of an overseas office denotes a certain rite of 
passage and a new ‘achieved status’ in the perception of key stakeholders such as the founding 
team, investors, employees, media, and government (Prashantham, 2013). This notion of passage 
through new life cycles resonates with the different stages of incubation experienced by the focal 
firms of our study. It is also well aligned with the concept of corporate parenting (Campbell, Goold 
& Alexander, 1995; Goold, Campbell & Alexander, 1998) which explores how parent firms may 
extend their strategic guidance and resources to support value creation in their subsidiary business 
units. While the literature on corporate parenting appears to involve a top-down approach to 
management, it is not inconsistent with theories of corporate entrepreneurship which argues that 
bottom up entrepreneurial initiatives within organizations can be leveraged to drive strategic 
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renewal and performance. Rather, studies have found that both strategies are complementary if they 
are balanced and calibrated in a coordinated way (Bieto, Planellas, & Parada, 2006).  
During the initial birth and early incubation period, both offspring firms Technovator and 
PUC Founder relied extensively on the incubating platform provided by their parent UREs. While 
the platform resources of Founder Group and Tong Fang were quite substantial, they did not 
constitute all the necessary ingredients for the successful incubation of its foreign subsidiary. 
Rather, a critical function of its parenting role involved knowing how to identify and mobilize those 
resources which were not readily available. Without the support functions of the parent URE, each 
individual start-up must face the tedious challenge of searching for and acquiring an accoutrement 
of different strategic resources to build up their own internal ecosystem for survival. However, with 
the platform approach, the offspring firm is provided with an array of incubating resources which 
include platform technology, initial seed capital, group platform resources and an internal business 
platform ecosystem. Table 4.2 summarizes our categorization of the different resources made available 
to PUC Founder and Technovator and its initial phase of international incubation. 
 
 
[Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
 
 
 
With respect to the types of incubating platform resources available, we provide the following 
definitions. Platform technologies refer to the core proprietary technologies, R&D processes and technical 
knowhow which has been transferred from the parent firm to their overseas offspring subsidiary for 
commercialization. Decisions concerning which technologies to transfer and the specific transfer 
mechanisms were made jointly between the parent group and the foreign cofounders of the offspring 
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firms. For Founder Group, the original intention to set up a foreign subsidiary in Malaysia was to expand 
its electronic publishing and management information systems businesses into South East Asia. However, 
after consulting with Mr. Teh Hon Seng, a Malaysian Chinese entrepreneur who was tapped by Founder 
Group’s executives to set up PUC Founder, the management team decided to transfer to its subsidiary 
Founder Group’s proprietary fingerprint technology which had already been successfully deployed in 
government security departments. Mr. Teh, who had served as Founder’s distributor of electronic 
publishing systems in Malaysia, identified the potential growth possibilities for biometric technologies 
which were in their infant stage of commercial development during the 1990s. After licensing the 
automated fingerprint technology from Founder Group, PUC Founder set up its R&D units in Malaysia 
and Shenzhen to develop its own fingerprint products which were subsequently marketed under the 
FingerTech brand to over 100 countries.  
Similarly, Technovator International collaborated with a Singaporean Chinese entrepreneur 
to transfer its integrated building automation systems (iBAS) technology for commercialization 
and expansion into the energy management systems market. Mr. Seah Han Leong, the Singaporean 
cofounder of Technovator, has extensive management experience at Honeywell, a multinational 
firm which is the leading provider of iBAS systems in North America and Asia.  During the 1980s, 
he helped to set up Honeywell’s representative office in Beijing, and became acquainted with Tong 
Fang’s president Lu Zhicheng. Although their friendship was established over 20 years ago, Mr. 
Seah did not begin working for Tong Fang until 2005 when he proposed to help set up Technovator 
in Singapore. As China’s largest supplier of iBAS components and solutions, Tong Fang Group 
would provide a strong technical foundation for the development of Technovator International’s 
iBAS products and energy management systems.  
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The initial seed capital to establish both overseas subsidiaries consist of several sources of 
which the most substantial portion was derived from their parent UREs. In the absence of venture 
capital, Founder Group furnished the initial outlay of capital required to cover the basic costs of 
setting its foreign subsidiaries. The successful IPO of Founder’s main HK subsidiary in 1995 raised 
critical funds of which 1 million Malaysian ringgits were injected into PUC Founder for its 
incorporation. According to Alan Cheung Shuen-Lung, who sits on the board of directors and 
serves as one of Founder Group’s pioneering founders: 
 
Founder Group was established on the basis of its innovative Chinese electronic publishing system 
which was developed by Peking University. After the decision was made for Founder Group to 
leverage this technology and establish operations abroad, I personally visited each country – 
Taiwan, Malaysia, Japan, and the United States – to meet with prospective partners and identify 
market opportunities. I met with Mr. Teh and invited him to Beijing. After entrusting him to set up 
our electronic publishing division, we sold our systems to all major newspapers in Southeast Asia 
through our Malaysian subsidiary. At the time, our systems were very new and innovative. The 
market seemed quite solid but we realized that revenues from this business line would eventually 
decline, so we decided to invest other areas including biometrics technology. 
 
Under the aegis of Mr. Teh, PUC Founder ventured into the biometrics field and 
successfully obtained a substantial Malaysian government grant in 1999 to support 70% of its R&D 
expenses for developing its first biometric prototypes. In addition, PUC Founder applied for public 
listing on Bursa Malaysia’s MESDAQ market to finance the commercialization of its new 
biometric products. PUC Founder also continued to actively leverage its Chinese electronic 
publishing (EP) and management information systems (MIS) businesses which offered a more 
stable revenue base to incubate its biometrics division. Together, these three pillars functioned to 
sustain the incubation process. The EP business has served as one of Founder Group’s mainstay 
150 
 
operations with its origins dating back to the mid 1980’s when the first Chinese laser typesetting 
systems were developed and manufactured by Beijing University New Technology Co., the 
predecessor to Founder Group. In addition to biometrics technology, this software intensive 
technology was transferred to PUC Founder to activate its nascent growth.  
The formative incubation process for Technovator mirrored the approach adopted by PUC 
Founder. After many years of industry experience with leading multinationals, Mr. Seah cultivated 
a business relationship with Tong Fang Group which culminated in his suggestion to establish an 
international start-up. During the initial period, Tong Fang Group positioned itself as the primary 
provider of investment capital for Technovator. Through its investment holding company 
Resuccess, Tong Fang Group indirectly became Technovator’s principal shareholder. As a 
minority shareholder, Mr. Seah Han Leong also contributed a substantial share of the capital needed 
to set up the company. However, the remaining funds were made available by two private equity 
firms – Zana China Fund and CTC Capital – which were introduced by Tong Fang Group to 
Technovator. Following a period of five years where it invested substantially in R&D and engaged 
in several international M&As, Technovator staged its IPO on the HK Stock Exchange, raising 
over $81 million HKD to support its expansion operations. According to Mr Seah: 
 
At the time that I proposed to set up Technovator International, I had decided to move on from 
TAC Controls [a multinational company] where I served as their Asia managing director for over 
7 years. After my experience gained from working for MNCs, I was able to identify clear 
opportunity gaps which could be leveraged in the creation of a new innovative company. The 
growth potential was further amplified by the rise in convergence of digital technologies for 
building smart buildings and integrated artificial environments. Tong Fang Group already 
possessed a solid foundation in systems integration and I had a strategic vision for leveraging their 
resources to enter the energy management systems business. With Tong Fang’s financial and 
151 
 
technical support, complemented by my expertise navigating the iBAS industry, we were able to 
play catch-up with more established multinational players.    
 
The group platform resources made available by Founder Group and Tong Fang Group to 
their offspring firms constitute a vital incubating backbone for their growth and evolution. The idea 
of platform is particularly salient in this context since the parent URE provides its offspring firms 
with a diverse pool of resources, technological support, and managerial expertise which help them 
to overcome the liability of international start-up. Such critical resources and services include 
management leadership, R&D technical support, access to expertise in other product divisions, 
administrative and human resources support, and most importantly the use of the parent firm’s 
brand name. Executives from Technovator and PUC Founder acknowledged making extensive use 
of these resources during the early stage of incubation to achieve a faster time-to-market 
development cycle. The ability of offspring firms to tap directly into these platform resources not 
only bolsters their agility but also helps them to avoid the prohibitive cost of setting up their own 
business infrastructures. This incubating platform which can be referred to as a ‘launching pad’ 
departs from traditional established patterns of development by typical international new ventures 
which must overcome significant hurdles to mobilize critical resources already accumulated by the 
parent URE for use by its offspring firms.  
Most importantly, in addition to platform resources, Founder Group and Tong Fang Group 
also nurtured internal platform ecosystems for their offspring firms which consisted of established 
business lines related directly to the parent UREs’ core technologies. Endowing their subsidiaries 
with such core competencies enables them to generate a stable revenue stream to support the R&D 
incubation of their new business lines – in this case biometric technology for PUC Founder and 
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energy management systems for Technovator International. Initially both firms derived the 
majority of their revenues from established business lines. It was not until after their new products 
won several international awards which raised their visibility that they began to receive orders from 
prospective clientele. For Technovator, entering into the EMS industry requires adopting a new 
energy management contracting business model where Technovator assumes the upfront costs of 
EMS installation but reaps a share of the profits derived from subsequent energy savings with its 
customers. While entailing a substantial risk since it requires Technovator to assume the financing 
costs, this new model enables the firm to generate a recurrent income stream rather than reaping 
one-off revenues obtained from product delivery.  
Similarly, PUC Founder also faced an uncertain period characterized by slow uptake of its 
biometric products where revenues from its EP and MIS business lines helped to keep the company 
afloat. In this sense, the internal platform ecosystem provided by parent UREs serves to secure the 
survival of their offspring subsidiaries until their nascent technologies are sufficiently upgraded to 
cultivate a steady client base. It also provides an organizational buffer for immature offspring firms 
to address unforeseen challenges which may surface with as they enter into new business segments.  
 
Post-IPO Extended Incubation Stage: Parenting of offspring firms during adolescence for 
global takeoff 
 
To maintain the momentum of business growth and jumpstart their overseas aspirations, both PUC 
Founder and Technovator International staged successful IPOs in international stock exchanges 
about five years following their incorporation. By now, the initial challenges experienced by both 
companies have been overcome, permitting them sufficient opportunities to attract strategic 
investors and build up a balance sheet for valuation. Although their IPOS were both oversubscribed 
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and raised abundant capital for overseas operations, both offspring firms remained closely tethered 
to their parent UREs via equity ownership.  
IPOs can provide existing owners of firms with a golden exit opportunity by selling their 
stakes to the public and make a profit. In the case of both PUC Founder and Technovator 
International, the decision by both parent UREs to preserve their ownership control allowed them 
to extend the incubation of their offspring firms. After the initial stage of enthusiasm following the 
IPO, high technology firms may begin to quickly use up their raised capital for rapid expansion. In 
the case of PUC Founder, it announced its IPO earnings were spent after about one year following 
flotation. Short of raising new capital, the decline in initial resource endowments may lead to a new 
period marked by ‘liability of adolescence’ (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Fichman & Levinthal, 
1991) where the new company’s initial assets are gradually used up and renewed efforts become 
necessary to establish market legitimacy.  
Similar to the high risk infant stage of development, this phase is characterized by a 
heightened risk of failure arising from declining asset stocks and the challenges of launching a new 
business line to attract new customers and maintain their goodwill. At the same time, the firm may 
begin to feel pressure to prove its competence by making more intensive investments in R&D, 
marketing, and strategic M&A to deepen its reputation and international presence. The parent firm 
may decide to step up certain aspects of its support system to facilitate this corporate strategy. Table 
4.3 provides an overview of the platform structures provided by the parent UREs to bolster the 
global takeoff of their offspring firms. 
 
[Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
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Beyond the initial stage of incubation, the parent URE may continue to extend their support 
through the provision of group platform resources to their offspring firms. Recognizing the rising 
challenges facing their subsidiaries to establish market legitimacy among their international 
competitors, Founder Group continued to provide managerial support and channel resources such 
as transferring some of Founder HK’s subsidiaries to PUC Founder for supporting its operational 
upgrading. The annual reports of Founder’s offspring firm reveal a clustering of related party 
transactions which pertain to the establishment of new R&D and sales subsidiaries for PUC 
Founder. Discussions with PUC Founder’s CEO reveal that such transactions which included 
distribution channels, administrative support, human resources, accounting services and R&D 
resources represented a transfer of two Founder HK’s subsidiaries – Founder GlobeTech in 
Shenzhen and Hong Kong to PUC Founder. These smaller subsidiaries which were engaged in EP 
and MIS businesses contributed to about 50% PUC Founder’s revenue stream while it incubated 
its FingerTec biometrics division. According to Mr. Teh:  
 
The 2-3year period following our IPO was perhaps one of the most challenging since I could not 
really see much light at the end of the tunnel. Although our biometrics prototypes were developed, 
the early commercialization process was challenging and we had some serious issues with quality 
control. Our customers were not satisfied and returned our products which caused revenues to 
plummet. The company was facing a critical stage where we had to strive for survival. Actually, 
our quality control problems led us to discard most of our initial inventory of biometrics devices 
and redesign new ones which all required more R&D investment. During this time where our 
biometrics division was not profitable, we relied on revenues from our EP and MIS business lines 
to stay afloat. After I implemented a new marketing strategy, it took about two years to turn the 
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company back to profit. Our biometrics business would not have been properly incubated unless 
we found other ways to support its development.  
 
In the extended period of incubation lasting from 2002-2010, Mr. Teh spearheaded the 
establishment of a new social media outreach program and an e-platform portal to promote product 
sales and optimize service delivery. He also established a global resellers program rather than rely 
on direct sales to end users. By providing his resellers with comprehensive online technical support 
through a new e-platform portal which included hardware and software video guides, updated 
product information, manuals, and warranty registration, he was able to reduce costs for resellers 
and help them attract new international clients. This branding strategy helped to secure greater 
visibility for PUC Founder, catapulting its brand recognition and presence to over 100 countries by 
2010. However, the consolidation and subsequent rise of FingerTec would not have been possible 
without extended support from Founder Group to PUC Founder during its critical stage of 
adolescence. It took another five years between 2002 and 2007 before PUC Founder finally became 
profitable. Moreover, more investment was made to support PUC Founder’s ongoing R&D 
activities to develop new product offerings such as facial recognition, multimedia, and cloud 
computing biometric technologies to supplement its traditional fingerprint products.  
The international evolution of Technovator also parallels PUC Founder’s development 
trajectory, apart from the fact that Technovator started to internationalize at an earlier stage before 
its IPO since it aspired to enter the energy management systems industry. Entry into this sector 
involved the execution of a series of cross-border acquisitions to build competitiveness by 
obtaining state-of-the-art energy management technologies and distribution channels. The 
acquisition of Canadian firm Distech Controls in 2008 consolidated a strategic international 
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partnership which further cascaded into other acquisitions in France and the Netherlands in 2010. 
Following its IPO in 2011, Technovator entered into a purchase agreement to obtain raw materials 
which would be supplied by Tong Fang Group to its subsidiary in Beijing. The subsidiary produces 
circuit boards which are shipped to Technovator’s Canadian and European subsidiaries for value-
added assembly before delivery to overseas clients in North America, Asia and Europe. Centralized 
business services from the parent URE are also provided to Technovator’s foreign subsidiaries to 
help coordinate their activities. According to Mr Seah: 
 
Very early on, I recognized the energy management systems business represented a significant 
potential opportunity which had not fully entered the radar screen of other MNCs. In establishing 
Technovator, I advised Tong Fang Group’s senior management that we did not have the luxury of 
spending the time and effort to engage in purely organic growth. The strategic challenge of 
building Technovator is equivalent to constructing a Formula 1 racing car. We had to hit the 
ground running and build a company capable of out-maneuvering its global competitors. The car 
would comprise the very best components which would all work together in a modular fashion so 
we made a number of overseas strategic acquisitions prior to our IPO to incubate and launch our 
new business line.   
 
Although Technovator did not experience the same setbacks as PUC Founder with respect 
to quality control, it faces a similar liability of newness associated with fine-tuning its new energy 
management contracting model. Following this approach, Technovator would assume the costs of 
installing its EMS systems in return for an agreement to share profits gained from energy-savings 
with its clients over an extended period. As mentioned earlier, this involves a substantial risk for 
Technovator to take over the financing costs so it must deliver the energy savings and establish a 
successful track record to secure future contracts. In the meantime, it relies on its core iBAS 
business to support the incubation of its EMS business. In the run-up to 2014, iBAS sales had 
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increased 14% to US $107 million while EMS sales grew by 68% to US $22 million. Technovator 
plans to substantially ramp up its EMS business over the next five years since the global market 
for smart building technology is estimated to expand significantly from US $6.3 billion in 2013 US 
$21.9 billion by 2018. 
During this adolescent stage of development characterized by growth in its production 
capabilities, the offspring firm may begin to increase its interactions with other subsidiaries within 
some industrial clusters established by their parent URE which include offspring firms embedded 
in a wider ‘innovation ecosystem’ supporting the overall parent group platform. Following its IPO, 
PUC Founder began to engage in a variety of two-way business transactions with other Founder 
subsidiaries including recurring subcontracting arrangements. PUC Founder also sourced several 
Founder subsidiaries including Founder Century and Founder Electronics with its biometric 
equipment. At the same time it maintained a subcontracting relationship with Founder Group for 
various EP and MIS projects. Similarly, Technovator International is currently engaged in an 
ongoing subcontracting agreement to supply subsidiaries of Tong Fang Group and its distributors 
with iBAS and EMS systems. Sales to Tong Fang’s subsidiaries increased from $13.8 to $21.5 
million USD from 2012-2013. The strategic value of nesting offspring firms in an embedded 
business ecosystem lies in the URE’s ability to continuously upgrade and evolve its overall 
technological platform. According to Gawer & Gusumano (2013), recurrent improvements to a 
firm’s technological platform are vital to maintaining competitive advantage in highly fluid and 
dynamic global industries. In the context of the URE, subsequent enhancements to its intra-group 
platform ecosystem through interactions among offspring firms provide learning experiences 
which can be internalized for future exploitation.  
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Another benefit to the ‘incubating platform’ model of development lies in the ability its 
offspring firms to build market legitimacy among its competitors. While the subsidiary is granted 
an unusual level of autonomy to develop its own products and services, it nonetheless must develop 
a client base which requires mutual trust and quality assurances. The lack of reputation and social 
capital characterizing most young firms often handicaps their ability to lock down a steadfast 
clientele. One way to circumvent this obstacle is to market its products through the sales network 
of its parent firm. The transfer of Founder GlobeTech to PUC Founder enabled it to acquire a 
distribution channel in HK for FingerTec products while Technovator has diversified its sales 
network via Tong Fang Group’s subsidiaries. Such initial support can operate to promote 
recognition of offspring firms’ own brands by a broader customer segment.  
 
International Spin-off Stage: Gaining independence through rite of passage into young 
adulthood 
 
In the final period leading to its complete spin-off into a separate entity, the offspring firm has 
finally managed to convert its accomplishments into a set of proven competencies, established a 
portfolio of diverse product offerings which satisfy a growing population of customers, and become 
self-sufficient. The transition is marked by a rise in profitability, potential new strategic alliances, 
and fine-tuning of its business model to capture a larger share of its target market. The offspring 
firm may begin to reduce its reliance on the parent’s ecosystem and focus on new business horizons 
while developing its own dominant logic apart from the parent URE’s core business areas.  
After 9 years of prolonged incubation, PUC Founder finally reached this threshold point by 
achieving an annual after-tax profit growth of 100% by 2011. Even prior to reaching this stage, 
proactive efforts were made by Mr. Teh and Founder Group’s senior executives to initiate the 
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process of contemplating PUC Founder’s future strategic direction. Identifying a viable strategy to 
exit on a high note and maximize value for future investors became their next mission. Moreover, 
both parties saw value in preserving their strategic cooperation rather than resetting to an arm’s 
length relationship. The ties and trust built upon years of mutual collaboration had helped to 
establish a relational network which retains significant value that could be leveraged for future 
international business opportunities.  
To establish its own independence, PUC Founder identified an attractive opportunity to tie 
up with Red Hot Media Asia (RHMA), a rising Malaysian media conglomerate with which it had 
conducted prior business. While PUC Founder did not need any cash injection, it recognized this 
chance as a dual opportunity for Founder Group to reap a substantial profit from its investment 
while allowing PUC Founder to acquire its managerial autonomy. More importantly, RHMA which 
had its roots in digital media and advertising saw value in PUC Founder’s EP and MIS divisions. 
Both parties saw synergies between PUC Founder’s EP, MIS and biometrics divisions and 
RHMA’s advertising, online trading platform, and financial services business lines. Also 
established in 1996 around the same time as PUC Founder’s incorporation, RHMA was founded 
by a young Malaysian Chinese entrepreneur named Cheong Chia Chieh. From its inception he had 
grown RHMA into a diversified media conglomerate with a presence in China and Malaysia.  
Listed on the Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange, RHMA was 
also moving in a similar growth trajectory as PUC Founder with its revenues doubling between 
2008 and 2010 and pre-tax profits rising by 135%. Moreover RHMA had ambitious expansion 
plans to target the greater Southeast Asian market with respect to digital media services and e-
commerce. A merger with PUC Founder would help to facilitate collaboration with Founder Group 
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for future overseas ventures into Southeast Asia. The proposed tie-up strategy would involve 
leveraging the expertise and resources of both firms to launch a new integrated e-platform 
incorporating e-content, e-payment, and B2B social media businesses which have witnessed a rapid 
take-off in Asian markets.  
The three pillars of this strategic plan include a proposal to set up an e-payment system 
known as Founder Pay which would be targeted towards Chinese companies seeking to do business 
overseas in Southeast Asia or other foreign markets, an Online to Offline (“O2O”) social media 
portal which connects Chinese companies to overseas customers, and an e-content system that also 
operates as an advertising platform which generates revenues from individual and institutional 
subscribers. The interlocking and mutually supporting components of these three pillar businesses 
would be combined together to facilitate e-commerce between China and Southeast Asia. With the 
approval of its parent Founder Group, PUC Founder entered into a conditional reverse acquisition 
agreement with RHMA in late 2010. The details of this corporate arrangement are summarized in 
Table 4.4.  
 
 
[Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
 
 
 
Under the terms of the proposed reverse takeover agreement, Resource Holding 
Management (RHM), the holding company for Red Hot Media Asia would inject its core business 
unit Red Media Asia into PUC Founder for a purchase consideration of 90 million Malaysian 
ringgits amounting to equity ownership of 62.48% in PUC Founder. Founder Group would dispose 
of its share but keep a minority stake of 3.19%. Red Media Asia comprises of Red Hot Media 
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Group and Ausscar Group which constitute RHM’s digital advertising and financial services 
divisions. The enlarged conglomerate would retain the name PUC Founder Berhad. Thus, the 
overall strategic vision of the combined group coalesces around leveraging different elements of 
PUC Founder’s original strengths in electronic publishing, management information systems, and 
biometrics with RHM’s media brokerage, financial services and online trading expertise to 
establish a one-stop shop for e-business solutions. In addition, the new corporate entity would be 
dual listed on the London Stock Exchange and the Bursa Malaysia, thus allowing it to raise capital 
in both markets to facilitate future expansion.  
After management approval of this agreement, the reverse takeover exercise was recently 
completed in January 2014. With its offspring firm spun off into another entrepreneurial firm 
possessing strong growth prospects, Founder Group had accomplished its corporate parenting 
duties but preserves a strategic alliance with PUC Founder to explore future business opportunities 
in the Southeast Asian market. According to Founder Group’s cofounding director Alan Cheung 
Shuen-Lung: 
 
PUC Founder was a little tree growing under the shadow of a much larger parent tree. We needed 
to allow it the freedom to grow independently as it cannot flourish and become its own big tree 
under the parent's shadow. 
 
The success story of PUC Founder may offer some insights into the current evolution of 
Technovator which shares similar characteristics with PUC Founder. Since Technovator was 
founded over 8 years after the incorporation of PUC Founder, it has only recently reached its 
adolescence. However, positive signs of its growing independence are already evident. 
Technovator currently generates about 40% of its revenue from overseas markets via Distech 
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Controls, its overseas joint venture subsidiary which was founded by Etienne Vielleux, a Canadian 
entrepreneur. Together he and Mr. Seah Han Leong have worked to make strategic acquisitions in 
several energy management companies in the Netherlands, France, and Canada, including Acelia, 
Comtec, and E2 Solutions. This ongoing effort to grow Technovator’s own distribution channels 
and R&D capabilities reflects its efforts to build an independent hub of operations.  
Moreover, in 2013, Technovator announced the introduction of several new institutional 
and strategic investors in Distech Controls which raised another CAD $25.5 million. Such capital 
raising efforts following its IPO indicate a view towards expansion for global take-off. As of 2014, 
annual profits have increased by 27% while shares growth was up by 216%. Senior executives have 
stated their intention to penetrate the Southeast Asian market following a rise in demand for zero-
energy consuming green buildings. It recently secured a contract to provide EMS services for the 
construction of Ruby Hall National Guest House, the official venue of the ASEAN summit in 2014. 
This is Technovator’s second high profile project in Burma, the first being Junction Square, a large 
scale shopping center which became operational in 2012. The installation of the shopping center’s 
iBAS system included a pioneering energy monitoring system which billed tenants for the actual 
amount of energy consumed. While the story of Technovator International remains to be written, 
it appears actively engaged in activities leading to value accretion for future spin-off opportunities. 
 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Comparing our case study evidence with insights from the literature streams on corporate parenting 
(Campbell, Goold & Alexander, 1995; Goold, Campbell & Alexander, 1998), sponsored spin-offs 
(Ito, 1995; Ito & Rose, 1994; Wallen & Dahlstrand, 2006), organizational hybrids (Kraatz & Block, 
2008, Thornton et al, 2012; Battilana & Dorado, 2010), innovation platform ecosystems (Gawer & 
163 
 
Cusumano, 2002; Gawer & Cusumano, 2013; Gawer & Phillips; 2013; Thomas, Autio, & Gunn, 
in press), and accelerated internationalization of EMNCs (Bonaglia, Goldstein & Mathews, 2007; 
Li, 2007, 2010; Mathews; 2006), we identify a novel ‘incubating platform’ organizational model 
for international entrepreneurial spin-offs by UREs. The modified hybrid structure of UREs stems 
from resource bricolage to span institutional voids arising from early absence of innovation 
resources and infrastructure by combining the typical incubation function widely deployed by 
advanced country universities with a centralized business platform. By showing how these dual 
features are interwoven together, we argue that this special ‘governance form’ of knowledge 
industrialization harbors certain unique advantages for international spin-off potential which we 
discuss in a detailed comparative study of PUC Founder Berhad and Technovator International. 
Figure 4.3 below presents a conceptual model of the multi-stage incubating platform model for 
international spin-off: 
 
 
[Insert Figure 4.3 about here] 
 
 
 
Specifically we propose that the ‘incubating platform’ approach enables the URE to propagate 
offspring firms which are nurtured under related industrial clusters to optimize their access to 
pooled resources for global take-off. At the onset of incubation, the embeddedness of the overseas 
offspring firm in this industrial ecosystem avails them to an array of diverse resources including 
seed capital, core technology, and managerial expertise which extend above and beyond resources 
offered via venture capital or corporate accelerator channels. For most overseas start-ups, this early 
stage can be unpredictable and challenging despite their identification of lucrative business 
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opportunities. The availability of abundant resources and specialized business knowledge from the 
parent URE helps to buffer the offspring in its embryonic phase, providing an extra cushion of 
protection rarely accessible to most international new ventures. To create an even stronger 
architectural leverage in addition to its platform resources and seed capital, the parent URE may 
step up investment by transferring some of its core business lines to its offspring. This umbilical 
cord operates to generate a stable revenue stream while the infant start-up ramps up its R&D and 
marketing activities for incubating a new business line to support overseas expansion. After 
demonstrating its growth potential, the offspring startup is floated on a foreign stock exchange via 
IPO. Therefore we propose: 
 
Proposition 1: During the early incubation phase, the parent URE provides a bundle of platform 
resources including platform technology, seed capital, managerial leadership, and core business 
lines to its offspring firm, creating an internal gestational ecosystem to optimize the offspring’s 
chances of international survival.  
 
Proposition 2: In the stages leading up to its overseas IPO, the offspring firm derives a reliable 
revenue stream by leveraging the core business lines transferred from its parent URE, placing the 
offspring in an advantageous position to set up its overseas operations relative to other 
international new ventures relying only on venture capital or accelerator channels of investment. 
 
 
The injection of equity through public listing serves to reduce the cost of capital for 
offspring firms, enabling them to borrow greater amounts on a standalone basis to finance their 
expanding operations. Despite the creation of their independent capital structure after this critical 
juncture, the parent URE continues to support its adolescent offspring through its next phase of 
international development. While PUC Founder and Technovator International were granted 
significant autonomy to develop their own product portfolios, their senior managers remained 
cognizant of the risks associated with the liability of adolescence. This phase is complicated by a 
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gradual decline in assets as the initial funding raised begins to dwindle while the pressure to 
demonstrate value creation increases. To sustain its offspring’s velocity of international expansion, 
the parent URE may channel additional resources its offspring firm. The overseas offspring firm 
may also become increasingly involved in recurrent transactions with other subsidiaries of the 
parent URE such as subcontracting arrangements to support production. 
Interactions between the offspring firm with other subsidiaries of the parent may provide 
enhanced learning and competence-building opportunities. At this point, the offspring firm may 
gradually switch from being reliant on the parent towards greater self-autonomy by developing its 
own organizational identity. However, this gradual development phase necessitates a prolonged 
incubation. Following its IPO, five years had passed before PUC Founder was able to orchestrate 
a successful marketing campaign to deploy its FingerTec brand of biometric products overseas. 
The elaborate campaign involved the creation of a global reseller program, a new electronic sales 
platform, and a social media campaign which included personal blogs and updates by its managing 
director. Similarly, Technovator engaged in a number of cross-border acquisitions over the past 6 
years to consolidate its EMS business line. Therefore we propose: 
 
Proposition 3: During the extended incubation phase, the parent URE may contribute additional 
resources to its offspring firm to help it overcome its liability of adolescence as it ramps up its 
international marketing, distribution and R&D activities to orchestrate a global takeoff.  
 
Proposition 4: The prolonged incubation phase may lead to an increase in interactions between 
the offspring firm and other parent subsidiaries to help bolster its market market legitimacy, 
contributing to the formation of an intra-group platform ecosystem. 
 
 
Towards the latter stage of its extended incubation before actual spin-off, the offspring firm 
finally begins to realize its performance potential, becoming less reliant on the parent URE’s intra-
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group platform to support its growth. Signs of this improvement can be observed in its ability to 
attract a broader array of clients, sales profitability, R&D achievements, and accumulation of assets 
in the immediate years leading up to its spin-off. Evaluating the case of PUC Founder, the process 
of spinning off may also require careful advanced preparation to identify a financially viable 
opportunity for the offspring firm and parent URE. The timing of the international spin-off is also 
important, not only as a means to raise additional rounds of capital for the spin-off but also for the 
parent to fully recoup its investment.  
In the case of PUC Founder, the operationalization of its spin-off via reverse merger with 
RHM also enabled it to enter new business lines such as e-content and social media, suggesting 
that spin-off opportunities can be coupled with other valuable growth strategies including 
combining forces with new strategic partners to build synergies and maximize take-off capabilities. 
While the final spin-off process is open-ended and subject to contextual circumstances facing the 
offspring firm, the experience of PUC Founder suggests that the spin-off process may not trigger a 
complete separation between the parent URE and its offspring. Rather than disengaging from its 
parent, the offspring firm may choose to become a strategic alliance partner to explore future 
business opportunities together. The spin-off process may support conditions for continued 
collaboration and knowledge-sharing to realize the spin-off’s potential in overseas markets. 
Therefore we propose: 
 
Proposition 5: The international spin-off process which enables the parent URE to reap its early 
investment may also be combined with additional growth strategies such as tie-ups with other 
strategic partners to build new synergies to maximize the offspring’s global take-off capabilities.   
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Proposition 6: Following the culmination of its international spin-off, the offspring firm may 
continue to cultivate a strategic alliance with its parent URE based on prior relationship ties to 
establish an alliance network for exploring new international business opportunities.  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
In elaborating a multifaceted ‘incubating platform’ model for international spin-offs, this study 
contributes to ongoing efforts to identify emergent processes and patterns of overseas venturing by 
emerging market entrepreneurial firms which may rely on new organizational models to orchestrate 
their cross-border activities. Our study aims to make several theoretical contributions. First, the 
longitudinal design of our study enables the development of a rich conceptual process model to 
capture the nascent phases and evolution of international entrepreneurship by UREs and their 
offspring firms, a hybrid organizational corporate entity from China. Currently, very little is known 
about the early stages of international entrepreneurship by new ventures, where the configuration 
of initial resources and capabilities is of paramount importance to new venture survival (Keupp & 
Gassman, 2009; Prashantham, 2012). 
In particular, we identify a novel approach to understanding how the URE as a hybrid 
between incubator and business enterprise can serve as an incubating platform for international 
start-ups to springboard abroad. The ‘incubating platform’ concept for international spin-off has 
yet to be explored in the literature on international entrepreneurship. As Keupp & Gassman (2009: 
618) accurately predicted in their assessment of future research opportunities in international 
entrepreneurship studies, ‘such entities [MNC international spin-offs] would probably behave 
differently in the international environment, and new theoretical linkages would have to be 
explored to analyze their behavior’. By illuminating how such incubation unfolds over an extended 
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duration, our study unveils the unique stages of evolution in UREs’ offspring startups to venture 
overseas. 
According to Sharma & Chrisman (1999: 17), ‘entrepreneurship encompasses acts of 
organizational creation renewal and innovation that occur within or outside an existing 
organization.’ While a spirited effort has been made to advance our theoretical understanding of 
international entrepreneurship (Coviello, McDougall, & Oviatt, 2011; Oviatt & McDougall, 2005; 
Zahra, 2005) the literature in this area has exhibited some longstanding inconsistencies, knowledge 
gaps and conflicting predictions (Keupp & Gassman, 2009) including a bias towards zooming the 
investigation focus solely on new start-ups started by independent individuals or small teams. Such 
a compartmentalized view overlooks the insights offered in the literature on corporate 
entrepreneurship which explores how new organizational units (spin-offs & subsidiaries) are 
founded by ‘an individual or group of individuals in association with an existing organization’ with 
the goal to establish a new business or ‘instigate renewal or innovation within that organization’ 
(Sharma & Chrisman, 1999: 18). By incorporating these insights from corporate entrepreneurship 
into our study, we hope to contribute to more robust theoretical development of the international 
entrepreneurship literature stream. 
This study holds some important implications not only for research on international 
entrepreneurship, but also for EMNCs which must overcome their latecomer status to compete with 
DMNCs. By articulating a blueprint which elucidates how offspring ventures of UREs from 
emerging economies can draw upon the resource base and accumulated knowledge of their parent 
firms to springboard abroad, we demonstrate the possibility of transcending such latecomer 
constraints through novel organizational modalities. In so doing, we attempt to fill in an important 
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piece of the puzzle on how overseas emerging market firms can address the twin liabilities of start-
up and foreignness. While the success of UREs’ overseas offspring is undoubtedly attributed to the 
strategic vision, responsibility and managerial aptitude of their dedicated foreign cofounders who 
navigated uncharted global markets with sophistication and persistence, the presence of a safety 
net and support system offered via their parent UREs offers an extra layer of protection which 
cannot be substituted by venture capital or other accelerator modes. 
Our model identifies the different stages of platform incubation spanning the birth, infancy, 
childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood of the offspring new ventures. To deepen our 
contribution, we show how the offspring firm is afforded a period of prolonged incubation under 
the umbrella of its parent URE to shield it from liabilities of adolescence arising from 
vulnerabilities related to increased pressure to demonstrate value creation as it sets up independent 
operations to launch its international expansion. We also evaluate the final spin-off process and 
investigate how the offspring firm may continue to sustain a relationship with its parent with a view 
to jointly explore new business opportunities for realizing the potential of the offspring’s global 
takeoff. 
One central but under-examined implication of this ‘incubating platform’ model is that by 
virtue of incubating multiple startups and nurturing a web of trust relationships, the parent and its 
offspring become engaged in the co-creation of an international alliance network for exploiting 
future business opportunities. Considerable value can be generated by providing adequate space 
and strategic flexibility for offspring firms to develop their own dynamic capabilities, 
complementary knowledge base, and dominant logic. In recent years, the business network view 
of internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009) has underscored the importance for 
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internationalizing firms to overcome their ‘liability of outsidership’ by penetrating existing foreign 
business networks. Extending this perspective, we propose that one alternative means to dissolve the 
barriers associated with such liability is through grafting and seeding new autonomous organizational 
structures to build the scaffolding for co-creating fresh network nodes, thereby devising innovative 
organizational solutions to address traditional challenges associated with internationalization. While 
recent theoretical studies have highlighted the instrumentality of cross-border market, eco-system and 
value co-creation (Pitelis & Teece, 2010; Pitelis, 2012), there is a lack of empirical studies investigating 
the specific organizational mechanisms and processes which could be leveraged for such purposes. 
The findings of our study are thus important for scholars interested in understanding how 
EMNCs can leverage organizational innovations to generate novel strategies for overseas venturing 
and international network creation (Bonaglia, Goldstein & Mathews, 2007; Mathews, 2006). Created 
as a response to early institutional voids in China’s innovation architecture, UREs combined the 
integration of incubation and business functions to establish ‘incubating platforms’ for their overseas 
offspring firms. The emergence of such alternative organizational forms and the unique solutions they 
devised to penetrate foreign markets suggest that more opportunities to investigate the cross-
fertilization between international corporate strategy and organizational behavior remain to be 
unmasked. In particular, this study highlights the interconnectedness between institutions, 
organizations, and global strategy. By virtue of their embeddedness in dynamic institutional 
environments, emerging market firms are likely to face greater pressure for organizational adaptation 
and learning which affect their overseas behavior. The rise of hybrid corporate entities from institutional 
transition may yield attractive research avenues for investigating additional linkages between 
organizational responses to institutional change and international business strategy. 
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This article presents the findings of an exploratory theory-building exercise using PUC Founder 
and Technovator International as focal subsidiaries of Founder Group and Tong Fang Group, two 
UREs in China which display a distinctive ‘incubating platform’ approach to internationalization.. 
While the model has only been explored in relation to UREs as an organizational form, it can 
potentially be tested and refined in other organizational contexts to more fully establish its validity 
and applicability. In particular a couple of features relating to the UREs in this research study 
should be highlighted to note their idiosyncrasies. 
First, Founder Group and Tong Fang Group are not typical of most UREs in China as their 
parent institutions, Peking University and Tsinghua University, represent the very top echelon of 
Chinese universities. Therefore, they are likely to have access to more abundant resources, research 
talent and organizational capabilities to develop valuable technologies which can be transferred to 
their respective offspring firms for commercialization. The challenge for most international 
entrepreneurial ventures resides in their ability to develop a proprietary portfolio of technologies 
which underpin their international competitiveness. Other UREs in China may be less innovative 
and thus less likely to successfully launch overseas spin-offs employing the same methods, 
although Fudan University’s Fuhua Group and Neusoft Group of China’s Northeastern University 
have both made significant progress with overseas venturing. 
Second, UREs are a product of China’s unique institutional context and the resource 
bricolage that it engendered may be different in other countries where conditions for such tight 
integration between the realms of academia and industry are not possible. While the Chinese 
government has actively encouraged this unique form of university-industry collaboration by 
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incentivizing the formation of UREs, the merits of this knowledge industrialization approach 
remains to be validated in other countries where basic scientific research in universities and 
commercial R&D activities remain separate. One reason for keeping these two streams of research 
separate lies in policy-makers’ priorities to maintain a distinction between pursuing science for the 
purpose of knowledge discovery and developing technology for the purpose of commercialization. 
Due to idiosyncratic institutional circumstances, hybrid university-owned businesses may not be 
widely prevalent in other countries, which may limit the scope of our research in other country 
contexts. 
However, with respect to promising directions for future investigation, the ‘incubating 
platform’ model for international spin-off can benefit from more extensive investigation into the 
spin-off strategies of a wider range of EMNCs and Western multinationals which may deploy such 
organizational innovations internationalize. In particular, a focus on globally competitive market 
leaders such as IBM, Google and Apple which already adopt a platform ecosystem approach for 
product development might reveal some novel platform features in their international operations. 
Finally, greater awareness can be dedicated to the organizational dimension underpinning 
firm internationalization strategies. For example, new types of hybrid firms such as UREs from 
China, commercial microfinance organizations from Bolivia (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), or public-
private nonprofits from the US (Jay, 2013) increasingly come into existence to solve complex 
organizational challenges by reconciling multiple institutional logics. Such organizations which 
reflect a unique bricolage of resources, networks, and capabilities may adopt unprecedented 
combinations of strategies for their overseas boundary-spanning activities which are seldom 
considered in mainstream studies. Our critical exploration of how offspring firms of hybrid UREs 
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leverage incubating platforms for global takeoff serves to illustrate some of the ways such 
organizational innovations can translate into unique asymmetrical advantages for international 
entrepreneurship. 
Figure 4.1 Emergence of university-run firms as hybrid organizational entities 
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Figure 4.2a Incubation timeline for PUC Founder Berhad 
Figure 4.2b Incubation timeline for Technovator International 
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Figure 4.3 Multi-stage spatial process model of incubating platform for international spin-offs
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Table 4.1a Archival data sources for PUC Founder Berhad 
  a The total number of archived materials is 308. 
Table 4.1b Archival data sources for Technovator International 
 a The total number of archived materials is 126. 
Summary of Archival Data Sources for PUC Founder Berhad 
Source  Numbera
Archival public documents (2002 - present) 
Annual reports and audits 
IPO listing prospectus 
Interim financial reports 
External investment reports    
Board of director meeting minutes 
Company records and documents (2006 - present) 
Blog archives of managing director 
Published interviews of senior managers 
In-depth company publications  
Company website news  
Corporate strategy presentations  
Regular corporate announcements 
News articles and media coverage 
Parent company archival documents (1995 - present) 
Annual reports and audits 
IPO listing prospectus 
In-depth company publications 
Company website news  
Regular corporate announcements 
Published interviews of senior managers 
Published in-depth case studies  
      10 
      1 
     23 
      8 
     20 
     40 
      9 
     15 
     30 
      7 
     23 
    38 
     16 
      1 
     18 
     17 
     23 
      6 
      3 
Summary of Archival Sources for Technovator International 
Source  Number a
Archival public documents (2011 - present) 
Annual reports and audits 
IPO listing prospectus 
Interim financial reports 
External investment reports    
Board of director meeting minutes 
Company records and documents (2006 - present) 
Published interviews of senior managers 
In-depth company publications 
Company website news  
Corporate strategy presentations  
Regular corporate announcements 
News articles and media coverage 
Parent company archival documents (1997 - present) 
Annual reports and audits 
IPO listing prospectus 
In-depth company publications 
Company website news  
Regular corporate announcements 
Published interviews of senior managers 
       3 
      1 
      5 
      3 
      3 
      8 
      5 
     11 
      5 
      5 
     15 
     14 
      1 
      8 
     12 
     15 
      9 
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Table 4.2 Pre-IPO initial incubation stage – parenting from infant to childhood period  
 
 
Incubating Platform Resources PUC Founder Berhad – (1997-2002) Technovator International – (2005-2011) 
 
 
Platform Technology 
Founder Group provides PUC Founder with a license to its 
proprietary fingerprint algorithm to develop a commercial range 
of biometric products. The FingerTec product line was originally 
adapted from technology used in automated fingerprint 
identification systems for criminal investigation and civil 
registration purposes by various government public security 
divisions. 
 
Tong Fang Group as China’s largest supplier of building automation 
solutions and network integration,  provides Technovator International  
with a wide array of proprietary technologies in remote monitoring, 
control, energy analytics, air conditioning, ventilation, heating, and  
IT integration to develop a new line of integrated building automation 
and energy management products. 
 
 
 
 
Initial Seed Capital 
Initial capital was secured from several sources – (1) Founder 
HK, a subsidiary of Founder Group which raised capital through 
IPO in HK Stock Exchange in 1996 became PUC Founder’s 
principal investor, (2) Research funding from the Malaysia 
Research and Development Grant Scheme to support R&D 
expenses for initial product development, (3) Revenues from PUC 
Founder’s electronic publishing and management information 
systems business.  
 
Initial capital was secured from several sources – (1) Tong Fang 
Group and its investment holding company Resuccess became 
Technovator’s principal shareholders, (2) Equity contributions by 
Mr. Seah Han Leong, the cofounder of Technovator made him a 
minority shareholder, (3) Strategic investments were made by two 
private equity firms Zana China Fund and CTC Capital which were 
introduced by Tong Fang to Technovator International. 
 
 
 
Group Platform Resources 
 
Founder Group provides PUC Founder with an array of business 
services including access to software and hardware sourced from 
other Founder subsidiaries such as Founder Electronics and 
Founder Information, top management leadership, Founder 
Group’s brand name, R&D technical support and expertise, 
administrative and accounting support, and human resources.  
 
Tong Fang Group provides Technovator  with a broad spectrum of 
business services including software and hardware from other 
subsidiaries such as Tong Fang Artificial Environment and Tong 
Fang Security Technology Co., product distribution channels, 
management leadership, Tong Fang’s brand name, R&D technical 
support and expertise, administrative and accounting support, and 
human resources  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Platform Ecosystem 
PUC Founder’s internal platform ecosystem comprised of three 
main business lines – electronic publishing, management 
information systems, and biometrics. Electronic publishing and 
management information systems constituted PUC Founders’ 
initial core businesses which generated steady revenues. PUC 
Founder’s biometrics division was in its nascent stages of R&D, 
requiring substantial capital to incubate and develop a new 
product line. Revenues from PUC Founder’s two established 
business lines helped to subsidize the biometrics division to fund 
R&D incubation for developing its first biometric prototypes.  
Technovator International’s internal platform ecosystem comprises 
of three business lines – integrated building automation systems 
(iBAS), energy management systems, and control security systems.  
Technovator’s iBAS products constitute an established business line 
that generates its primary revenue stream. Tong Fang Group also 
supplied the capital to acquire Distech Controls, a Canadian energy 
management systems provider. The acquisition enabled Technovator 
to build competitiveness in the energy systems management 
industry. Revenues from iBAS business are used to support ongoing 
incubation of its energy management systems business. 
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 Table 4.3 Post-IPO extended incubation stage – prolonged parenting through adolescence 
 
 
  Incubating Platform for  Global Takeoff PUC Founder Berhad – (2002-2010) Technovator International – (2011-Present) 
 
 
 
Extended Parent Ownership 
 
PUC Founder’s successful IPO on the Bursa Malaysia in 2002 enabled 
it to raise a sufficient capital base for R&D and global business 
development. Rather than spinning off into an independent company, 
PUC Founder remained tethered to Founder Group via controlling 
equity ownership. Founder Group assumed its role as principal 
shareholder of PUC Founder with 35.90% ownership while PUC 
Founder’s cofounder Mr. Teh Hong Seng holds 10.59% ownership as 
the company’s second largest minority shareholder. 
 
Technovator International’s successful IPO on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange in 2011 has enabled it to raise adequate capital to support its 
ongoing R&D and global expansion. Instead of spinning off into an 
independent company, Technovator International remains a subsidiary of 
Tong Fang Group. As the principal shareholder, Tong Fang Group holds 
32.98% of Technovator International while cofounder Mr. Seah Han 
Leong holds 11.53% ownership as the firm’s third largest minority 
shareholder following Zana China Fund which holds 12.55%.  
 
 
 
 
Group Platform Resources 
 
Founder Group continues to provide PUC Founder with access to 
resources and business services in addition to enhancing its support in 
several respects. Founder Group helps to transfer two subsidiaries, 
Founder GlobalTech (HK) and Founder GlobalTech (Shenzhen) to PUC 
Founder to support its revenue stream and operational capabilities as it 
continues to incubate its nascent biometrics division. New efforts were 
made to help PUC Founder establish market legitimacy by enabling 
PUC Founder to access Founder GlobeTech’s (HK) distribution 
services. 
 
Tong Fang Group continues to provide Technovator International with 
ongoing resources in several respects. After establishment of 
Technovator’s new subsidiary, Tong Fang Technovator International 
(Beijing), Tong Fang Group entered into an ongoing purchase agreement 
to provide raw materials including peripheral equipment, software, and 
other components utilized by Technovator Beijing in the production 
process. Other efforts have been made to help Technovator establish 
market legitimacy by tapping into Tong Fang Group’s extensive sales 
network.  
 
 
 
 
Intra-Group Platform Ecosystem 
A series of recurrent related party transactions between Founder Group 
subsidiaries including Founder HK, Founder Century, Founder 
Electronics, Founder North America and Founder Order Computer 
System and PUC Founder were made shore up its business growth. 
This included Founder Group subsidiaries entering into a series of 
subcontracting arrangements with PUC Founder to provide services for 
the development, installation and implementation of an advertising 
management system. 
A series of recurrent party transactions between Tong Fang Group 
subsidiaries including Tong Fang Artificial Environment, Tong Fang 
Security Technology, Tong Fang Health and Technology and 
Technovator were made to shore up its business growth. Technovator 
also entered into an ongoing subcontracting arrangement with Tong Fang 
Group to sell its iBAS and EMS products to Tong Fang Group and other 
affiliated parties for a period of three years. The ongoing subcontracting 
arrangement has been renewed until the end of 2016.   
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                    Table 4.4 International spin-off stage – gaining independence through rite of passage into young adulthood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PUC Founder Berhad – (2010 - Present) 
 
 
Preparations for Final Spin-off 
 
Following its IPO, PUC Founder Berhad launched a five year ‘Going Global’ strategy 
in 2003 which led to the creation of a global distribution network culminating in the 
expansion of its presence to over 100 countries. By 2011 it recorded a profit growth of 
over 100%. To support its expansion in a competitive industry and diversify its 
revenue base, it entered into a conditional reverse acquisition agreement in 2010 with 
Red Hot Media International, an advertising and media company founded by another 
Malaysian Chinese entrepreneur in 1996. The reverse takeover proposal required in 
advance the internal restructuring of Red Media Asia in preparation for completing the 
terms of the acquisition which was completed by January 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
Terms of Reverse Takeover  
 
The reverse takeover deal includes the following key elements agreed to by the 
executive management of both companies: 1) the entire stake of Red Media Asia, its 
core business unit would be injected into PUC Founder in exchange for a controlling 
stake of 62.48% in PUC Founder. The parent firm Founder Group would dispose of its 
shares but retain a minority stake of 3.19% 2) under the agreement the enlarged 
corporate group would retain the name PUC Founder Berhad 3) the reverse takeover 
triggers a shift in strategic direction with PUC Founder seeking to expand into the e-
content, e-payment, and B2B social media business post-merger 4) FingerTec would 
leverage Red Hot Media’s sales and distribution network to deepen its penetration into 
the Southeast Asian market while Red Hot Media would utilize Founder Group’s 
network to expand its advertising and media business in the Chinese mainland.  
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Reorganization  
The new corporate group structure of PUC Founder Berhad would comprise of three 
main pillars under the umbrella of the parent company Resource Holding Management 
(RHM) which is listed on the London Stock Exchange: 1) Red Hot Media which 
comprises the advertising and media arm of the conglomerate which was injected into 
PUC Founder 2) PUC Founder’s electronics publishing, management information 
systems and biometrics arms 3) Ausscar Group which is Red Hot Media’s financial 
services division. The corporate reorganization is accompanied by a corresponding 
enlargement in the board of directors with the appointment of several executives from 
RHM to the board. Cheong Chia Chieh, the founding director of RHM becomes the 
new group managing director while Teh Hon Seng remains as executive director. The 
combined revenues of both PUC Founder and Red Media totaled to 13.1 RM million 
in 2013.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
5.1 SUMMARY 
This thesis endeavors to respond to calls for a stronger cross-fertilization of ideas between the 
literatures on institutional diversity and international business (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). In 
particular it is concerned with exploring how institutional complementarities between government 
institutions in emerging market countries can evolve through institutional transition, thus giving 
rise to diversity in capitalism and new patterns of behavior in organizations that diffuse into their 
overseas investment strategies. According to Boyer (2012: 33), ‘this is a challenge to the variety of 
capitalism approach that postulates a one-to-one correspondence between firms’ organization and 
institutional forms operating at the macro level’. While it has been widely acknowledged that 
economic institutions exert a direct impact on firm-level phenomena (North, 1990: Williamson, 
1985), relatively less attention has been devoted to explore the implications of institutional 
evolution for the realignment of relevant stakeholders contributing to the rise in diverse new 
organizational forms in the emerging economy context. One interesting angle to understand how 
such new business structures evolve is to observe how they refract and mediate the challenges 
associated with vital institutional change processes.  
An important implication of this outcome is the increasing manifestation of hybridity and 
diversity among differently organized state-owned actors which have progressively evolved 
distinct attributes and strategic orientations, propelling them to exhibit their own unique specialized 
182 
 
capabilities and organizational approaches to internationalization. This dissertation is composed of 
three research essays which evaluate how institutionally derived forms of organizational diversity 
have re-sculpted the patterns of emerging economy state-owned firms’ overseas investment 
activities. By clarifying some of the evolving internal complexity of institution-firm linkages, this 
thesis seeks to shed light on how the embeddedness of such firms in fragmented mini-institutional 
environments can lead them to adopt very different approaches for internationalization.  
 
5.2 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS  
Each of the three research papers comprising this thesis employs a different methodology to 
identify the varying dimensions of state-owned firms’ organizational diversity and how they impact 
firms’ overseas venturing strategies. The first paper sets the stage by developing a theoretical 
framework which bridges the political economy, organizational sociology, and international 
business literatures. It delineates how the reconfiguration of macro-institutional reforms can 
recalibrate central and local institutions of economic coordination giving rise to sharpened 
distinctions between the organizational features of central and local SOEs. The paper examines the 
strategic implications of such differentiation in their firm-level resources and capabilities for their 
cross-border venturing activities. This theoretical development offers significant contributions by 
progressing beyond static and singular conceptions of SOEs’ identities to pinpoint new patterns in 
the shifting mutation of their attributes and perceptions by host countries that propel them to pursue 
specialized strategies for outward FDI. 
The second paper investigates how corporate ownership reform spawns the emergence of 
diverse marketized ownership identities which have consequences for firms’ outward FDI. The rise 
of these new shareholding categories has motivated researchers including Delios et al (2006) to 
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develop a new ownership classification system to account for Chinese shareholders’ increasingly 
variegated identities. It has been widely acknowledged that shareholders can play strategic agenda-
setting roles and impact how resources are channeled into their invested firms. Thus, corporate 
ownership reform bears transformational consequences for state-owned firms’ ability to derive 
institutional competitive advantages for internationalization.  
This paper traces how the ownership reform process yielded new categories of shareholding 
including marketized state owners which have been restructured into profit-oriented organizations. 
Building on insights from the first paper, this second paper makes a contribution by demonstrating 
how reformed marketized and non-reformed ownership at central and local levels of government 
may confer different levels of institutional competitive advantage to their invested firms which are 
reflected in their varying propensities for outward FDI. Moreover, the study finds that meso-level 
institutional structures such as state business group affiliation may moderate the relationship 
between firms’ ownership identities and their rate of foreign market entry. The goal of the study is 
geared to capturing how adaptation in the institutional architecture embedded in ownership 
structures and state business group affiliation reshapes the parameters of Chinese firms’ ability to 
expand their foreign operations.  
The final paper explores how institutional transitions can give rise to hybrid state-owned 
university-run firms which employ ‘institutional bricolage’ to learn, modify, combine, and 
optimize existing institutional elements for leveraging new organizational solutions to 
internationalize. In so doing, the study illuminates the linkages between EMNC’s evolving 
organizational architecture and international business strategy. Based on extensive field work and  
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archival data, the study evaluates the origins of university-run firms from China as hybrids 
merging business enterprises and incubators to build new organizational templates operationalizing 
architectural leverage. It illustrates how they constructed ‘incubating platforms’ for the creation 
and extended parenting of international entrepreneurial high-technology start-ups for orchestrated 
and coordinated leapfrogging into foreign markets. By unveiling the unique mechanisms developed 
by university-run firms to venture overseas, this exploratory study responds to recent calls for 
deeper investigation into the relationship between institutions, organizational structure and global 
strategy.  
According to Carney et al., (2009: 366), ‘we see great heterogeneity in the emergence of 
novel and hybrid organizational forms, such as clustered production networks, specialist firms that 
participate in global commodity chains, and large government-linked enterprises...[which] are 
suggestive of much greater variation in corporate forms than is predicted by Varieties of Capitalism 
and other institutional theories of organization. Therefore, explaining variation in the population 
of domestic firms in a country remains a crucial task for an institutional theory of firm strategy’. 
This study makes an important contribution by targeting precisely this research gap as well as 
making further extensions to reveal the some unique implications of new organizational forms in 
emerging economies for firm internationalization strategies.  
  
5.3 CLOSING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
This dissertation focuses on investigating the implications of institutional change on emerging economy 
SOEs’ internationalization and therefore leaves space for extended investigation on how such SOEs 
may proactively respond to develop new market institutions or co-evolve with them. Secondly, while 
the empirical sections of this thesis are context-specific, future research can apply empirical methods 
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to test the theoretical framework developed in this thesis to analyze the impact of different macro-
institutional reforms on the foreign investment patterns of SOEs from other emerging economy 
countries.  
There are nonetheless some additional limitations which can be addressed by future studies. 
Institutional transition is a gradual process and the effects of particular reforms may not become visible 
for years. The empirical findings of this study capture a snapshot in time with respect to the 
morphogenesis of emerging market state-owned firms from China. With the simultaneous unfolding of 
multiple reforms in other country contexts, it may also be challenging to disentangle their 
interconnected and contingent effects on firms’ attributes and strategic choices. In addition there exist 
other unique facets of diversity and hybridity in various countries which remain yet to be elaborated. 
Furthermore, there is considerable internal geographical heterogeneity within national boundaries 
which may impact the formation of firm characteristics. Future studies can also benefit from 
investigating the effects of macro-institutional changes in host countries which may alter the operating 
environment for foreign investing firms. Recent research finds evidence that evolving political 
conditions in host environments can substantially curtail the ability of multinational firms to maintain 
their organizational legitimacy in these countries (Bucheli & Kim, 2012).  
Most importantly, the findings of this thesis hold valuable implications for research into the 
relationship between institutional transition, organizational diversity and global business strategy. The 
instantiation of new varieties of Asian capitalism has unleashed fresh strategic imperatives among state-
owned firms to evolve and intensively recalibrate their resource profiles and dynamic capabilities 
(Carney et al., 2009). To a large extent, such organizational innovation and creativity is not limited to 
SOEs but applicable to wider population of emerging economy firms. By delving into more deeply in 
186 
 
a systematic manner into domestic institutional contexts and employing different methodologies to 
capture and pinpoint how such firms are reconstituting their capability structures through organizational 
bricolage and reconfiguration in alignment with the evolving institutional infrastructure, future studies 
can uncover new entrepreneurial modalities, innovative practices and unique pathways engineered by 
emerging economy firms to successfully thrive in global markets. To this extent, more research can be 
applied to examine the relative performance, time horizons, deployment, and replicability associated 
with varying organizational strategies of emerging economy firms.  
187 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Abubakar, M. 2010. Towards world class corporations. Presentation by the Indonesian Minister of State-
Owned Enterprises. http://www.euromoneyconferences.com/downloads/Asia/2010/Indonesia10/ 
SOE.pdf [Accessed 15 October 2013]. 
Accenture. 2008. Multi-polar world 2: The rise of the emerging-market multinational. 
http://www.accenture.com/NR/rdonlyres/2835C9BA-2077-4C68-B1CD-
8B87DC9F009B/0/MPW2Jan08.pdf. 
Aguilera, R., Desender, K., & Kabbach de Castro, L. 2012. A bundle perspective on comparative 
corporate governance. In Clarke, T. & Branson, D. (Eds.), SAGE Handbook of Corporate 
Governance. London: Sage Publications.  
Ahlstrom, D., & Bruton, G. D. 2010. Rapid institutional shifts and the co-evolution of entreneurial firms 
in transition economies. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(3): 531–554. 
Ahmad E., & Mansoor, A. 2002. Indonesia: Managing decentralization. IMF Working Paper, Fiscal 
Affairs Department and Independent Evaluation Office, Washington DC. 136(2). 
Ai, C. & Norton E. 2003. Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economic Letters, (80): 123–129. 
Allison, P.A. 2012. Logistic regression using SAS: Theory & application. North Carolina, USA: SAS Press. 
Allison, P. D. & Waterman, R. P. 2002. Fixed effects negative binomial regression Models. Sociological 
Methodology, 32(1): 247–265. 
Aoki, M. 1994. The contingent governance of teams: Analysis of institutional complementarity. 
International Economic Review. 35(3): 657-676. 
Aoki, M., Jackson, G., & Miyajima, H. 2007. Corporate governance in Japan: Institutional change and 
organizational diversity. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Arregle, J.L., Beamish, P.W., & Hébert, L. 2009. The regional dimension of MNEs’ foreign subsidiary 
localization. Journal of international Business Studies, 40: 86-107. 
188 
 
Aulakh, P.S., & Kotabe, M. 2008. Institutional changes and organizational transformation in developing 
economies. Journal of International Management, 14(3): 209-216.  
Bai, C., Lu, J., & Tao, Z. 2009. How does privatization work in China? Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 37(3): 453-470. 
Baker W.E., & Sinkula, J.M. 1999. The synergistic effect of market orientation and learning orientation on 
organizational performance. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 27(4): 411–427. 
Banalieva, E.R., & Santoro, M.D. 2009. Local, regional, or global? Geographic orientation and relative 
financial performance of emerging market multinational enterprises. European Management 
Journal, 27(5): 344-355. 
Barkema, H. & Vermeulen, F. 1997. What differences in the cultural backgrounds of partners are 
detrimental for international joint ventures? Journal of International Business Studies, 28(4): 845-
864. 
Bartel, A.P., & Harrison, A.E. 2005. Ownership versus the environment: Disentangling the sources of 
public-sector inefficiency. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(1): 135-147. 
Battilana J., & Dorado S. 2010. Building sustainable hybrid organizations: The case of commercial 
microfinance organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 53(6): 1419–1440. 
 
Besharov, M., & Smith, W. 2013. Multiple logics in organizations: Explaining their varied nature and 
implications. Academy of Management Review, 39(3): 364-381.   
 
Bhaumik, S.K., Driffield, N., & Pal, S., 2010. Does ownership structure of emerging market firms affect 
their outward FDI? The case of the Indian automotive and pharmaceutical sectors. Journal of 
International Business Studies, (41): 437-450. 
Bieto, E., Planellas, M., & Parada, P. 2005. Corporate entrepreneurship vs. corporate parenting: Do they 
fit together for creating value in the corporation? In S.A. Zahara (Ed.) Frontiers of 
entrepreneurship research: Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual entrepreneurship research 
conference: 445-446. Wellesley MA: Babson College. 
 
189 
Boeh, K.K., & Beamish, P.W. 2012. Time travel and the liability of distance in foreign direct investment: 
Location choice and entry mode. Journal of International Business Studies, 43(5): 525-535. 
Bonaglia F., Goldstein A., & Mathews, J. A. 2007. Accelerated internationalization by emerging markets 
multinationals: The case of the white goods sector. Journal of World Business, 42(4): 369–383. 
Boyer, R. 2012. A new epoch but still diversity within and between capitalisms: China in comparative 
perspective. In Lane, C. & Wood, G. (Eds.), Capitalist diversity and diversity within capitalism: 
32-67. London: Routledge. 
Bresnahan T., Gambardella, A., & Saxenian, A. 2001. ‘Old economy’ inputs for ‘new economy’   
             outcomes: Cluster formation in the new Silicon Valleys. Industrial and Corporate Change, 
             10(4): 835–860. 
Brouthers, K.D. 2002. Institutional, cultural and transaction cost influences on entry mode choice and 
performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2): 203-221. 
Bruderl, J., & Schussler, R. 1990. Organizational mortality: Liability of newness adolescence. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(3): 1–34. 
Bucheli, M., & Kim, M.Y. 2012. Political institutional change, obsolescing legitimacy, and multinational 
corporations. Management International Review, 52(6): 847-877. 
Campbell, J.L. 2004. Institutional change and globalization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Campbell, A., Goold, M., & Alexander, M. 1995. Corporate Strategy: The quest for parenting advantage. 
Harvard Business Review, 73 (2): 120–133. 
Cantwell, J., Dunning, J.H., Lundan, S. 2010. An evolutionary approach to understanding international 
business activity: The co-evolution of MNEs and the institutional environment. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 41(4): 567–586. 
Carney, M., & Gedajlovic, E. 2001. Corporate governance and firm capabilities: A comparison of 
managerial, alliance, and personal capitalisms. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 18(3): 335-
354. 
190 
 
Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E., Heugens, P., Van Essen, M., & Oosterhout, J. 2011. Business group 
affiliation, performance, context, and strategy: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management 
Journal, 54(3):437-460. 
Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E., & Yang, X. 2009. Varieties of Asian Capitalism: Toward an institutional 
theory of Asian enterprise. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26 (3): 361–380. 
 
Caulfield, J. 2006. Local government reform in China: A rational actor perspective. International Review 
of Administrative Sciences, 72(2): 253-267. 
Child, J., & Marinova, S. Forthcoming. The role of contextual combinations in the globalization of 
Chinese firms. Management and Organization Review, DOI: 10.1111/more.12073. 
Chan, C.M., & Makino, S. 2010. Does subnational region matter? Foreign affiliate performance in the 
United States and China. Strategic Management Journal, 31(11): 1226-1243.  
Chang, S.J., & Hong, J.B. 2000. Economic performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea: 
Intragroup resource sharing and internal business transactions. Academy of Management Journal, 
43(3): 429-448. 
Chang, S.J., Chung, C.N., & Mahmood, I.P. 2006. When and how does business group affiliation promote 
firm innovation? A tale of two emerging economies. Organization Science, 17(5): 637-656. 
Chang, S.J., & Xu, D. 2008. Spillovers and competition among foreign and local firms in China. Strategic 
Management Journal, 29(5): 495-518. 
Chen, V.Z., Li, J., Shapiro, D., & Zhang, X. 2014. Ownership structure and innovation: An emerging 
market perspective. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 31(1): 1-24. 
Child, J., & Rodrigues, S. 2005. The internationalization of Chinese firms: A case for theoretical revision? 
Management Organization Review, 1(3): 381-410. 
Child, J., & Tse, D.K. 2001. China's transition and its implications for international business. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 32(1): 5-21.  
191 
 
Chien, S.S. 2006. Institutional innovations, asymmetric decentralization, and local economic development: 
A case study of Kunshan in post-Mao China. Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy, 25(2): 269-290. 
Chittoor, R., Sarkar, M.B., Ray, S., & Aulakh, P.S. 2009. Third-world copycats to emerging 
multinationals: Institutional changes and organizational transformation in the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry. Organization Science, 20(1): 187-205. 
Chung, W., Mitchell, W., & Yeung, B. 2003. Foreign direct investment and host country productivity: The 
American automotive component industry in the 1980s. Journal of International Business Studies, 
34(2): 199-218.  
Ciborra, C.U. 1996. The platform organization: Recombining strategies, structures, and surprises. 
Organization Science, 7(2): 103–118. 
 
Clarysse, B., Wright, M., Lockett, A., Van de Velde, E., & Vohora, A. 2005. Spinning off new ventures: 
A typology of incubation strategies from European research institutions. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 20(2):183–216. 
 
Colpan, A., Hikino, T., & Lincoln, J. 2010. The Oxford Handbook on Business Groups. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Contractor, F.J., Kumar, V., & Kundu, S.K. 2007. Nature of the relationship between international 
expansion and performance: The case of emerging market firms. Journal of World Business, 
42(4): 401-417. 
 
Coviello, N.E., McDougall, P.P., & Oviatt, B.M. 2011. The emergence, advance and future of 
international entrepreneurship research: An introduction to the special forum. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 26(6), 625–631. 
 
Crouch, C. & Streeck, W. 1997. Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and 
Diversity. London: Sage. 
Cui, L., & Jiang, F. 2012. State ownership effect on firms’ FDI ownership decisions under institutional 
pressure: A study of Chinese outward-investing firms. Journal of International Business Studies, 
43(3): 264–284. 
192 
 
Cui, L., & Jiang, F.  2009. FDI entry mode choice of Chinese firms: A strategic behavior perspective. 
Journal of World Business, 44(4): 434-444. 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Villalonga, B. 2000. Explaining the variance in the performance effects of 
privatization. Academy of Management Review, 25(3): 581-590. 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Genc, M. 2008. Transforming disadvantages into advantages: Developing-country 
MNEs in the least developed countries. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(6): 957-979. 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Dau, L.A. 2009. Structural reform and firm exports. Management International 
Review, 49(4): 479-507. 
 
Dacin, M.T., Goodstein, J., & Scott, W.R. 2002. Institutional theory and institutional change: Introduction 
to the special research forum. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1): 45-56. 
Dau, L.A. 2012. Pro-market reforms and developing country multinational corporations. Global Strategy 
Journal, 2(3): 262–276. 
 
Demers, C. 2008. Organizational change theories: A synthesis. Sage Publications, Inc.  
 
Delios, A., Zhi, J.W., & Zhou, N. 2006. A new perspective on ownership identities in China's listed 
companies. Management & Organization Review, 2(3): 319-343. 
DiMaggio, P.J. 1997. Culture and cognition: An interdisciplinary review. Annual Review of Sociology, 23: 
263 – 287. 
DiMaggio, P.J., & Powell, W. 1991. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Di Minin, A., Zhang, J., & Gammeltoft, P. 2012. Chinese foreign direct investment in R&D in Europe. 
European Management Journal, 30(3): 189-203. 
Doh, J.P. 2000. Entrepreneurial privatization strategies: Order of entry and local partner collaboration as 
sources of competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 25(3): 551-571.  
193 
 
Doh, J.P., Teegen, H., & Mudambi, R. 2004. Balancing private and state ownership in emerging markets' 
telecommunications infrastructure: Country, industry, and firm influences. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 35(3): 233-250.  
Domadenik, P., Prašnikar, J., & Svejnar, J. 2008. Restructuring of firms in transition: Ownership, 
institutions and openness to trade. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(4): 725-746.  
Dunning, J. 2004. Institutional reform, FDI and European transition economies. In R. Grosse (Ed.) 
International business and governments in the 21st century: 49-79. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Dunning, J.H., Kim, C., & Park, D. 2008. Old wine in new bottles: A comparison of emerging market 
TNCs today and developed-country TNCs thirty years ago. In Sauvant, K., (Ed.), The rise of 
transnational corporations from emerging markets: Threat or opportunity?:158-180. 
Chelthenham: Edward Elgar. 
Eisenhardt, K. E. 1989. Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity environments. Academy of 
Management Journal, 32(3): 543-576. 
 
Elango, B., & Pattnaik, C. 2007. Building capabilities for international operations through networks: A 
study of Indian firms. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4): 541-555. 
 
Ennen, E., & Richter, A. 2010. The whole is more than the sum of its parts - or is it? A review of the 
empirical literature on complementarities in organizations. Journal of Management, 36(1): 207–
233. 
 
Etzkowitz, H. 1998. The norms of entrepreneurial science: Cognitive effects of the new university-
industry linkages. Research Policy, 27(8): 823-833. 
 
Eun, J., Lee, K., & Wu, G. 2006. Explaining the “university-run enterprises” in China: A theoretical 
framework for university–industry relationship in developing countries and its application to 
China. Research Policy, 35(9): 1329–1346. 
 
194 
 
Eun, J., & Lee, K. 2010. An empirical inquiry into “academy-run enterprises” in China: Unique 
characteristics and evolutionary changes. International Journal of Innovation Management. 14(1): 
123-150. 
 
Fichman M., & Levinthal D. A. 1991. Honeymoons and the liability of adolescence: A new perspective on 
duration dependence in social and organizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 
16(2): 442–468. 
 
Filatotchev, I., Strange, R., Piesse, J., & Lien, Y.C. 2007. FDI by firms from newly industrialized 
economies in emerging markets: Corporate governance, entry mode and location. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 38(4): 556-502.  
Fitriningrum, A. 2008. SOEs towards a central or coordinated ownership unit. Indonesian Ministry of 
State-Owned Enterprises. http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate 
ownedenterprises/44787681.pdf [Accessed 15 October 2013]. 
Friedman, E., Johnson, S., & Mitton, T. 2003. Propping and tunneling. Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 31(4): 732-750. 
Gammeltoft, P., Barnard, H., & Madhok, A. 2010. Emerging multinationals, emerging theory: Macro and 
micro-level perspectives. Journal of International Management, 16(2): 95-101.  
Gammeltoft, P., Filatotchev, I. & Hobdari, B. 2012. Emerging multinational companies and strategic fit: A 
contingency framework and future research agenda. European Management Journal, 30(3): 175–188. 
Gawer, A. 2010. The organization of technological platforms. In Phillips, N., Sewell, G., & Griffiths, D., 
(Eds.) Technology and organization: Essays in honour of Joan Woodward (Research in the 
Sociology of Organizations, Volume 29): 287-296. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
Gawer A., & Cusumano M. 2002. Platform leadership: How Intel, Microsoft and Cisco drive industry 
innovation. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Gawer, A., & Cusumano, M.A. 2008. How companies become platform leaders. MIT Sloan Management 
Review, 49(2): 28.  
 
195 
 
Gawer, A., & Cusumano, M.A. 2013. Industry platforms and ecosystem innovation. Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, Early View: DOI: 10.1111/jpim.12105. 
 
Gawer, A., & Phillips, N. 2013. Institutional work as logics shift: The case of Intel’s transformation to 
platform leader. Organization Studies, 34(8): 1035-1071.  
 
Ghemawat, P., & Hout, T. 2008. Tomorrow's global giants: Not the usual suspects. Harvard Business 
Review, 86: 80-88. 
 
Girod, S., & Bellin, J. 2011. Revisiting the ‘modern’ multinational enterprise theory: An emerging market 
multinational perspective. In Ramamurti, R., & Hashai, N. (Eds.) The future of foreign direct 
investment and the multinational enterprise (Research in Global Strategic Management, Volume 
15): 167-210. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
Globerman, S., & Shapiro, D. 2009. Economic and strategic considerations surrounding Chinese FDI in 
the United States. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(1): 163-183. 
Goold, M., Campbell A., & Alexander, M. 1998. Corporate strategy and parenting theory. Long Range 
Planning, 31(2): 308–314. 
 
Gordon, K., & Tash, A. 2009. Foreign government-controlled investors and recipient country investment 
policies: A scoping paper. OECD Investment Division.  
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R. 1996. Understanding radical organizational change: Bringing together 
the old and the new institutionalism. Academy of Management Review, 21(4): 1022-1054. 
Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E.R., & Lounsbury, M. 2011. Institutional 
complexity and organizational responses. Academy of Management Annals, 5(1): 317-371. 
Gubbi, S.R., Aulakh, P.S., Ray, S., Sarkar, M.B., & Chittoor, R. 2010. Do international acquisitions by 
emerging-economy firms create shareholder value? The case of Indian firms. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 41(3): 397–418. 
Guillen, M.F., & Garcia-Canal, E. 2009. The American model of the multinational firm and the ‘new 
multinationals’ from emerging markets. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(2): 23–35. 
 
196 
 
Gupta, N. 2005. Partial privatization and firm performance. Journal of Finance, 60(2): 987-1015. 
Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. 2001. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative 
advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hall, P.A., & Taylor, R. 1996. Political science and the three new institutionalisms. Political Studies, 
44(5): 936-957. 
Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C.K. 1989. Strategic Intent. Harvard Business Review, 67(3): 63-76. 
Hancke, B., Rhodes M., and Thatcher M., (Eds). 2007. Beyond varieties of capitalism: Conflict, 
contradiction, and complementarities in the European economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Haveman, H. & Rao, H. 2006. Hybrid forms and the evolution of thrifts. American Behavioral Scientist, 
49(7): 974-986. 
He, J., Mao, X., Rui, O., & Zha, Z. 2013. Business groups in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 22: 
166-192. 
He, W., & Lyles, M.A. 2008. China's outward foreign direct investment. Business Horizons, 51(6): 485-491. 
Henisz, W.J., & Zelner, B.A. 2005. Legitimacy, interest groups pressures, and change in emergent 
institutions: The case of foreign investors and host country governments. Academy of 
Management Review, 30(2): 361-382. 
Hermelo, F.D., & Vassolo, R. 2010. Institutional development and hypercompetition in emerging 
economies, Strategic Management Journal, 31(13): 1457-1473. 
Hoskisson, R.E., Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., & Peng, M. 2012. Emerging multinationals from mid-range 
economies: The influence of institutions and factor markets. Journal of Management Studies, 
50(7): 1295-1321. 
Hu, F. 2005. Deconstructing state-owned enterprises in socialist China under reform: A scalar 
examination. Environment and Planning A, (37): 703-722. 
Huang, Z., Li, L., Ma, G., & Xu, L. C. 2014. Local information and decentralization of state-owned 
enterprises in China: Hayek is right. Working Paper from the Summer Institute of Finance 
Conference. Online access: http://www.cafr-sif.com/2014selectpapers/Hayek_May_19.pdf. 
197 
 
Inoue, C., Lazzarini, S., & Mussachio, A. 2013. Leviathan as a minority shareholder: Firm-level 
implications of equity purchases by the state. Academy of Management Journal, 56(6): 1775-
1801. 
International Monetary Fund. 2014. Emerging markets in transition: Growth prospects and challenges. 
IMF Staff Discussion Notes. 14(6).  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41588. 
Ishizuka, F. 2009. Vietnamese local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the crossroads: Implications of 
SOE restructuring at the local level. Japan External Trade Organization Working Paper. 
Ito, K. 1995. Japanese spinoffs: unexplored survival strategies. Strategic Management Journal, 16(6): 
431–446. 
Ito, K., & Rose, E.L. 1994. The genealogical structure of Japanese firms: Parent-subsidiary relationships. 
Strategic Management Journal, 15: 35–52. 
 
Jackson, G., & Deeg, R. 2008. Comparing capitalisms: Understanding institutional diversity and its 
implications for international business. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(4): p. 540-
561. 
Jaworski, B.J., & Kohli, A. 1993. Market orientation: Antecedent and consequences. Journal of 
Marketing, 57(3): 53-70. 
Jay, J. 2013. Navigating paradox as a mechanism of change and innovation in hybrid organizations. 
Academy of Management Journal, 56(1): 137–159. 
 
Jeffersen, G., Jiang, R., & Tortorice, D. 2014. Restructuring China’s research institutes: Impacts on 
China’s research orientation and productivity. Online access: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2443546. 
 
Jefferson, G., & Su, J. 2006. Privatization and restructuring in China: Evidence from shareholding 
ownership, 1995-2001. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34(1): 146-166. 
Jin, H.H., Qian, Y.Y. & Weingast, B.R. 2005. Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, 
Chinese style. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9-10): 1719-1742. 
198 
 
Jin, J., & Zou, H.F. 2005. Fiscal decentralization, revenue and expenditure assignments, and growth in 
China. Journal of Asian Economics, 16(9): 1047-1064. 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.E. 1977. The internationalization process of the firm: A model of knowledge 
development and increasing foreign market commitments. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 8(1): 23-32. 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.E. 2009. The Uppsala internationalization process model revisited: From 
liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership. Journal of International Business Studies, 
40(9): 1411-1431. 
Jones, M., & Coviello, N.E. 2005. Internationalization: Conceptualizing an entrepreneurial process of 
behavior in time. Journal of International Business Studies, 36(3): 284–303. 
 
Jormanainen, I., & Koveshnikov, A. 2012. International activities of emerging market firms: A critical 
assessment of research in top international management journals. Management International 
Review, 52(5): 691-725. 
Karaca-Mandic, P., Norton, E., & Dowd, B. 2012. Interaction terms in nonlinear models. Health Services 
Research, 47(1): 255-274. 
Keister, L.A. 1998. Engineering growth: Business group structure and firm performance in China's 
transition economy. American Journal of Sociology, 104(2): 404-440. 
Keupp, M.M., & Gassmann, O. 2009. The past and future of international entrepreneurship: A review and 
suggestions for developing the field. Journal of Management, 35(3): 600–633. 
 
Khanna, P. 2012. The rise of hybrid governance. The Mckinsey Center for Government. 
http://www.mckinsey.com/features/government_designed_for_new_times/the_rise_of_hybrid_go
vernance. [Accessed 18 May 2013]. 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. 1997. Why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging markets. Harvard 
Business Review, 75(4): 41-51. 
Kim, H., Kim, H., & Hoskisson, R.E. 2010. Does market-oriented institutional change in an emerging 
economy make business group-affiliated multinationals perform better? An institution-based view. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 41(7): 1141-1160. 
199 
 
Kim, W., Nam, I.C., Cuong, T.T. 2010. On the governance of state-owned economic groups in Vietnam. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1729093&download=yes [Accessed 18 May 
2013]. 
Knight, G.A., & Cavusgil, S.T. 1996. The born global Firm: A challenge to traditional internationalization 
theory. In Cavusgil, S.T., & Madsen, T. (Eds.), Advances in international marketing: 11-26. 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
 
Knight, G.A., & Cavusgil, S.T. 2004. Innovation, organizational capabilities, and the born-global firm. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 35(2): 124–141. 
Kostova, T., & Roth, K. 2002. Adoption of an organizational practice by subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations: Institutional and relational effects. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1): 215-
233. 
Kostova, T., & Zaheer, S. 1999. Organizational legitimacy under conditions of complexity: The case of 
the multinational enterprise. Academy of Management Review, 24(1): 64–81. 
Kowalski, P., Büge, M., & Egeland, M. 2013. State-owned enterprises: Trade effects and policy 
implications. OECD Trade Policy Paper, No. 147.  
Kraatz M., & Block, E. 2008. Organizational implications of institutional pluralism. In Greenwood R., 
Oliver C., Suddaby R., & Sahlin-Andersson K. (Eds.), The Sage handbook of organizational 
institutionalism: 243–275. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Kroll, H.N., & Liefner, I. 2008. Spin-off enterprises as a means of technology commercialisation in a 
transforming economy: Evidence from three universities in China. Technovation, 28(5): 298–313. 
Krug, B., & Hendrische, H. 2008. Framing China: Transformation and institutional change through co-
evolution. Management Organization Review. 4(1): 81-108. 
Kumar, V., Gaur, A.S., & Pattnaik, C. 2012. Product diversification and international expansion of 
business groups: Evidence from India. Management International Review, 52(2): 175-192. 
Lamin, A. 2013. Business groups as information resource: An investigation of business group affiliation in 
the Indian software services industry. Academy of Management Journal, 56(5): 1487-1509. 
200 
 
Lane, C. 2005. Institutional transformation and system change: Changes in the corporate governance of 
German corporations. In Morgan, G., Whitley, R., & Moen, E. (Eds.), Changing capitalisms? 
Complementarities, contradictions and capability development in an international context: 78-
109. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lane, C., & Wood, G. 2009. Capitalist diversity and diversity within capitalism. Economy and Society, 
38(4): 531-551.  
Lane, C., & Wood, G. 2012. Capitalist diversity and diversity within capitalism. London:  Routledge. 
Li, J., Chen, D., & Shapiro, D.M. 2013. FDI spillovers at the national and subnational level: The impact 
on product innovation by Chinese firms. Management Organization Review. 9(3): 413-435. 
Li, J., Li, Y., & Shapiro, D.M. 2013. Knowledge seeking and outward FDI of emerging market firms: The 
moderating effect of inward FDI. Global Strategy Journal, 2(4): 277-344. 
Li, M.H., Cui, L., & Lu, J.Y. 2014. Varieties in state capitalism: Outward FDI strategies of central and 
local state-owned enterprises from emerging economy countries. Journal of International 
Business Studies, forthcoming. 
Li, P.P. 2007. Toward an integrated theory of multinational evolution: The evidence of Chinese 
multinational enterprises as latecomers. Journal of International Management, 13(3): 296–318. 
 
Li, P.P. 2010. Toward a learning-based view of internationalization: The accelerated trajectories of cross-
border learning for latecomers. Journal of International Management, 16(1): 43–59. 
 
Li, P.Y., & Meyer, K. E. 2009. Contextualizing experience effects in international business: A study of 
ownership strategies. Journal of World Business, 44 (4): 370-382.  
Liao, L., Liu, B., & Wang, H. 2014. China’s secondary privatization: Perspectives from the split-share 
structure reform. Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.  
Lien, Y.C., & Filatotchev, I. 2015. Ownership characteristics as determinants of FDI location decisions in 
emerging economies. Journal of World Business, forthcoming. 
201 
 
Lipsey, R.E. 2004. Home and host country effects on foreign direct investment. In Baldwin, R., & 
Winters, A. (Eds.), Challenges to globalization: Analyzing the economics: 333-382. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
Lin, J.Y., & Liu, Z. 2000. Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China. Economic Development 
& Cultural Change, 49(1): 1-21. 
Lin, J. Y., Tao, R. & Liu, M. 2005. Decentralization and local governance in the context of China's 
transition. Perspectives, 6(2): 25–36. 
Lin, L.W., & Milhaupt, C.J. 2013. We are the (national) champions: Understanding the mechanisms of 
state capitalism in China. Stanford Law Review, 65(4): 697-760. 
Liu, G.S., & Woo, W.T. 2001. How will ownership in China’s industrial sector evolve with WTO 
accession? China Economic Review, 12(2): 137-161. 
Liu, X., Lu, J.Y., & Chizema, A. 2013. Top executive compensation, regional institutions and Chinese 
OFDI. Journal of World Business, in press: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2013.04.004. 
Liu, X.H., Lu, J.Y., Filatotchev, I., Buck, T., & Wright, M. 2010. Returnee entrepreneurs, knowledge 
spillovers and innovation in high-tech firms in emerging economies. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 41(7): p. 1183-1197.  
Lu, J. 2002. Intra- and inter-organizational imitative behavior: Institutional influences on Japanese firms' 
entry mode choice, Journal of International Business Studies, 33(1): 19-37. 
Lu, J.Y., Liu, X.H., & Wang, H.L. 2010. Motives for outward FDI of Chinese private firms: Firm 
resources, industry dynamics, and government policies. Management Organization Review, 7(2): 
223-248. 
Lu, J., & Xu, D. 2006. Growth and survival of international joint ventures: An external-internal legitimacy 
perspective. Journal of Management, 32(3): 426-448. 
Luo, Y., & Rui, H. 2009. An ambidexterity perspective toward multinational enterprises from emerging 
economies. Academy of Management Perspective, 23(4): 49-70.  
202 
 
Luo, Y. D., & Tung, R.L. 2007. International expansion of emerging market enterprises: A springboard 
perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4): 481-498. 
Luo, Y., Xue, Q., & Han, B. 2010. How emerging market governments promote outward FDI: Experience 
from China. Journal of World Business, 45(1): 68-79. 
Luo, Y., Sun, J., Wang, L.S. 2011. Emerging economy copycats: capability, environment and strategy. 
The Academy of Management Perspectives, 25(2): 37-56. 
Luo, Y., & Wang, L.S. 2012. Foreign direct investment strategies by developing country multinationals: A 
diagnostic model for home country effects. Global Strategy Journal, 2(3): 244–261.  
Luo, Y. & Yao, J. 2006. Impact of state ownership and control mechanisms on the performance of group 
affiliated companies in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23(4): 485-503. 
Ma, X.F., Yao, X.T., & Xi, Y.M. 2006. Business group affiliation and firm performance in a transition 
economy: A focus on ownership voids. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23(4): 467-483. 
Ma, X.F., Tong, T.W., & Fitza, M. 2013. How much does subnational region matter to foreign subsidiary 
performance? Evidence from Fortune global 500 corporations’ investment in China. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 44(1): 66-87. 
Madhok, A., & Keyhani, M. 2012. Acquisitions as entrepreneurship: asymmetries, opportunities, and the 
internationalization of multinationals from emerging economies. Global Strategy Journal, 2(1): 26-40. 
 
Malesky, E.J. 2008. Straight ahead on red: How foreign direct investment empowers subnational leaders. 
Journal of Politics, 70(1): 97-119.  
Manolova, T.S., Manev, I.M., & Gyoshev, B.S. 2010. In good company? The role of personal and inter-
firm networks for new venture internationalization in a transition economy. Journal of World 
Business, 45(3): 257-265.  
Martin, X. 2014. Commentary on Institutional Advantage. Global Strategy Journal. (4): 55-69. 
Martinez, J.I., Esperanca, J.P., & de la Torre, J.R. 2005. Organizational change among emerging Latin 
American firms: From multilatinas to multinationals. Management Research, 3(3): 173–188. 
 
203 
 
Mathews, J.A. 2006. Dragon multinationals: New players in 21st century globalization. Asia Pacific 
Journal of Management, 23(1): 5–27. 
 
Mathews, J.A., & Zander, I. 2007. The international entrepreneurial dynamics of accelerated 
internationalisation. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(3): 387-403. 
McMullen, J., & Dimov, D. 2013. Time and the entrepreneurial journey: The problems and promise of 
studying entrepreneurship as a process. Journal of Management Studies, 50(8): 1481–1512. 
 
Meyer, A.D., Tsui, A.S., & Hinings, C.R. 1993. Configurational approaches to organizational analysis. 
Academy of Management Journal, 36(6): 1175-1195. 
Meyer, J.W., & Rowan, B. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. 
American Journal of Sociology, 83(2): 340-363. 
Meyer, K.E., 2014. Process perspectives on the growth of emerging market multinationals. In Ramamurti, 
R., &  Cuervo-Cazurra, A., (Eds.),  Understanding multinationals from emerging markets: 169-
195. Cambridge University Press.  
Meyer, K.E., Ding, Y., Li, J., & Zhang, H. 2014. Overcoming distrust: How state-owned enterprises adapt 
their foreign entries to institutional pressures abroad. Journal of International Business Studies, 
forthcoming. doi:10.1057/jibs.2014.15. 
Meyer, K.E., & Nguyen, H. 2005. Foreign investment strategies and sub-national institutions in emerging 
markets: Evidence from Vietnam. Journal of Management Studies, 42(1): 63–93. 
Meyer, K.E., Mudambi, R., & Narula, R. 2011. Multinational enterprises and local contexts: The 
opportunities and challenges of multiple embeddedness. Journal of Management Studies, 48(2): 
235–252. 
Miller, S.R., Thomas, D.E., Eden, L., & Hitt, M.A. 2008. Knee deep in the big muddy: The survival of 
emerging market firms in developed markets. Management International Review, 47(6): 645-665. 
Mishra, R.K. 2009. State owned enterprises in India: Reviewing the evidence. Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, OECD Occasional Paper.  
204 
 
Ministry of National Development Planning. 2010. Regulation of the President of the Republic of 
Indonesia number 5 of 2010 regarding the national medium-term development plan (RPJMN) 
2010-2014. http://www.theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/rpjmn-2010-2014-english-
version__20100521111052__2608__0.pdf [Accessed: 6 September 2013]. 
Mohr, L. 1982. Explaining organizational behavior. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Morck, R., & Nakamura, M. 2007. Business groups and the big push: Meiji Japan’s mass privatization and 
subsequent growth. The National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper Series, No. 
13171. 
Mowery, D., & Nelson R. 1999. Sources of industrial leadership: Studies of seven industries. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Mudambi, R., & Zahara, S. 2007. The survival of international new ventures. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 38(2): 333-352. 
Murrell, P. 2003. Institutions and firms in transition economies. In Ménard, C. & Shirley, M. (Eds.), 
Handbook of new institutional economics: 667-694. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. 
Murtha, T., & Lenway, S. 1994. Country capabilities and the strategic state: How political institutions 
affect multinational corporations’ strategies. Strategic Management Journal, 15(S2): 113-129. 
Musacchio, A., & Lazzarini, S. 2014. Reinventing state capitalism: Leviathan in business, Brazil and 
beyond. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Narula, R. 2012. Do we need different frameworks to explain infant MNEs from developing countries? 
Global Strategy Journal, 2(3): 188-204. 
Narula, R., & Guimón, J. 2010. The investment development path in a globalized world: Implications for 
Eastern Europe. Eastern Journal of European Studies, 1(2): 5-19. 
Nee, V., 1992. Organizational dynamics of market transition: Hybrid forms, property rights, and mixed 
economy in China. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(1):1-27. 
Nee, V., & Opper, S. 2007. On politicized capitalism. In Nee, V., & Swedberg, R., (Eds.), On capitalism: 
93-127. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
205 
Newman, K. 2000. Organizational transformation during institutional upheaval. Academy of Management 
Review, 25(3): 602-619. 
OECD. 2000. The Indonesian privatization program. Joint OECD/APEC Privatisation Forum.  
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/1923660.pdf. 
[Accessed 18 May 2013]. 
OECD. 2008. State owned enterprises in Russia. OECD Roundtable on Corporate Governance of SOEs. 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/42576825.pdf. [Accessed 18 May 
2013]. 
Oi, J.C. 1992. Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism in China. 
 World Politics, 45(1): 99-126. 
Oliver, C. 1991. Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management Review, 16(1): 
145–179. 
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Oviatt, B.M., & McDougall, P.P. 2005. Defining international entrepreneurship and modelling the speed 
of internationalization. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(5): 537–553. 
Pache, A., & Santos, F. 2010. When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to 
conflicting institutional demands. Academy of Management Review, 35(3): 455-476.  
Palepu, K.G. 1986. Predicting takeover targets. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8: 3-35. 
Park, S.H., Li, S., & Tse, D.K. 2006. Market liberalization and firm performance during China's economic 
transition. Journal of International Business Studies, 37(1): 127-147.  
Peng, M.W. 2012. The global strategy of emerging multinationals from China. Global Strategy Journal, 
2(2): 297–107. 
Peng, M.W., & Heath, P.S. 1996. The growth of the firm in planned economies in transition: Institutions, 
organizations, and strategic choice. The Academy of Management Review, 21(2): 492-528.  
206 
 
Peng, M. W., Sun, S.L., Pinkham, B., & Chen, H. 2009. The institution-based view as a third leg for a 
strategy tripod. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(3): 63-81. 
Peng, M.W., Sun, S.L., & Tan, W. 2008. Competing on scale or scope? Lessons from Chinese firms’ 
internationalization. In Alon, I., & Mclntyre, J. R. (Eds.), Globalization of Chinese enterprises: 
77-97. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Peng, M.W., Tan, J., & Tong, T.W. 2004. Ownership types and strategic groups in an emerging economy. 
Journal of Management Studies, 41(7): 1105-1129. 
Peng, M.W., Wang, D.Y., & Jiang, Y. 2008. An institution-based view of international business strategy: 
A focus on emerging economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(5): 920-936. 
Pettigrew, A.M., Woodman, R.W., & Cameron, K.S. 2001. Studying organizational change and 
development: Challenges for future research. Academy of Management Journal, 44(4): 697–713. 
 
Phan, P.H., Siegel, D.S., & Wright, M. 2005. Science parks and incubators: Observations, synthesis and 
future research. Journal of Business Venturing, 20(2): 165–182. 
 
Powell, W.W., 1990. Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of organization. Research in 
Organizational Behavior, 12:295-336. 
 
Prahalad, C.K., & Bettis, R.A. 1986. The dominant logic: A new linkage between diversity and 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 7(6): 485–501. 
 
Prashantham, S., & Floyd, W.S. 2012. Routine microprocesses and capability learning in international 
new ventures. Journal of International Business Studies, 43(6): 544–562. 
 
Prashantham, S., & Floyd, W. S. 2013. New venture internationalization as a rite of passage: Unpacking 
transitional vulnerabilities. Academy of Management Conference Paper. 
 
Prashantham, S., & Young, S. 2011. Post-entry speed of international new ventures. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 35(2): 275-292. 
 
Purfield, C. 2004. The decentralization dilemma in India. Asia and Pacific Department of the International 
Monetary Fund. IMF Working Paper Series, No. 04/32. 
207 
Quer, D., Claver, E., & Rienda, L. 2011. Political risk, cultural distance, and outward foreign direct 
investment: Empirical evidence from large Chinese firms. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
29(4): 1089-1104.  
Rabe-Hesketh, S., & Skrondal, A. 2012. Multilevel and longitudinal modeling using STATA. STATA 
Press. 
Ralston, D.A., Terpstra-Tong, J., Terpstra, R.H., Wang, X., & Egri, C. 2006. Today's state-owned 
enterprises of China: Are they dying dinosaurs or dynamic dynamos? Strategic Management 
Journal, 27(9): 825-843. 
Ramamurti, R. 2012. What is really different about emerging market multinationals? 
 Global  Strategy Journal, 2(1): 41-47. 
Ramamurti, R., & Singh, J.V. 2009. Indian multinationals: Generic internationalization strategies. In 
Ramamurti R., & Singh, J.V., (Eds), Emerging multinationals from emerging markets: 110-166. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ramasamy, B., Yeung, M., & Laforet, S. 2012. China’s outward foreign direct investment: Location 
choice and firm ownership. Journal of World Business, 47(1): 17-25. 
Roth, K., & Kostova, T. 2003. Organizational coping with institutional upheaval in transition economies. 
Journal of World Business, 38(4): 314–330. 
Rugman, A.M. 1981. Inside the multinationals: The economics of internal markets. London: Croom Helm. 
Rugman, A.M., & Verbeke, A. 1992. A note on the transnational solution and the transaction cost theory 
of multinational strategic management. Journal of International Business Studies, 23(4): 761-771. 
Rui, H., & Yip, G.S. 2008. Foreign acquisitions by Chinese firms: A strategic intent perspective. Journal 
of World Business, 43(2): 213-226. 
Santos-Vijande, M.L., Sanzo Perez, M.J., Alvarez-Gonzalez, L.I., & Vazquez-Casielles, R. 2005. The 
effects of market orientation on business strategic behaviour. Journal of Strategic Marketing, 
13(1): 17–42. 
208 
 
Scott, W.R. 2004. Institutional theory: Contributing to a theoretical research program. In Smith, K.G., & 
Hitt, M.A. (Eds), Great minds in management: The process of theory development: 460-484. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Shapiro, D., & Globerman, S. 2012. The international activities and impacts of state-owned enterprises. In 
Sauvant, K., Sachs, L., & Jongbloed, W. (Eds.), Sovereign investment: Concerns and policy 
reactions: 98-144. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Shi, W.L., Sun, S.L., & Peng, M. 2012. Sub-national institutional contingencies, network positions, and 
IJV partner selection. Journal of Management Studies, 49(7): 1221-1245. 
Sharma, P., & Chrisman, J.J. 1999. Reconciling the definitional issues in the field of corporate 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 23(3): 11–27. 
 
Slater, S.F., & Narver, J.C. 1995. Market orientation and the learning organization. Journal of Marketing, 
59(3): 63–74. 
Smoke, P. 2001. Fiscal decentralization in developing countries: A review of current concepts and 
practice. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Democracy, Governance and 
Human Rights Programme Paper No. 2.  
Snow, C. C., Miles, R.E., & Miles, G. 2006. The configurational approach to organization design: Four 
recommended initiatives. In Burton, R. M., Håkonsson, D.D., Eriksen, B., & Snow, C.C. (Eds.), 
Organization design: The evolving state-of-the-art: 3–18. Boston: Springer. 
Stal, E., & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2011. The investment development path and FDI from developing 
countries: The role of pro-market reforms and institutional voids. Latin America Business Review, 
12(3): 209-231. 
Streeck, W., & Thelen, K.A. 2005. Beyond continuity: Institutional change in advanced political 
economies. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Suhomlinova, O. 2006. Towards a model of organizational co-evolution in transition economies. Journal 
of Management Studies, 43: 1537–54. 
 
209 
 
Sun, P., Mellahi, K., & Thun, E. 2010. The dynamic value of MNE political embeddedness: The case of 
the Chinese automobile industry. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(7): 1161-1182. 
Tallman, S. & Li, J.T. 1996. Effects of internationalization: Japanese FDI strategies in Asia-Pacific. 
Academy of Management Journal, 39(1): 179-196. 
Tan, D., & Meyer, K.E. 2010. Business groups' outward FDI: A managerial resources perspective. Journal 
of International Management, 16(2): 154-164. 
Tan, J. 2007. Phase transitions and emergence of entrepreneurship: The transformation of Chinese SOEs 
over time. Journal of Business Venturing, 22 (1): 77-96. 
Thomas, L., Autio, E., & Gann, D. 2014. Architectural Leverage: Putting platforms in context. Academy 
of Management Perspective, 28(2): 198-219.  
 
Thornton, P.H., Jones, C., & Kury, K. 2005. Institutional logics and institutional change: Transformation 
in accounting, architecture, and publishing. In Jones, C. & Thorton, P.H. (Eds), Research in the 
Sociology of Organizations: 125-170. New York: Elsevier/JAI. 
Thornton P.H., & Ocasio W. 2008. Institutional logics. In Greenwood R., Oliver C., Suddaby R., & 
Sahlin-Andersson K., (Eds.), The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism: 99–129. 
London: Sage. 
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W. & Lounsbury, M. 2012. The institutional logics perspective: A new approach 
to culture, structure, and process. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Tolentino, P. 2010. Home country macroeconomic factors and outward FDI of China and India. Journal of 
International Management, 16(2): 102–120. 
 
Uhlenbruck, K., Meyer, K.E. & Hitt, M. 2003. Organizational transformation in transition economies: 
resource-based and organizational learning perspectives. Journal of Management Studies, 40: 
257–282. 
 
Vuong, Q.H.1989. Likelihood ratio tests for model specification and non-nested hypotheses. 
Econometrica, (57): 307-333. 
210 
 
Wallin, M.W., &  Dahlstrand, Å.L. 2006. Sponsored spin-offs, industrial growth and change. 
Technovation, 26(5-6): 611–620. 
 
Wang, C., Hong, J., Kafouros, M., & Boateng, A. 2012a. What drives the internationalization of Chinese 
firms? Testing the explanatory power of three theoretical frameworks. International Business 
Review, 21(3): 426-438. 
Wang, C., Hong, J., Kafouros, M., & Wright, M. 2012b. Exploring the role of government involvement in 
outward FDI from emerging economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 43(7): 655–
676. 
Wei, Y.H.D. 2007. Regional development in China: Transitional institutions, embedded globalization, and 
hybrid economies. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 48(1): 16-36. 
Wells, L.T. 1983. Third world multinationals: The rise of foreign investments from developing countries. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Whitley, R. 1992. Business systems in East Asia. London: Sage Publications. 
Witt, M.A., & Lewin, A. 2007. Outward foreign direct investment as escape response to home country 
institutional constraints. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4): 579-594. 
Witt, M.A., & Redding, G. 2013 Asian business systems: Institutional comparison, clusters and 
implications for varieties of capitalism and business systems theory. Socio-Economic Review, 11: 
129-166. 
Wright, M., Hoskisson, R.E., Filatotchev, I., & Peng, M.W. 2005. Strategy research in emerging 
economies: Challenging the conventional wisdom. Journal of Management Studies, 42(1): 1-33. 
Wu, W.P. 2010. Managing and incentivizing research commercialization in Chinese universities. Journal 
of Technology Transfer, 35(2): 203-224. 
Xu, D., & Shenkar, O. 2002. Institutional distance and the multinational enterprise. Academy of 
Management Review, 27(4): 608-618. 
Yamakawa, Y., Peng, M. W., & Deeds, D. L. 2008. What drives new ventures to internationalize from 
emerging to developed economies? Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32(1): 59-82. 
211 
 
Yiu, D.W. 2011. Multinational advantages of Chinese business groups: A theoretical exploration. 
Management and Organization Review, 7(2): 249–277. 
Yiu, D.W., Lau, C.M., & Bruton, G.D. 2007. International venturing by emerging economy firms: The 
effects of firm capabilities, home country networks, and corporate entrepreneurship. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 38(4): 519–540. 
Yiu, D.W., & Makino, S. 2002. The choice between joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary: An 
institutional perspective. Organization Science, 13(6): 667–683. 
Yusuf, S., & Nabeshima, K. 2008. Two decades of reform: The changing organization dynamics of 
Chinese industrial firms. In Logan, J. (Ed.), Urban China in Transition: 27-47. Wiley-Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd. 
Zaheer, S. 1995. Overcoming the liability of foreignness. Academy of Management Journal, 38(2): 341-363. 
Zahra S. 2005. A theory of international new ventures: A decade of research. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 36: 20–28. 
Zattoni, A., Pedersen, T., & Kumar, V. 2009. The performance of group-affiliated firms during 
institutional transition: A longitudinal study of Indian firms. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 17(4): 510-523. 
Zhang, J., Zhou, C., & Ebbers, H. 2011. Completion of Chinese overseas acquisitions: Institutional 
perspectives and evidence. International Business Review, 20(2): 226–238. 
Zhang, Y., & Li, X. 2006. Ownership structure and corporate diversification. Business & Politics, 8(1):1–
19. 
Zheng, Y. 2010. Central-local relations: The power to dominate. In Fewsmith, J., (Ed.), China today, 
China tomorrow: Domestic politics, economy, and society: 193-222. Lanham, MD.: Rowman & 
Littlefield.  
Zhou, K. Z., Tse, D. K., & Li, J.J. 2006. Organizational changes in emerging economies: Drivers and 
consequences. Journal of International Business Studies, 37(2): 248–263. 
212 
TITLER I PH.D.SERIEN:
2004
1. Martin Grieger
 Internet-based Electronic Marketplaces
 and Supply Chain Management
2. Thomas Basbøll
 LIKENESS
 A Philosophical Investigation
3. Morten Knudsen
 Beslutningens vaklen
 En systemteoretisk analyse of mo-
derniseringen af et amtskommunalt 
sundhedsvæsen 1980-2000
4. Lars Bo Jeppesen
 Organizing Consumer Innovation
 A product development strategy that 
is based on online communities and 
allows some ﬁrms to beneﬁt from a 
distributed process of innovation by 
consumers
5. Barbara Dragsted
 SEGMENTATION IN TRANSLATION 
AND TRANSLATION MEMORY 
 SYSTEMS
 An empirical investigation of cognitive
 segmentation and effects of integra-
ting a TM system into the translation 
process
6. Jeanet Hardis
 Sociale partnerskaber
 Et socialkonstruktivistisk casestudie 
 af partnerskabsaktørers virkeligheds-
opfattelse mellem identitet og 
 legitimitet
7. Henriette Hallberg Thygesen
 System Dynamics in Action
8. Carsten Mejer Plath
 Strategisk Økonomistyring
9. Annemette Kjærgaard
 Knowledge Management as Internal 
 Corporate Venturing
 – a Field Study of the Rise and Fall of a
  Bottom-Up Process
10. Knut Arne Hovdal
 De profesjonelle i endring
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
11. Søren Jeppesen
 Environmental Practices and Greening 
 Strategies in Small Manufacturing 
 Enterprises in South Africa
 – A Critical Realist Approach
12. Lars Frode Frederiksen
 Industriel forskningsledelse
 – på sporet af mønstre og samarbejde 
i danske forskningsintensive virksom-
heder
13. Martin Jes Iversen
 The Governance of GN Great Nordic
 – in an age of strategic and structural
  transitions 1939-1988
14. Lars Pynt Andersen
 The Rhetorical Strategies of Danish TV 
 Advertising 
 A study of the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years with 
 special emphasis on genre and irony
15. Jakob Rasmussen
 Business Perspectives on E-learning
16. Sof Thrane
 The Social and Economic Dynamics 
 of Networks 
 – a Weberian Analysis of Three 
 Formalised Horizontal Networks
17. Lene Nielsen
 Engaging Personas and Narrative 
 Scenarios – a study on how a user-
 centered approach inﬂuenced the 
 perception of the design process in 
the e-business group at AstraZeneca
18. S.J Valstad
 Organisationsidentitet
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
19. Thomas Lyse Hansen
 Six Essays on Pricing and Weather risk 
in Energy Markets
20.  Sabine Madsen
 Emerging Methods – An Interpretive
  Study of ISD Methods in Practice
21. Evis Sinani
 The Impact of Foreign Direct Inve-
stment on Efﬁciency, Productivity 
Growth and Trade: An Empirical Inve-
stigation
22. Bent Meier Sørensen
 Making Events Work Or, 
 How to Multiply Your Crisis
23. Pernille Schnoor
 Brand Ethos
 Om troværdige brand- og 
 virksomhedsidentiteter i et retorisk og 
diskursteoretisk perspektiv 
24. Sidsel Fabech
 Von welchem Österreich ist hier die 
Rede?
 Diskursive forhandlinger og magt-
kampe mellem rivaliserende nationale 
identitetskonstruktioner i østrigske 
pressediskurser 
25. Klavs Odgaard Christensen
 Sprogpolitik og identitetsdannelse i
  ﬂersprogede forbundsstater
 Et komparativt studie af Schweiz og 
 Canada
26. Dana B. Minbaeva
 Human Resource Practices and 
 Knowledge Transfer in Multinational 
 Corporations
27. Holger Højlund
 Markedets politiske fornuft
 Et studie af velfærdens organisering i 
 perioden 1990-2003
28. Christine Mølgaard Frandsen
 A.s erfaring
 Om mellemværendets praktik i en 
transformation af mennesket og 
 subjektiviteten
29. Sine Nørholm Just
 The Constitution of Meaning
 – A Meaningful Constitution? 
 Legitimacy, identity, and public opinion 
in the debate on the future of Europe
2005
1. Claus J. Varnes
 Managing product innovation through 
 rules – The role of formal and structu-
red methods in product development
2. Helle Hedegaard Hein
 Mellem konﬂikt og konsensus
 – Dialogudvikling på hospitalsklinikker
3. Axel Rosenø
 Customer Value Driven Product Inno-
vation – A Study of Market Learning in 
New Product Development
4. Søren Buhl Pedersen
 Making space
 An outline of place branding
5. Camilla Funck Ellehave
 Differences that Matter
 An analysis of practices of gender and 
 organizing in contemporary work-
places
6. Rigmor Madeleine Lond
 Styring af kommunale forvaltninger
7. Mette Aagaard Andreassen
 Supply Chain versus Supply Chain
 Benchmarking as a Means to 
 Managing Supply Chains
8. Caroline Aggestam-Pontoppidan
 From an idea to a standard
 The UN and the global governance of 
 accountants’ competence
9. Norsk ph.d. 
10. Vivienne Heng Ker-ni
 An Experimental Field Study on the 
 Effectiveness of Grocer Media 
 Advertising 
 Measuring Ad Recall and Recognition, 
 Purchase Intentions and Short-Term 
Sales
11. Allan Mortensen
 Essays on the Pricing of Corporate 
Bonds and Credit Derivatives
12. Remo Stefano Chiari
 Figure che fanno conoscere
 Itinerario sull’idea del valore cognitivo 
e espressivo della metafora e di altri 
tropi da Aristotele e da Vico ﬁno al 
cognitivismo contemporaneo
13. Anders McIlquham-Schmidt
 Strategic Planning and Corporate 
 Performance
 An integrative research review and a 
 meta-analysis of the strategic planning 
 and corporate performance literature 
 from 1956 to 2003
14. Jens Geersbro
 The TDF – PMI Case
 Making Sense of the Dynamics of 
 Business Relationships and Networks
15 Mette Andersen
 Corporate Social Responsibility in 
 Global Supply Chains
 Understanding the uniqueness of ﬁrm 
 behaviour
16.  Eva Boxenbaum
 Institutional Genesis: Micro – Dynamic
 Foundations of Institutional Change
17. Peter Lund-Thomsen
 Capacity Development, Environmental 
 Justice NGOs, and Governance: The 
Case of South Africa
18. Signe Jarlov
 Konstruktioner af offentlig ledelse
19. Lars Stæhr Jensen
 Vocabulary Knowledge and Listening 
 Comprehension in English as a Foreign 
 Language
 An empirical study employing data 
 elicited from Danish EFL learners
20. Christian Nielsen
 Essays on Business Reporting
 Production and consumption of  
strategic information in the market for 
information
21. Marianne Thejls Fischer
 Egos and Ethics of Management 
 Consultants
22. Annie Bekke Kjær
 Performance management i Proces-
 innovation 
 – belyst i et social-konstruktivistisk
 perspektiv
23. Suzanne Dee Pedersen
 GENTAGELSENS METAMORFOSE
 Om organisering af den kreative gøren 
i den kunstneriske arbejdspraksis
24. Benedikte Dorte Rosenbrink
 Revenue Management
 Økonomiske, konkurrencemæssige & 
 organisatoriske konsekvenser
25. Thomas Riise Johansen
 Written Accounts and Verbal Accounts
 The Danish Case of Accounting and 
 Accountability to Employees
26. Ann Fogelgren-Pedersen
 The Mobile Internet: Pioneering Users’ 
 Adoption Decisions
27. Birgitte Rasmussen
 Ledelse i fællesskab – de tillidsvalgtes 
 fornyende rolle
28. Gitte Thit Nielsen
 Remerger
 – skabende ledelseskræfter i fusion og 
 opkøb
29. Carmine Gioia
 A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF 
 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
30. Ole Hinz
 Den effektive forandringsleder: pilot, 
 pædagog eller politiker?
 Et studie i arbejdslederes meningstil-
skrivninger i forbindelse med vellykket 
gennemførelse af ledelsesinitierede 
forandringsprojekter
31. Kjell-Åge Gotvassli
 Et praksisbasert perspektiv på dynami-
ske 
 læringsnettverk i toppidretten
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
32. Henriette Langstrup Nielsen
 Linking Healthcare
 An inquiry into the changing perfor-
 mances of web-based technology for 
 asthma monitoring
33. Karin Tweddell Levinsen
 Virtuel Uddannelsespraksis
 Master i IKT og Læring – et casestudie 
i hvordan proaktiv proceshåndtering 
kan forbedre praksis i virtuelle lærings-
miljøer
34. Anika Liversage
 Finding a Path
 Labour Market Life Stories of 
 Immigrant Professionals
35. Kasper Elmquist Jørgensen
 Studier i samspillet mellem stat og   
 erhvervsliv i Danmark under 
 1. verdenskrig
36. Finn Janning
 A DIFFERENT STORY
 Seduction, Conquest and Discovery
37. Patricia Ann Plackett
 Strategic Management of the Radical 
 Innovation Process
 Leveraging Social Capital for Market 
 Uncertainty Management
2006
1. Christian Vintergaard
 Early Phases of Corporate Venturing
2. Niels Rom-Poulsen
 Essays in Computational Finance
3. Tina Brandt Husman
 Organisational Capabilities, 
 Competitive Advantage & Project-
Based Organisations
 The Case of Advertising and Creative 
 Good Production
4. Mette Rosenkrands Johansen
 Practice at the top
 – how top managers mobilise and use
 non-ﬁnancial performance measures
5. Eva Parum
 Corporate governance som strategisk
 kommunikations- og ledelsesværktøj
6. Susan Aagaard Petersen
 Culture’s Inﬂuence on Performance 
 Management: The Case of a Danish 
 Company in China
7. Thomas Nicolai Pedersen
 The Discursive Constitution of Organi-
zational Governance – Between unity 
and differentiation
 The Case of the governance of 
 environmental risks by World Bank 
environmental staff
8. Cynthia Selin
 Volatile Visions: Transactons in 
 Anticipatory Knowledge
9. Jesper Banghøj
 Financial Accounting Information and  
 Compensation in Danish Companies
10. Mikkel Lucas Overby
 Strategic Alliances in Emerging High-
Tech Markets: What’s the Difference 
and does it Matter?
11. Tine Aage
 External Information Acquisition of 
 Industrial Districts and the Impact of 
 Different Knowledge Creation Dimen-
sions
 
 A case study of the Fashion and  
Design Branch of the Industrial District 
of Montebelluna, NE Italy
12. Mikkel Flyverbom
 Making the Global Information Society 
 Governable
 On the Governmentality of Multi- 
Stakeholder Networks
13. Anette Grønning
 Personen bag
 Tilstedevær i e-mail som inter-
aktionsform mellem kunde og med-
arbejder i dansk forsikringskontekst
14. Jørn Helder
 One Company – One Language?
 The NN-case
15. Lars Bjerregaard Mikkelsen
 Differing perceptions of customer 
value
 Development and application of a tool 
for mapping perceptions of customer 
value at both ends of customer-suppli-
er dyads in industrial markets
16. Lise Granerud
 Exploring Learning
 Technological learning within small 
 manufacturers in South Africa
17. Esben Rahbek Pedersen
 Between Hopes and Realities: 
 Reﬂections on the Promises and 
 Practices of Corporate Social 
 Responsibility (CSR)
18. Ramona Samson
 The Cultural Integration Model and 
 European Transformation.
 The Case of Romania
2007
1. Jakob Vestergaard
 Discipline in The Global Economy
 Panopticism and the Post-Washington 
 Consensus
2. Heidi Lund Hansen
 Spaces for learning and working
 A qualitative study of change of work, 
 management, vehicles of power and 
 social practices in open ofﬁces
3. Sudhanshu Rai
 Exploring the internal dynamics of 
software development teams during 
user analysis
 A tension enabled Institutionalization 
 Model; ”Where process becomes the 
 objective”
4. Norsk ph.d. 
 Ej til salg gennem Samfundslitteratur
5. Serden Ozcan
 EXPLORING HETEROGENEITY IN 
 ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIONS AND 
 OUTCOMES
 A Behavioural Perspective
6. Kim Sundtoft Hald
 Inter-organizational Performance 
 Measurement and Management in 
Action
 – An Ethnography on the Construction 
of Management, Identity and 
 Relationships
7. Tobias Lindeberg
 Evaluative Technologies
 Quality and the Multiplicity of 
 Performance
8. Merete Wedell-Wedellsborg
 Den globale soldat
 Identitetsdannelse og identitetsledelse 
i multinationale militære organisatio-
ner
9. Lars Frederiksen
 Open Innovation Business Models
 Innovation in ﬁrm-hosted online user 
 communities and inter-ﬁrm project 
 ventures in the music industry 
 – A collection of essays
10. Jonas Gabrielsen
 Retorisk toposlære – fra statisk ’sted’ 
til persuasiv aktivitet
11. Christian Moldt-Jørgensen
 Fra meningsløs til meningsfuld  
evaluering.
 Anvendelsen af studentertilfredsheds-
 målinger på de korte og mellemlange  
 videregående uddannelser set fra et 
 psykodynamisk systemperspektiv
12. Ping Gao
 Extending the application of 
 actor-network theory
 Cases of innovation in the tele-
 communications industry
13. Peter Mejlby
 Frihed og fængsel, en del af den 
samme drøm? 
 Et phronetisk baseret casestudie af 
 frigørelsens og kontrollens sam-
eksistens i værdibaseret ledelse! 
 
14. Kristina Birch
 Statistical Modelling in Marketing
15. Signe Poulsen
 Sense and sensibility: 
 The language of emotional appeals in 
insurance marketing
16. Anders Bjerre Trolle
 Essays on derivatives pricing and dyna-
mic asset allocation
17. Peter Feldhütter
 Empirical Studies of Bond and Credit 
Markets
18. Jens Henrik Eggert Christensen
 Default and Recovery Risk Modeling 
and Estimation
19. Maria Theresa Larsen
 Academic Enterprise: A New Mission 
for Universities or a Contradiction in 
Terms?
 Four papers on the long-term impli-
cations of increasing industry involve-
ment and commercialization in acade-
mia
20.  Morten Wellendorf
 Postimplementering af teknologi i den  
 offentlige forvaltning
 Analyser af en organisations konti-
nuerlige arbejde med informations-
teknologi
21.  Ekaterina Mhaanna
 Concept Relations for Terminological 
Process Analysis
22.  Stefan Ring Thorbjørnsen
 Forsvaret i forandring
 Et studie i ofﬁcerers kapabiliteter un-
der påvirkning af omverdenens foran-
dringspres mod øget styring og læring
23.  Christa Breum Amhøj
 Det selvskabte medlemskab om ma-
nagementstaten, dens styringstekno-
logier og indbyggere
24.  Karoline Bromose
 Between Technological Turbulence and 
Operational Stability
 – An empirical case study of corporate 
venturing in TDC
25.  Susanne Justesen
 Navigating the Paradoxes of Diversity 
in Innovation Practice
 – A Longitudinal study of six very 
 different innovation processes – in 
practice
26.  Luise Noring Henler
 Conceptualising successful supply 
chain partnerships
 – Viewing supply chain partnerships 
from an organisational culture per-
spective
27.  Mark Mau
 Kampen om telefonen
 Det danske telefonvæsen under den 
tyske besættelse 1940-45
28.  Jakob Halskov
 The semiautomatic expansion of 
existing terminological ontologies 
using knowledge patterns discovered 
on the WWW – an implementation 
and evaluation
29.  Gergana Koleva
 European Policy Instruments Beyond 
Networks and Structure: The Innova-
tive Medicines Initiative
30.  Christian Geisler Asmussen
 Global Strategy and International 
 Diversity: A Double-Edged Sword?
31.  Christina Holm-Petersen
 Stolthed og fordom
 Kultur- og identitetsarbejde ved ska-
belsen af en ny sengeafdeling gennem 
fusion
32.  Hans Peter Olsen
 Hybrid Governance of Standardized 
States
 Causes and Contours of the Global 
Regulation of Government Auditing
33.  Lars Bøge Sørensen
 Risk Management in the Supply Chain
34.  Peter Aagaard
 Det unikkes dynamikker
 De institutionelle mulighedsbetingel-
ser bag den individuelle udforskning i 
professionelt og frivilligt arbejde
35.  Yun Mi Antorini
 Brand Community Innovation
 An Intrinsic Case Study of the Adult 
Fans of LEGO Community
36.  Joachim Lynggaard Boll
 Labor Related Corporate Social Perfor-
mance in Denmark
 Organizational and Institutional Per-
spectives
2008
1. Frederik Christian Vinten
 Essays on Private Equity
2.  Jesper Clement
 Visual Inﬂuence of Packaging Design 
on In-Store Buying Decisions
3.  Marius Brostrøm Kousgaard
 Tid til kvalitetsmåling?
 – Studier af indrulleringsprocesser i 
forbindelse med introduktionen af 
kliniske kvalitetsdatabaser i speciallæ-
gepraksissektoren
4. Irene Skovgaard Smith
 Management Consulting in Action
 Value creation and ambiguity in 
 client-consultant relations
5.  Anders Rom
 Management accounting and inte-
grated information systems
 How to exploit the potential for ma-
nagement accounting of information 
technology
6.  Marina Candi
 Aesthetic Design as an Element of 
 Service Innovation in New Technology-
based Firms
7.  Morten Schnack
 Teknologi og tværfaglighed
 – en analyse af diskussionen omkring 
 indførelse af EPJ på en hospitalsafde-
ling
8. Helene Balslev Clausen
 Juntos pero no revueltos – un estudio 
sobre emigrantes norteamericanos en 
un pueblo mexicano
9. Lise Justesen
 Kunsten at skrive revisionsrapporter.
 En beretning om forvaltningsrevisio-
nens beretninger
10. Michael E. Hansen
 The politics of corporate responsibility:
 CSR and the governance of child labor 
and core labor rights in the 1990s
11. Anne Roepstorff
 Holdning for handling – en etnologisk 
undersøgelse af Virksomheders Sociale 
Ansvar/CSR
12. Claus Bajlum
 Essays on Credit Risk and 
 Credit Derivatives
13. Anders Bojesen
 The Performative Power of Competen-
ce  – an Inquiry into Subjectivity and 
Social Technologies at Work
14. Satu Reijonen
 Green and Fragile
 A Study on Markets and the Natural  
Environment
15. Ilduara Busta
 Corporate Governance in Banking
 A European Study
16. Kristian Anders Hvass
 A Boolean Analysis Predicting Industry 
Change: Innovation, Imitation & Busi-
ness Models
 The Winning Hybrid: A case study of 
isomorphism in the airline industry
17. Trine Paludan
 De uvidende og de udviklingsparate
 Identitet som mulighed og restriktion 
blandt fabriksarbejdere på det aftaylo-
riserede fabriksgulv
18. Kristian Jakobsen
 Foreign market entry in transition eco-
nomies: Entry timing and mode choice
19. Jakob Elming
 Syntactic reordering in statistical ma-
chine translation
20. Lars Brømsøe Termansen
 Regional Computable General Equili-
brium Models for Denmark
 Three papers laying the foundation for 
regional CGE models with agglomera-
tion characteristics
 
21. Mia Reinholt
 The Motivational Foundations of 
Knowledge Sharing
22.  Frederikke Krogh-Meibom
 The Co-Evolution of Institutions and 
Technology
 – A Neo-Institutional Understanding of 
Change Processes within the Business 
Press – the Case Study of Financial 
Times
23. Peter D. Ørberg Jensen
 OFFSHORING OF ADVANCED AND 
HIGH-VALUE TECHNICAL SERVICES: 
ANTECEDENTS, PROCESS DYNAMICS 
AND FIRMLEVEL IMPACTS
24. Pham Thi Song Hanh
 Functional Upgrading, Relational 
 Capability and Export Performance of 
Vietnamese Wood Furniture Producers
25. Mads Vangkilde
 Why wait?
 An Exploration of ﬁrst-mover advanta-
ges among Danish e-grocers through a 
resource perspective
26.  Hubert Buch-Hansen
 Rethinking the History of European 
Level Merger Control
 A Critical Political Economy Perspective
2009
1. Vivian Lindhardsen
 From Independent Ratings to Commu-
nal Ratings: A Study of CWA Raters’ 
Decision-Making Behaviours
2. Guðrið Weihe
 Public-Private Partnerships: Meaning 
and Practice
3. Chris Nøkkentved
 Enabling Supply Networks with Colla-
borative Information Infrastructures
 An Empirical Investigation of Business 
Model Innovation in Supplier Relation-
ship Management
4.  Sara Louise Muhr
 Wound, Interrupted – On the Vulner-
ability of Diversity Management
5. Christine Sestoft
 Forbrugeradfærd i et Stats- og Livs-
formsteoretisk perspektiv
6. Michael Pedersen
 Tune in, Breakdown, and Reboot: On 
the production of the stress-ﬁt self-
managing employee
7.  Salla Lutz
 Position and Reposition in Networks 
 – Exempliﬁed by the Transformation of 
the Danish Pine Furniture Manu-
 facturers
8. Jens Forssbæck
 Essays on market discipline in 
 commercial and central banking
9. Tine Murphy
 Sense from Silence – A Basis for Orga-
nised Action 
 How do Sensemaking Processes with 
Minimal Sharing Relate to the Repro-
duction of Organised Action?
10. Sara Malou Strandvad
 Inspirations for a new sociology of art: 
A sociomaterial study of development 
processes in the Danish ﬁlm industry
11. Nicolaas Mouton
 On the evolution of social scientiﬁc 
metaphors: 
 A cognitive-historical enquiry into the 
divergent trajectories of the idea that 
collective entities – states and societies, 
cities and corporations – are biological 
organisms.
12. Lars Andreas Knutsen
 Mobile Data Services:
 Shaping of user engagements
13. Nikolaos Theodoros Korﬁatis
 Information Exchange and Behavior
 A Multi-method Inquiry on Online 
Communities
14.  Jens Albæk
 Forestillinger om kvalitet og tværfaglig-
hed på sygehuse
 – skabelse af forestillinger i læge- og 
plejegrupperne angående relevans af 
nye idéer om kvalitetsudvikling gen-
nem tolkningsprocesser
15.  Maja Lotz
 The Business of Co-Creation – and the 
Co-Creation of Business
16. Gitte P. Jakobsen
 Narrative Construction of Leader Iden-
tity in a Leader Development Program 
Context
17. Dorte Hermansen
 ”Living the brand” som en brandorien-
teret dialogisk praxis:
 Om udvikling af medarbejdernes 
brandorienterede dømmekraft
18. Aseem Kinra
 Supply Chain (logistics) Environmental 
Complexity
19. Michael Nørager
 How to manage SMEs through the 
transformation from non innovative to 
innovative? 
20.  Kristin Wallevik
 Corporate Governance in Family Firms
 The Norwegian Maritime Sector
21. Bo Hansen Hansen
 Beyond the Process
 Enriching Software Process Improve-
ment with Knowledge Management
22. Annemette Skot-Hansen
 Franske adjektivisk aﬂedte adverbier, 
der tager præpositionssyntagmer ind-
ledt med præpositionen à som argu-
menter
 En valensgrammatisk undersøgelse
23. Line Gry Knudsen
 Collaborative R&D Capabilities
 In Search of Micro-Foundations
24. Christian Scheuer
 Employers meet employees
 Essays on sorting and globalization
25. Rasmus Johnsen
 The Great Health of Melancholy
 A Study of the Pathologies of Perfor-
mativity
26. Ha Thi Van Pham
 Internationalization, Competitiveness 
Enhancement and Export Performance 
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 Evidence from Vietnam
27. Henriette Balieu
 Kontrolbegrebets betydning for kausa-
tivalternationen i spansk
 En kognitiv-typologisk analyse
2010
1.  Yen Tran
 Organizing Innovationin Turbulent 
Fashion Market
 Four papers on how fashion ﬁrms crea-
te and appropriate innovation value
2. Anders Raastrup Kristensen
 Metaphysical Labour
 Flexibility, Performance and Commit-
ment in Work-Life Management
3. Margrét Sigrún Sigurdardottir
 Dependently independent
 Co-existence of institutional logics in 
the recorded music industry
4.  Ásta Dis Óladóttir
 Internationalization from a small do-
mestic base:
 An empirical analysis of Economics and 
Management
5.  Christine Secher
 E-deltagelse i praksis – politikernes og 
forvaltningens medkonstruktion og 
konsekvenserne heraf
6. Marianne Stang Våland
 What we talk about when we talk 
about space:
 
 End User Participation between Proces-
ses of Organizational and Architectural 
Design
7.  Rex Degnegaard
 Strategic Change Management
 Change Management Challenges in 
the Danish Police Reform
8. Ulrik Schultz Brix
 Værdi i rekruttering – den sikre beslut-
ning
 En pragmatisk analyse af perception 
og synliggørelse af værdi i rekrutte-
rings- og udvælgelsesarbejdet
9. Jan Ole Similä
 Kontraktsledelse
 Relasjonen mellom virksomhetsledelse 
og kontraktshåndtering, belyst via ﬁre 
norske virksomheter
10. Susanne Boch Waldorff
 Emerging Organizations: In between 
local translation, institutional logics 
and discourse
11. Brian Kane
 Performance Talk
 Next Generation Management of  
Organizational Performance
12. Lars Ohnemus
 Brand Thrust: Strategic Branding and 
Shareholder Value
 An Empirical Reconciliation of two 
Critical Concepts
13.  Jesper Schlamovitz
 Håndtering af usikkerhed i ﬁlm- og 
byggeprojekter
14.  Tommy Moesby-Jensen
 Det faktiske livs forbindtlighed
 Førsokratisk informeret, ny-aristotelisk 
τηθος-tænkning hos Martin Heidegger
15. Christian Fich
 Two Nations Divided by Common 
 Values
 French National Habitus and the 
 Rejection of American Power
16. Peter Beyer
 Processer, sammenhængskraft  
og ﬂeksibilitet
 Et empirisk casestudie af omstillings-
forløb i ﬁre virksomheder
17. Adam Buchhorn
 Markets of Good Intentions
 Constructing and Organizing 
 Biogas Markets Amid Fragility  
and Controversy
18. Cecilie K. Moesby-Jensen
 Social læring og fælles praksis
 Et mixed method studie, der belyser 
læringskonsekvenser af et lederkursus 
for et praksisfællesskab af offentlige 
mellemledere
19. Heidi Boye
 Fødevarer og sundhed i sen- 
modernismen
 – En indsigt i hyggefænomenet og  
de relaterede fødevarepraksisser
20. Kristine Munkgård Pedersen
 Flygtige forbindelser og midlertidige 
mobiliseringer
 Om kulturel produktion på Roskilde 
Festival
21. Oliver Jacob Weber
 Causes of Intercompany Harmony in 
Business Markets – An Empirical Inve-
stigation from a Dyad Perspective
22. Susanne Ekman
 Authority and Autonomy
 Paradoxes of Modern Knowledge 
Work
23. Anette Frey Larsen
 Kvalitetsledelse på danske hospitaler
 – Ledelsernes indﬂydelse på introduk-
tion og vedligeholdelse af kvalitetsstra-
tegier i det danske sundhedsvæsen
24.  Toyoko Sato
 Performativity and Discourse: Japanese 
Advertisements on the Aesthetic Edu-
cation of Desire
25. Kenneth Brinch Jensen
 Identifying the Last Planner System 
 Lean management in the construction 
industry
26.  Javier Busquets
 Orchestrating Network Behavior  
for Innovation
27. Luke Patey
 The Power of Resistance: India’s Na-
tional Oil Company and International 
Activism in Sudan
28. Mette Vedel
 Value Creation in Triadic Business Rela-
tionships. Interaction, Interconnection 
and Position
29.  Kristian Tørning
 Knowledge Management Systems in 
Practice – A Work Place Study
30. Qingxin Shi
 An Empirical Study of Thinking Aloud 
Usability Testing from a Cultural 
Perspective
31.  Tanja Juul Christiansen
 Corporate blogging: Medarbejderes 
kommunikative handlekraft
32.  Malgorzata Ciesielska
 Hybrid Organisations.
 A study of the Open Source – business 
setting
33. Jens Dick-Nielsen
 Three Essays on Corporate Bond  
Market Liquidity
34. Sabrina Speiermann
 Modstandens Politik
 Kampagnestyring i Velfærdsstaten. 
 En diskussion af traﬁkkampagners sty-
ringspotentiale
35. Julie Uldam
 Fickle Commitment. Fostering political 
engagement in 'the ﬂighty world of 
online activism’
36. Annegrete Juul Nielsen
 Traveling technologies and 
transformations in health care
37. Athur Mühlen-Schulte
 Organising Development
 Power and Organisational Reform in 
the United Nations Development 
 Programme
38. Louise Rygaard Jonas
 Branding på butiksgulvet
 Et case-studie af kultur- og identitets-
arbejdet i Kvickly
2011
1. Stefan Fraenkel
 Key Success Factors for Sales Force 
Readiness during New Product Launch
 A Study of Product Launches in the 
Swedish Pharmaceutical Industry
2. Christian Plesner Rossing
 International Transfer Pricing in Theory 
and Practice
3.  Tobias Dam Hede
 Samtalekunst og ledelsesdisciplin
 – en analyse af coachingsdiskursens 
genealogi og governmentality
4. Kim Pettersson
 Essays on Audit Quality, Auditor Choi-
ce, and Equity Valuation
5. Henrik Merkelsen
 The expert-lay controversy in risk 
research and management. Effects of 
institutional distances. Studies of risk 
deﬁnitions, perceptions, management 
and communication
6. Simon S. Torp
 Employee Stock Ownership: 
 Effect on Strategic Management and 
Performance
7. Mie Harder
 Internal Antecedents of Management 
Innovation
8. Ole Helby Petersen
 Public-Private Partnerships: Policy and 
Regulation – With Comparative and 
Multi-level Case Studies from Denmark 
and Ireland
9. Morten Krogh Petersen
 ’Good’ Outcomes. Handling Multipli-
city in Government Communication
10. Kristian Tangsgaard Hvelplund
 Allocation of cognitive resources in 
translation - an eye-tracking and key-
logging study
11. Moshe Yonatany
 The Internationalization Process of 
Digital Service Providers
12. Anne Vestergaard
 Distance and Suffering
 Humanitarian Discourse in the age of 
Mediatization
13. Thorsten Mikkelsen
 Personligsheds indﬂydelse på forret-
ningsrelationer
14. Jane Thostrup Jagd
 Hvorfor fortsætter fusionsbølgen ud-
over ”the tipping point”?
 – en empirisk analyse af information 
og kognitioner om fusioner
15. Gregory Gimpel
 Value-driven Adoption and Consump-
tion of Technology: Understanding 
Technology Decision Making
16. Thomas Stengade Sønderskov
 Den nye mulighed
 Social innovation i en forretningsmæs-
sig kontekst
17.  Jeppe Christoffersen
 Donor supported strategic alliances in 
developing countries
18. Vibeke Vad Baunsgaard
 Dominant Ideological Modes of  
Rationality: Cross functional 
 integration in the process of product
 innovation
19.  Throstur Olaf Sigurjonsson
 Governance Failure and Icelands’s
 Financial Collapse
20.  Allan Sall Tang Andersen
 Essays on the modeling of risks in
 interest-rate and inﬂation markets
21.  Heidi Tscherning
 Mobile Devices in Social Contexts
22.  Birgitte Gorm Hansen
 Adapting in the Knowledge Economy
  Lateral Strategies for Scientists and 
Those Who Study Them
23.  Kristina Vaarst Andersen
 Optimal Levels of Embeddedness
  The Contingent Value of Networked 
Collaboration
24.  Justine Grønbæk Pors
 Noisy Management
  A History of Danish School Governing 
from 1970-2010
25.  Stefan Linder
  Micro-foundations of Strategic  
Entrepreneurship
  Essays on Autonomous Strategic Action
26.  Xin Li
  Toward an Integrative Framework of 
National Competitiveness
 An application to China
27.  Rune Thorbjørn Clausen
 Værdifuld arkitektur 
  Et eksplorativt studie af bygningers 
rolle i virksomheders værdiskabelse
28.  Monica Viken
  Markedsundersøkelser som bevis i 
varemerke- og markedsføringsrett
29.  Christian Wymann
  Tattooing 
  The Economic and Artistic Constitution 
of a Social Phenomenon
30.  Sanne Frandsen
 Productive Incoherence 
  A Case Study of Branding and  
Identity Struggles in a Low-Prestige 
Organization
31.  Mads Stenbo Nielsen
 Essays on Correlation Modelling
32.  Ivan Häuser
 Følelse og sprog
  Etablering af en ekspressiv kategori, 
eksempliﬁceret på russisk
33.  Sebastian Schwenen
 Security of Supply in Electricity Markets
2012
1.  Peter Holm Andreasen
  The Dynamics of Procurement  
Management
 - A Complexity Approach
2.  Martin Haulrich
  Data-Driven Bitext Dependency 
 Parsing and Alignment
3.  Line Kirkegaard
  Konsulenten i den anden nat 
  En undersøgelse af det intense  
arbejdsliv
4.  Tonny Stenheim
  Decision usefulness of goodwill  
under IFRS
5.  Morten Lind Larsen
  Produktivitet, vækst og velfærd
  Industrirådet og efterkrigstidens  
Danmark 1945 - 1958
6.  Petter Berg
  Cartel Damages and Cost Asymmetries 
7.  Lynn Kahle
 Experiential Discourse in Marketing 
  A methodical inquiry into practice  
and theory
8.  Anne Roelsgaard Obling
  Management of Emotions  
in Accelerated Medical Relationships
9.  Thomas Frandsen
  Managing Modularity of  
Service Processes Architecture
10.  Carina Christine Skovmøller
  CSR som noget særligt
  Et casestudie om styring og menings-
skabelse i relation til CSR ud fra en 
intern optik
11.  Michael Tell
  Fradragsbeskæring af selskabers  
ﬁnansieringsudgifter
  En skatteretlig analyse af SEL §§ 11, 
11B og 11C
12.  Morten Holm
  Customer Proﬁtability Measurement 
Models
  Their Merits and Sophistication  
across Contexts
13.  Katja Joo Dyppel
  Beskatning af derivater 
 En analyse af dansk skatteret
14.  Esben Anton Schultz
  Essays in Labor Economics 
 Evidence from Danish Micro Data
15.  Carina Risvig Hansen
  ”Contracts not covered, or not fully 
covered, by the Public Sector Directive”
16.  Anja Svejgaard Pors
 Iværksættelse af kommunikation
  - patientﬁgurer i hospitalets strategiske 
kommunikation
17.  Frans Bévort
  Making sense of management with 
logics
  An ethnographic study of accountants 
who become managers
18.  René Kallestrup
  The Dynamics of Bank and Sovereign 
Credit Risk
19.  Brett Crawford
  Revisiting the Phenomenon of Interests 
in Organizational Institutionalism
  The Case of U.S. Chambers of  
Commerce
20.  Mario Daniele Amore
  Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance
21.  Arne Stjernholm Madsen
  The evolution of innovation strategy 
  Studied in the context of medical 
device activities at the pharmaceutical 
company Novo Nordisk A/S in the 
period 1980-2008
22.  Jacob Holm Hansen
  Is Social Integration Necessary for  
Corporate Branding?
  A study of corporate branding  
strategies at Novo Nordisk
23.  Stuart Webber
  Corporate Proﬁt Shifting and the  
Multinational Enterprise
24.  Helene Ratner
  Promises of Reﬂexivity
  Managing and Researching  
Inclusive Schools
25.  Therese Strand
  The Owners and the Power: Insights 
from Annual General Meetings
26.  Robert Gavin Strand
  In Praise of Corporate Social  
Responsibility Bureaucracy
27.  Nina Sormunen
 Auditor’s going-concern reporting
  Reporting decision and content of the 
report
28.  John Bang Mathiasen
  Learning within a product development 
working practice:
  - an understanding anchored  
in pragmatism
29.  Philip Holst Riis
  Understanding Role-Oriented Enterprise 
Systems: From Vendors to Customers
30.  Marie Lisa Dacanay
 Social Enterprises and the Poor 
  Enhancing Social Entrepreneurship and 
Stakeholder Theory
31.  Fumiko Kano Glückstad
  Bridging Remote Cultures: Cross-lingual 
concept mapping based on the  
information receiver’s prior-knowledge
32.  Henrik Barslund Fosse
  Empirical Essays in International Trade
33.  Peter Alexander Albrecht
  Foundational hybridity and its  
reproduction 
 Security sector reform in Sierra Leone
34.  Maja Rosenstock
 CSR  - hvor svært kan det være? 
  Kulturanalytisk casestudie om  
udfordringer og dilemmaer med at 
forankre Coops CSR-strategi
35.  Jeanette Rasmussen
 Tweens, medier og forbrug
  Et studie af 10-12 årige danske børns 
brug af internettet, opfattelse og for-
ståelse af markedsføring og forbrug
36.  Ib Tunby Gulbrandsen
  ‘This page is not intended for a  
US Audience’
  A ﬁve-act spectacle on online  
communication, collaboration  
& organization.
37.  Kasper Aalling Teilmann
  Interactive Approaches to  
Rural Development
38.  Mette Mogensen
  The Organization(s) of Well-being  
and Productivity
  (Re)assembling work in the Danish Post
39.  Søren Friis Møller
  From Disinterestedness to Engagement 
  Towards Relational Leadership In the 
Cultural Sector
40.  Nico Peter Berhausen
  Management Control, Innovation and 
Strategic Objectives – Interactions and 
Convergence in Product Development 
Networks
41.  Balder Onarheim
 Creativity under Constraints
  Creativity as Balancing  
‘Constrainedness’
42.  Haoyong Zhou
 Essays on Family Firms
43.  Elisabeth Naima Mikkelsen
 Making sense of organisational conﬂict
  An empirical study of enacted sense-
making in everyday conﬂict at work
2013
1.  Jacob Lyngsie
  Entrepreneurship in an Organizational 
Context
2.  Signe Groth-Brodersen
 Fra ledelse til selvet
  En socialpsykologisk analyse af  
forholdet imellem selvledelse, ledelse 
og stress i det moderne arbejdsliv
3.  Nis Høyrup Christensen
  Shaping Markets: A Neoinstitutional 
Analysis of the Emerging  
Organizational Field of Renewable 
Energy in China
4.  Christian Edelvold Berg
 As a matter of size 
  THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL  
MASS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
SCARCITY FOR TELEVISION MARKETS 
5.  Christine D. Isakson
  Coworker Inﬂuence and Labor Mobility  
Essays on Turnover, Entrepreneurship 
and Location Choice in the Danish 
Maritime Industry
6.  Niels Joseph Jerne Lennon
  Accounting Qualities in Practice  
Rhizomatic stories of representational 
faithfulness, decision making and  
control
7.  Shannon O’Donnell
 Making Ensemble Possible
  How special groups organize for  
collaborative creativity in conditions  
of spatial variability and distance
8.  Robert W. D. Veitch
  Access Decisions in a  
Partly-Digital World 
Comparing Digital Piracy and Legal 
Modes for Film and Music
9.  Marie Mathiesen
 Making Strategy Work 
 An Organizational Ethnography
10.  Arisa Shollo
 The role of business intelligence in   
 organizational decision-making 
11.  Mia Kaspersen
  The construction of social and  
environmental reporting
12. Marcus Møller Larsen
 The organizational design of offshoring
13. Mette Ohm Rørdam
 EU Law on Food Naming
 The prohibition against misleading   
 names in an internal market context
14. Hans Peter Rasmussen 
 GIV EN GED!
 Kan giver-idealtyper forklare støtte 
 til velgørenhed og understøtte 
 relationsopbygning?
15. Ruben Schachtenhaufen 
 Fonetisk reduktion i dansk
16. Peter Koerver Schmidt
 Dansk CFC-beskatning
  I et internationalt og komparativt  
perspektiv
17. Morten Froholdt
 Strategi i den offentlige sektor 
 En kortlægning af styringsmæssig   
 kontekst, strategisk tilgang, samt 
 anvendte redskaber og teknologier for  
 udvalgte danske statslige styrelser
18. Annette Camilla Sjørup
 Cognitive effort in metaphor translation
 An eye-tracking and key-logging study
19. Tamara Stucchi
  The Internationalization  
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 A Context-Speciﬁc Study
20. Thomas Lopdrup-Hjorth
 “Let’s Go Outside”:
 The Value of Co-Creation
21. Ana Alaovska
 Genre and Autonomy in Cultural 
 Production
 The case of travel guidebook 
 production
22. Marius Gudmand-Høyer
  Stemningssindssygdommenes historie  
i det 19. århundrede
  Omtydningen af melankolien og 
manien som bipolære stemningslidelser 
i dansk sammenhæng under hensyn til 
dannelsen af det moderne følelseslivs 
relative autonomi. 
  En problematiserings- og erfarings-
analytisk undersøgelse
23. Lichen Alex Yu
 Fabricating an S&OP Process
  Circulating References and Matters  
of Concern
24. Esben Alfort
 The Expression of a Need
 Understanding search
25. Trine Pallesen
 Assembling Markets for Wind Power  
 An Inquiry into the Making of 
 Market Devices
26. Anders Koed Madsen
 Web-Visions
 Repurposing digital traces to organize  
 social attention
27. Lærke Højgaard Christiansen
 BREWING ORGANIZATIONAL 
 RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS
28. Tommy Kjær Lassen
 EGENTLIG SELVLEDELSE
  En ledelsesﬁlosoﬁsk afhandling om 
selvledelsens paradoksale dynamik og 
eksistentielle engagement
29. Morten Rossing
 Local Adaption and Meaning Creation  
 in Performance Appraisal
30. Søren Obed Madsen
 Lederen som oversætter
 Et oversættelsesteoretisk perspektiv 
 på strategisk arbejde
31. Thomas Høgenhaven
 Open Government Communities
 Does Design Affect Participation?
32. Kirstine Zinck Pedersen 
 Failsafe Organizing? 
 A Pragmatic Stance on Patient Safety
33. Anne Petersen
 Hverdagslogikker i psykiatrisk arbejde
 En institutionsetnograﬁsk undersøgelse  
 af hverdagen i psykiatriske 
 organisationer
34. Didde Maria Humle
 Fortællinger om arbejde
35. Mark Holst-Mikkelsen
 Strategieksekvering i praksis 
 – barrierer og muligheder! 
36. Malek Maalouf
 Sustaining lean
 Strategies for dealing with
 organizational paradoxes
37. Nicolaj Tofte Brenneche
 Systemic Innovation In The Making
 The Social Productivity of 
 Cartographic Crisis and Transitions 
 in the Case of SEEIT
38. Morten Gylling
 The Structure of Discourse
 A Corpus-Based Cross-Linguistic Study
39. Binzhang YANG
 Urban Green Spaces for Quality Life
  - Case Study: the landscape  
architecture for people in Copenhagen
40. Michael Friis Pedersen
 Finance and Organization:  
 The Implications for Whole Farm 
 Risk Management
41. Even Fallan
 Issues on supply and demand for 
 environmental accounting information
42. Ather Nawaz
 Website user experience
 A cross-cultural study of the relation  
 between users´ cognitive style, context  
 of use, and information architecture 
 of local websites
43. Karin Beukel
 The Determinants for Creating 
 Valuable Inventions
44. Arjan Markus
 External Knowledge Sourcing 
 and Firm Innovation 
 Essays on the Micro-Foundations 
 of Firms’ Search for Innovation
2014
1.  Solon Moreira
  Four Essays on Technology Licensing 
and Firm Innovation
2.  Karin Strzeletz Ivertsen
 Partnership Drift in Innovation 
 Processes
 A study of the Think City electric 
 car development
3.  Kathrine Hoffmann Pii
 Responsibility Flows in Patient-centred  
 Prevention
4.  Jane Bjørn Vedel
 Managing Strategic Research
 An empirical analysis of 
 science-industry collaboration in a   
 pharmaceutical company
5.  Martin Gylling
 Processuel strategi i organisationer   
 Monograﬁ om dobbeltheden i 
 tænkning af strategi, dels som 
 vidensfelt i organisationsteori, dels 
 som kunstnerisk tilgang til at skabe 
 i erhvervsmæssig innovation
6.  Linne Marie Lauesen
 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 in the Water Sector: 
 How Material Practices and their 
 Symbolic and Physical Meanings Form 
 a Colonising Logic
7.  Maggie Qiuzhu Mei
 LEARNING TO INNOVATE: 
 The role of ambidexterity, standard,  
 and decision process
8.  Inger Høedt-Rasmussen
 Developing Identity for Lawyers
 Towards Sustainable Lawyering
9.  Sebastian Fux
 Essays on Return Predictability and   
 Term Structure Modelling
10.  Thorbjørn N. M. Lund-Poulsen
 Essays on Value Based Management
11.  Oana Brindusa Albu
 Transparency in Organizing: 
 A Performative Approach
12.  Lena Olaison
 Entrepreneurship at the limits
13.  Hanne Sørum
 DRESSED FOR WEB SUCCESS?
  An Empirical Study of Website Quality 
in the Public Sector
14.  Lasse Folke Henriksen
 Knowing networks
 How experts shape transnational 
 governance
15.  Maria Halbinger
 Entrepreneurial Individuals
 Empirical Investigations into 
 Entrepreneurial Activities of 
 Hackers and Makers
16.  Robert Spliid
 Kapitalfondenes metoder 
 og kompetencer
17.  Christiane Stelling
 Public-private partnerships & the need,  
 development and management 
 of trusting 
 A processual and embedded 
 exploration
18.  Marta Gasparin
 Management of design as a translation  
 process
19.  Kåre Moberg
 Assessing the Impact of 
 Entrepreneurship Education
 From ABC to PhD
20.  Alexander Cole
 Distant neighbors
 Collective learning beyond the cluster
21.  Martin Møller Boje Rasmussen
 Is Competitiveness a Question of 
 Being Alike?
 How the United Kingdom, Germany  
 and Denmark Came to Compete   
 through their Knowledge Regimes 
 from 1993 to 2007
22.  Anders Ravn Sørensen
 Studies in central bank legitimacy, 
 currency and national identity
 Four cases from Danish monetary 
 history
23.  Nina Bellak
  Can Language be Managed in  
International Business?
 Insights into Language Choice from a  
 Case Study of Danish and Austrian  
 Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
24.  Rikke Kristine Nielsen
 Global Mindset as Managerial 
 Meta-competence and Organizational  
 Capability: Boundary-crossing 
 Leadership Cooperation in the MNC
  The Case of ‘Group Mindset’ in 
 Solar A/S.
25.  Rasmus Koss Hartmann
 User Innovation inside government  
 Towards a critically performative 
 foundation for inquiry
26.  Kristian Gylling Olesen
  Flertydig og emergerende ledelse i 
folkeskolen 
  Et aktør-netværksteoretisk ledelses-
studie af politiske evalueringsreformers 
betydning for ledelse i den danske 
folkeskole
27.  Troels Riis Larsen
  Kampen om Danmarks omdømme 
1945-2010
 Omdømmearbejde og omdømmepolitik
28.  Klaus Majgaard
  Jagten på autenticitet i offentlig styring
29.  Ming Hua Li
 Institutional Transition and
 Organizational Diversity:
 Differentiated internationalization
 strategies of emerging market 
 state-owned enterprises
TITLER I ATV PH.D.-SERIEN
1992
1.  Niels Kornum
  Servicesamkørsel – organisation, øko-
nomi og planlægningsmetode
1995
2.  Verner Worm
 Nordiske virksomheder i Kina
 Kulturspeciﬁkke interaktionsrelationer
 ved nordiske virksomhedsetableringer i
 Kina
1999
3.  Mogens Bjerre
 Key Account Management of Complex
 Strategic Relationships
 An Empirical Study of the Fast Moving
 Consumer Goods Industry
2000
4.  Lotte Darsø
 Innovation in the Making
  Interaction Research with heteroge-
neous Groups of Knowledge Workers
 creating new Knowledge and new
 Leads
2001
5.  Peter Hobolt Jensen
 Managing Strategic Design Identities
  The case of the Lego Developer Net-
work
2002
6.  Peter Lohmann
 The Deleuzian Other of Organizational
 Change – Moving Perspectives of the
 Human
7.  Anne Marie Jess Hansen
 To lead from a distance: The dynamic
  interplay between strategy and strate-
gizing – A case study of the strategic
 management process
2003
8.  Lotte Henriksen
 Videndeling
  – om organisatoriske og ledelsesmæs-
sige udfordringer ved videndeling i
 praksis
9.  Niels Christian Nickelsen
  Arrangements of Knowing: Coordi-
nating Procedures Tools and Bodies in
 Industrial Production – a case study of
 the collective making of new products
2005
10.  Carsten Ørts Hansen
  Konstruktion af ledelsesteknologier og
 effektivitet
TITLER I DBA PH.D.-SERIEN
2007
1.  Peter Kastrup-Misir
 Endeavoring to Understand Market
 Orientation – and the concomitant
 co-mutation of the researched, the
 re searcher, the research itself and the
 truth
2009
1.  Torkild Leo Thellefsen
  Fundamental Signs and Signiﬁcance 
effects
 A Semeiotic outline of Fundamental
 Signs, Signiﬁcance-effects, Knowledge
 Proﬁling and their use in Knowledge
 Organization and Branding
2.  Daniel Ronzani
 When Bits Learn to Walk Don’t Make
 Them Trip. Technological Innovation
 and the Role of Regulation by Law
 in Information Systems Research: the
 Case of Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation
 (RFID)
2010
1.  Alexander Carnera
 Magten over livet og livet som magt
 Studier i den biopolitiske ambivalens
